


# Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter



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
## A NOTE FROM THE EDITOR

This issue includes, in addition to our regular reviews, two thought-provoking articles. The first, by the significant Hungarian writer András Nagy, is a fascinating look at the role Kierkegaard has played in Hungarian cultural life. I thought the story was gripping and I welcome the chance to share it with my readers. The other article is a piece from Marilyn Piety, a graduate student who is doing research in Copenhagen, protesting the decision of the Danish periodical Kierkegardiana to restrict publication to "world languages" and thus to

exclude Danish. I am also including a letter of reply by Arne Grøn on behalf of the editors of Kierkegardiana, which I was expressly asked to publish in Danish.

It goes without saying that the opinions expressed are those of the authors and not this editor. My purpose in publishing the two is to stimulate some serious thinking about the question, "How important is it to read Kierkegaard in Danish?" Brief letters or responses to this question are welcomed.

# NEWS YOU SHOULD NOTE



## KIERKEGAARD SOCIETY NEWS

The Kierkegaard Society continues to grow. An election was recently held by mail. Nominated for President, M. Jamie Ferreira of the University of Virginia; for Vice-President, Andrew Burgess of the University of New Mexico; for Secretary-Treasurer, Mark Lloyd Taylor of Seattle Pacific University; and as Members-at-Large of the Executive Committee, Stephen Crites of Wesleyan University (AAR) and Merold Westphal of Fordham University (APA). New members should send \$5 dues to Mark Lloyd Taylor, School of Religion, Seattle Pacific University, Seattle, WA 98119. Taylor will be glad to send members a print-out of the membership list of the Society for \$.50 to cover photocopying and mailing costs. Upcoming meetings of the Society are detailed below.

## UPCOMING MEETINGS

### 1991 Meeting of Kierkegaard Society at the AAR Annual Meeting in Kansas City

The Kierkegaard Society will meet in conjunction with the American Academy of Religion Annual Meeting in Kansas City, Missouri, on Friday evening, November 22, 1991. Those interested are invited to meet for dinner at 6:00 p.m.; consult the bulletin board near the AAR registration desk under "K" for the location. The program will be from 7:30 to 10:30 p.m. in the McShann Room A in the Allis Plaza Hotel, and it will focus on The Concept of Irony. Papers and responses are as follows: Robert L. Perkins, Stetson University, "'What a Hegelian Fool I Was': The Influence of Hegel in Kierkegaard's Dissertation, with a response by Vincent McCarthy, St. Joseph's University; Vanessa Rumble, Boston College, "Socrates Unbound: Irony and Personality in Kierkegaard's Begrebet Ironi, with a response by Stephen Crites, Wesleyan University; Mark Lloyd Taylor, Seattle Pacific University, "Kierkegaard and the Sexual Politics of Irony," with a response by Sylvia Walsh, Stetson University.

### Meeting of Kierkegaard Society at 1991 Eastern Division APA Meeting

The Kierkegaard Society will meet in conjunction with the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in New York, December 27-30, 1991. The precise time and place of the meeting is not yet known but will be included in the program published by the APA under the "Associated Groups" section. The program is as follows: Robert R. Williams, Hiram College, "Morality and God: Kierkegaard's Teleological Suspension of the Ethical," and Martin J. Matustik, Purdue University, "Habermas' Reading of Kierkegaard: The Possibility of a Communicative and Existential Ethic."

### Meeting of Kierkegaard Society at 1992 Pacific Division APA Meeting

The Pacific Division of the APA, meeting in Seattle March 25-28, 1992, will also include a meeting of the Kierkegaard Society, arranged by John Donnelly of the University of San Diego. Time and place of the meeting will be included in the APA Pacific Division Program. The chair of the meeting will be John Donnelly. Philip L. Quinn, University of Notre Dame, will speak on "Divine Command Ethics and Kierkegaard's Works of Love," with a response by Martin Andic, University of Massachusetts, Boston; Andrew Cross, University of California, Berkeley, will speak on "Conflicts of Agency, Conflicts of

Assessment: Fear and Trembling's Other Moral Dilemma," with a response by Edward F. Mooney, Sonoma State University.

### Kierkegaard Consultation at the Annual Meeting of AAR/SE in Atlanta

The Southeastern Regional Meeting of the American Academy of Religion will include a Kierkegaard Consultation. This meeting will take place in Atlanta, Georgia, the weekend of March 21, 1992, at the downtown Hilton Hotel. Exact information about the time and place of the meeting can be obtained later from Ronald L. Hall, Francis Marion College, Box F7500, Florence, SC 29501-0056. The meeting will be chaired by Hall, and includes four papers (no commentators): David Cain, Mary Washington College, "Faiths and Repetitions"; Ron Hustwit, College of Wooster, "What Bouwsma Found in Kierkegaard"; C. Stephen Evans, St. Olaf College, "Offense and Apologetics in Philosophical Fragments"; and J. Norris Beam, University of Tampa, "Kierkegaard and the Holocaust."

### PUBLICATION NEWS

#### Kierkegaard's Writings

Practice in Christianity will be published by Princeton University Press in November, 1991. Concluding Unscientific Postscript is in page-proof stage and is scheduled for publication in two volumes early in 1992.

#### International Kierkegaard Commentary News

Robert Perkins is still open to receiving articles about Philosophical Fragments until the end of 1991. Articles about Either/Or are still being sought and should be submitted by June 1, 1992. Potential contributors should write to Perkins, Department of Philosophy, Stetson University, DeLand, FL 32720, and request a copy of the instructions for manuscript preparation and sigla. Mercer University Press now requires that accepted articles be submitted on computer disk as well as hard copy. It now appears that Fear and Trembling and Repetition articles will be published in a single volume that should appear by the summer of 1992.

### OTHER NEWS

#### Possibility of a Reprint of Samlede Værker First Edition

Julia Watkin of Copenhagen recently wrote to me and asked me to inquire about interest in the United States in a facsimile reprint of the first edition of Kierkegaard's Samlede Værker. This edition is now hard to come by and quite expensive. It has several advantages for scholarly work. It is more accurate than the third edition, which is currently in print, and it is not in Gothic type, as is the second edition. The pagination of this edition is also included in the margins of the Princeton edition of Kierkegaard's Writings, and is also used for references in the Papirer. Julia therefore thinks that a reprint of this edition might be quite useful and she has a set she might be willing to sacrifice for this purpose. She would welcome any suggestions as to whether and how it might be possible to get a publisher to take this project on. If you have any ideas or wish to just register enthusiasm for the project, you may write to her at Stenagervej 15, 2900 Hellerup, Denmark.

## Martinez Appointed as Philosophy Chair at Spelman College

In accordance with the policy announced last time of including news of appointments of Kierkegaard scholars, I am pleased to say that Roy Martinez has been appointed Chair of the Philosophy Department at Spelman College in Atlanta, Georgia.

## Corrections to Kisiel Review of Bigelow Book

I am sorry to report that an egregious number of typographical errors crept into the review published in the last issue of this Newsletter (#23) by Theodore Kisiel of Patrick Bigelow's The Conning, the Cunning of Being. Please note the following corrections in your copy (corrections underlined):

Line 17 of first paragraph (page 8): Should read "and subterfuges, ever withdrawing and enfolding into ever deeper"

Line 11 of second column on p. 8: Delete words "of the language"

Line 17 of first column on p. 9: Change "interested" to "interesting"

Line 30 (first line of last paragraph on p. 9): Punctuation after "parody" should be question mark, not colon.

My sincere apologies to Professor Kisiel for these mistakes that marred an excellent review.

## Computer Editions of Kierkegaard

Many readers may already know that a new, simpler and "friendly" version of the McKinnon-prepared version of Kierkegaard's Samlede Værker is now available from InteLex Corporation, P.O. Box 1827, Clayton, Georgia 30525-1827 (USA). The price is \$199.95 for individuals and \$499.95 for institutions. Also, a new "as-is" version of the A Papirer is available from Inter Editions, 3005 Barat Road, Montreal, Canada H3Y 2H4. A price for the latter has not yet been set, but it is anticipated to be around \$500.

## REVIEWS

Birgit Bertung. *Om Kierkegaard Kvinder og Kærlighed* (Copenhagen: C. A. Rietzels Forlag, 1987) 100 pages. Reviewed by Marilyn Piety (McGill University and Copenhagen University)

The argument of this book is that, contrary to the views of many recent Kierkegaard interpreters, Kierkegaard was not a sexist thinker. Bertung maintains that while there are many apparently sexist remarks in Kierkegaard's works, these remarks should be appreciated in the context of his views concerning the nature of communication and hence interpreted as a provocation to women to throw off the unauthentic form of existence which the prevailing social conventions encouraged them to adopt.

Bertung begins by examining Kierkegaard's dialectic of communication. An understanding of this dialectic is, she maintains, essential for understanding Kierkegaard's views on any more specific subject such as the one with which the book is concerned. That is, she explains that Kierkegaard does not think it was possible to communicate truths about existence or actuality directly and that hence "[w]hat is essential in the dialectic of communication," according to Bertung, is that "the individual [reader] is forced, by being presented with abstract statements or claims, to think for himself/herself and to react concretely or 'actually'" (p. 16). This involvement of the reader with the text is accomplished, she explains, by confronting him/her with contradictions. The assumption is that the reader cannot simply accept these contradictions, but that they demand some kind of reaction. That is, contradictory claims cannot both be true; hence when confronted with such claims, the reader is forced to decide which, if either, is correct.

Contradictory statements concerning women are particularly numerous, according to Bertung. She takes, as her point of departure, the following quotations: "Woman is characterized by more anxiety than man...The size of anxiety is a prophecy of the wonder of perfection" (Pap. V B 52: 23) and "the real fury against the ideal proceeds from family life, from the lioness, or, to say it another way--and it is sometimes true--from the sow to her young" (JP 2, 1823/Pap. XI, 2 A 271).

The first of these statements concerns what one might refer to as Kierkegaard's anthropology. Bertung claims that this anthropology is "the hermeneutic key to

the understanding of his entire philosophy of existence and thus also to what may possibly have a special relation to 'women'" (p. 21), hence the second chapter of the book addresses the issue of Kierkegaard's "Anthropology and Dogmatic" (pp. 21-29). This chapter is concerned primarily with that anthropology as it is expressed in *The Sickness Unto Death* and specifically with what Kierkegaard identifies there as "masculine" and "feminine" forms of despair (SUD, 49/SV XI, 162). A human being, according to Kierkegaard, is a synthesis of "the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity" (SUD, 13/SV XI, 127). Bertung observes, however, that a human being is not in an immediate sense a self, but that these contradictory elements of which the individual is comprised must be properly related to one another.

Bertung is concerned with what Kierkegaard characterizes as two quite specific ways in which an individual can fail to realize the proper relation of the elements of which he or she is comprised. That is, an individual can, in despair not will to be him/herself, which is identified as the "despair of weakness" or "feminine despair," or he/she can in despair will to be him/herself and this is identified as the despair of "defiance" or "masculine despair." Bertung observes that this can, at first glance, appear to be merely a repetition of the old cliché concerning the weakness of women relative to men. She continues, however, that it is important to appreciate that Kierkegaard uses the formulations "masculine" and "feminine despair" rather than "men's" and "women's despair," and that he acknowledges that it is possible for women to experience "masculine despair" and vice versa. That is, Bertung argues that when Kierkegaard uses the adjective "feminine" to denote what he also refers to as the "despair of weakness" he is not saying that all women are weak or that all women are weak relative to men, in the way that it can be said of all ducks that they have webbed feet. He is not speaking about a weakness which is *necessarily* characteristic of women, but rather about what he believes to be an historically contingent actuality that more women than men can be characterized in this way.

Bertung also observes that Kierkegaard describes the essence of women as "devotedness" ["*Hengivelse*] (SUD, 50 n./SV XI, 162 n.). She argues, however, that this refers to woman *qua* sex or to the role of woman in sexual intercourse and procreation and continues that Kierkegaard argues that "[i]n relation to God, where such a difference between man-woman disappears, the same thing is valid for the man as for the women, that devotion is the self and that in the giving of oneself the self is attained" (SUD, 50/SV XI, 163).

The third chapter is entitled "Psychology and Freedom" (pp. 30-42). This chapter represents a continuation of the project of articulating Kierkegaard's anthropology. Bertung examines here Kierkegaard's claim in *The Concept of Anxiety* that women are more sensuous or are characterized by more anxiety than men. This claim, observes Bertung, concerns women's "physical structure" ["*legemlig Organisation*"] (CA, 64/SV IV, 334) and not some kind of physiological or psychological shortcoming which women have relative to men. That is, while both women and men come under the determination of necessity (i.e., of certain biological processes or physical instincts) in sexual intercourse, women come under this determination once again in the act of giving birth. Bertung argues, however, that this does not mean that women are in any way inferior to men, for Kierkegaard claims that "[t]he size of anxiety is a prophecy of the wonder of perfection."

Bertung also argues here that many Kierkegaard scholars have misinterpreted his remarks about the relation between sin and sexuality and have mistakenly concluded that a normal sexual life was something to which he was opposed and hence that he disliked women because of their sexuality or because of the temptation they represented for men. According to Kierkegaard, "[t]he sexual as such is not the sinful" (SUD, 68/SV IV, 337), observes Bertung. Sin, she continues, is "an inner dividedness" (p. 34) or a double-mindedness which infects the individual at a more fundamental level and keeps the individual from properly integrating sexuality into his or her personality ('personality' is being used here in the technical sense of fully developed self). The task of the individual, according to Kierkegaard, is not to destroy or even to abstract from sexuality, "[t]he task, of course, is to bring it under the qualification of the spirit" (SUD, 80/SV IV, 349).

I am going to skip over the fourth and fifth chapters which are devoted to the "stages" of existence and the various claims made about women from the

perspectives of individual stages, and the concepts of "love" and "marriage," because it is the sixth chapter which is perhaps the most important of the entire work and which provides a possible key to understanding not merely the claims made about women in Kierkegaard's various pseudonymous works, but to understanding many of Kierkegaard's other views as well. This chapter is entitled "The relative and the absolute in the concept woman" (pp. 62-74) and it identifies what may very well be the central reason that scholars have often, in the view of the author, mistakenly interpreted Kierkegaard's philosophy as sexist. That is, it examines the confusion between what are probably best identified as essential and accidental characteristics (Bertung does not, however, use these expressions).

According to Kierkegaard, although there is an obvious and important physical difference between men and women, there is, again, no difference between them "in spirit", and this, according to Bertung, is what is essential. Much of what Kierkegaard says about women, she argues, concerns what is *accidentally* characteristic of them, what they have made of themselves or allowed themselves to become, and not what is *essentially* characteristic of them or what they could and should be and if one fails to appreciate this, she continues, "there is no limit to what one could read out of the [i.e., Kierkegaard's] various texts" (p. 63). Bertung argues that many of Kierkegaard's negative remarks about women are of the same sort as many of the negative remarks about priests, that is, that they are the result of empirical observation, of what women (or priests) tend actually to be like and not what they can and should be like, ideally. (There are, of course, many people who fail to appreciate the essence of Kierkegaard's criticism of priests and these people will, unfortunately, not be helped by the comparison.)

Chapter seven is entitled "Conclusion Concerning Kierkegaard's Attack upon Women" (pp. 75-91). This chapter recapitulates the arguments presented in the previous chapters. Bertung reiterates that the attack on women is of the same sort as the attack upon the church, that is, it is not an attack on what women are in essence, but what they tend to let themselves become. According to Bertung's argument, Kierkegaard accuses women of allowing themselves to become appendages to men and procreative machines and that if this is properly understood, then it becomes clear that "[w]hat he did was not to devalue woman, but on the contrary indirectly to try to get her upgraded as equal to, but different from, man" (p. 78).

Chapter eight (pp. 79-91) is a comparison of Kierkegaard's views on women with those of two Danish authors Karen Blixen and Suzanne Brøgger and chapter nine, entitled "The Contemporary Perspective" (pp. 92-98) represents an attempt to develop what Bertung believes are the social and economic consequences of Kierkegaard's views on women as she interprets them.

While the basic arguments of the book are convincing, they are not without difficulties. One of these difficulties is that some of the negative remarks about women come from Kierkegaard's journals rather than from published works. This makes the claim that such remarks should not be taken at face value but rather viewed as attempts at indirect communication more problematic. It is possible, of course, to argue that Kierkegaard knew that his journals would one day be published, but I believe a stronger case can be made from Bertung's own observation that Kierkegaard was not a "systematic" thinker on the order of Aristotle or Hegel. That is, Kierkegaard was concerned primarily with *prescription* and not *description*, hence it is reasonable to assume that however disappointed he may have been with women as a group, he would not have wanted to locate a cause for what he may have interpreted as their failure to achieve authentic selfhood in some a priori limitation upon their potential for such selfhood. When Kierkegaard says that in actuality women, more often than not, only relate themselves to God through their husbands, he is not, argues Bertung, making a statement concerning what is necessarily true of women on the order of "all ducks have webbed feet" (p.27); he is rather observing what happens, accidentally or contingently, to be true of a great number of women. The same thing can be said, of course, with respect to the remark about mothers with which Bertung begins her book. That is, "family life," does not represent a threat to the ideal for Kierkegaard in the way that it represents a threat to socialism for Marx; it comes contingently to represent a threat because society, or Christendom, has made it an end in itself [i.e., "*Livets Alvor*"] (SV 19, 179). A mother is not *essentially* a "lioness" or "a sow," but a woman can contingently come to fit such a characterization.

One of the biggest difficulties with the book, however, is not the result of any fault of Bertung's but is rather the result of a substantial ambiguity in the definition of sexism. To address properly the issue of whether Kierkegaard was sexist it is necessary to have a relatively well defined idea of what sexism is and this is something that, unfortunately, we do not appear to have. Some would consider that any claim that there are

fundamental differences in the way men and women think is sexist. If we could establish that Kierkegaard's remark that women lack "both the egoistical concept of the self" that characterizes men, "and, in a decisive sense, intellectuality," (SUD, 49 n./SV XI, 162 n.) was not merely polemical, but was an essential part of his "anthropology," then it would appear that on the view of at least some, Kierkegaard would be sexist.

Not all opponents of sexism, however, accept this view. Many argue that there *are* fundamental intellectual differences between men and women, but that these differences actually complement each other and do not mean that women are in any way inferior to men. Many militant feminists also accept the claim that women do not possess intellectuality in the sense in which men employ this expression. They argue, however, that women possess an intellectuality or rationality which is actually *superior* to "male rationality," which, they contend, is characterized by an excess of aggression or the desire to control or to dominate.

Bertung argues convincingly that there is no foundation in Kierkegaard's philosophy for the view that women are inherently less valuable than men. But because of the aforementioned ambiguity in the definition of sexism, this does not definitively answer the question of whether Kierkegaard was sexist.

It might finally be objected that whatever arguments one might make in defence of Kierkegaard's philosophy, there is evidence in his journals, as well as in anecdotes involving Kierkegaard collected from people who knew him, that he was personally sexist. That is, however egalitarian his philosophy may have been, it is still possible that Kierkegaard was not inclined to listen to women as carefully as to men or to take their views as seriously. However unfortunate this may be if it is true, it is not an issue which is of any concern to scholars.

There are a number of small problems with Bertung's book, such as an oversimplification of the foundation of Kierkegaard's views concerning the necessity of indirect communication, which can be distracting. These difficulties should not, however, distract the reader from appreciating the merits of the book. The basic arguments are convincing; hence it represents an admirable defence of Kierkegaard's thought against the charge that it was sexist that is well worth reading.

Arnold B. Come, Trendelenburg's Influence on Kierkegaard's Modal Categories (Montreal: Inter Editions, 1991) ix and 95 pages. Available for \$13.00 plus postage from Inter Editions, 3005 Barat Road, Montreal, Canada H3Y 2H4. Reviewed by George Connell, Concordia College - Moorhead, Minnesota.

Though scores of books and reams of articles have been written tabulating Kierkegaard's supposed debts to all manner of philosophers, theologians, and literary figures, almost nothing has been said, here or abroad, about one of the debts he openly avows: "There is no modern philosopher from whom I have profited so much as from Trendelenburg...[N]ow that I have read him, how much more lucid and clear everything is to me. My relation to him is very special." (J. & P. 5977; Pap. VIII, 1 A 18).<sup>1</sup> Arnold Come's monograph represents a welcome first step toward understanding and evaluating this claim. Given the scope and almost total obscurity of Trendelenburg's work, Come's is no small task. Fortunately, Kierkegaard makes it clear that it is preeminently Trendelenburg's treatment of logic and especially his discussions of the modal categories to which he is indebted. (See, for example, Papirer VI B 54,21.) Come's monograph accordingly focuses on relatively confined sections of the two thinkers' works. (In Trendelenburg's case, the chapter "Die Modalen Kategorien" in Logische Untersuchungen; in Kierkegaard's case the "Interlude" of Philosophical Fragments and The Sickness Unto Death.)

Come's monograph is divided into four chapters: the first examines Kierkegaard's knowledge of logic; the second offers "an overview of the general character of Trendelenburg's philosophy, and his place in the development of logic"(14); the third focuses specifically on Trendelenburg's treatment of the modal categories; the fourth and final chapter presents a four part comparison of Trendelenburg and Kierkegaard.

Chapter One traces the development of Kierkegaard's knowledge of logic from his days as a student at Copenhagen, through the first trip to Berlin, up to his discovery in 1843 of Trendelenburg but of Aristotle as well. Beyond the specific information conveyed, this chapter is useful in orienting twentieth century readers to the distinctively nineteenth century use of "logic" relevant to this study. Come notes that Hegel's logic was already a topic of controversy in Copenhagen when Kierkegaard arrived at the university, with Heiberg and Martensen championing Hegel's view and Sibbern and Møller in opposition. Come doesn't note it, but Mynster was also involved in this debate on the side of the traditionalists.

[See Viktor Kuhr's Modsigelsens Grundsætning (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1915)] In Berlin, Kierkegaard witnessed similar disputes between the Hegelian, Werder, and the anti-Hegelian, Schelling.

I must confess to disappointment at the briefness of Come's account here. No doubt the summary character of this chapter was dictated by the limited size of the monograph, but only if we have a fairly detailed grasp of what Kierkegaard thought before he began reading Trendelenburg can we assess the influence of the latter on the former. Achieving such a grasp would require not only an examination of Kierkegaard's journal entries (and perhaps letters from Berlin) but also a more detailed recreation of the debates to which he was reacting. To illustrate the importance of such a study: one of the most striking areas of parallelism between Kierkegaard and Trendelenburg is in their respective criticisms of the opening moves of Hegel's logic. Given Kierkegaard's statements of indebtedness to Trendelenburg, it would be easy to conclude that this parallelism is clear evidence of influence. But many of Kierkegaard's criticisms of Hegel's logic, especially as regards its claims to a presuppositionless beginning, are already stated in Johannes Climacus which Kierkegaard wrote before reading Trendelenburg. (Kierkegaard says at Papirer VIII,1 A 18 that he began to read Trendelenburg after completing Repetition; the Hongs date Johannes Climacus to the period between the completion of Either/Or and the beginning of Repetition.) Until questions of chronology are investigated in detail, it is appropriate to speak of parallelisms or disagreements between Trendelenburg and Kierkegaard but not of influence. Come inadvertently raises just such concerns over how to distinguish influence from parallelism when he describes Kierkegaard's opposition in the period prior to reading Trendelenburg to Werder's treatment of the modal categories. (See 7-8)

Come's second chapter sets itself the ambitious task of providing an overview of Trendelenburg's thought, especially as presented in Logische Untersuchungen. Given that English language readers will be tabulae rasae in matters Trendelenburgian, this chapter is especially important in helping readers place Trendelenburg's logical views in some sort of context.



Come here focuses on the issue of Trendelenburg's self-declared Aristotelianism; he has illuminating things to say on Trendelenburg's teleological metaphysics and consequent linkage of the concepts "ground" and "cause." But I don't come away from the chapter with the overview promised. Part of the problem here is that Come jumps the gun and begins comparing Trendelenburg and Kierkegaard on a variety of points. Such a comparison is the declared task of the monograph's final chapter, but here it distracts from the task of getting a bead on Trendelenburg's overall project.

Chapter Three on Trendelenburg's development of the modal categories displays just the focus and organization lacking in the second chapter. Come moves effectively through the concepts "ground," "possibility," "actuality," "necessity," and "freedom" so that not only their particular meanings for Trendelenburg become clear but also their interconnections. The overall picture that emerges here is surprising given Kierkegaard's enthusiasm for Trendelenburg. Trendelenburg postulates an ultimate purpose toward which all natural and historical development necessarily moves. For Trendelenburg, contingency is an epistemological rather than metaphysical category. It denotes the inadequacy of our knowledge rather than the real indeterminacy of events.

Given the picture that emerges in the third chapter, it is unsurprising that the final chapter has much more to say about the disagreements between Trendelenburg and Kierkegaard than about their agreements. (The chapter's concluding summary nicely illustrates this: Come states the two thinkers' points of

unity in a seven line paragraph and then uses most of the next three pages to summarize their differences.) This preponderant emphasis on disagreement throws into question Kierkegaard's avowals of debt to and declarations of admiration for Trendelenburg. As Come notes, Kierkegaard had a much better eye for their points of agreement than for their disagreements (although Kierkegaard does lament that Trendelenburg altogether overlooks the category of the leap and thereby misconceives the transition from possibility to actuality. See Pap. V A 74-75.) But Come leaves unexplained Kierkegaard's curiously uncritical enthusiasm. I suggest that this enthusiasm has as much or more to do with their shared enmity to Hegel as with shared positive beliefs. As I noted above there are striking parallels between Trendelenburg's and Kierkegaard's criticisms of Hegel's logic. Both decry Hegel's claim to make a presuppositionless beginning in logic with the concept of being; both reject the transition of being to nothing as a misunderstanding of negation; both accuse Hegel of smuggling an empirically derived awareness of movement into his logic when he derives becoming from the mutual equivalence of being and nothing. Come briefly notes that Kierkegaard's motivation to study logic generally and Trendelenburg specifically was his desire to "acquire tools to attack and destroy the very foundations of 'the System'." (3) But Come's overriding interest in the concept of the self developed in The Sickness Unto Death leads him to focus on the positive modal views of the two philosophers rather than on their shared polemics against Hegel. One shouldn't, however, underestimate the power of shared enmity to make friends.

1. Since Trendelenburg is not a widely familiar figure, I will quote Come's brief biographical footnote on him: "Trendelenburg was born in Eutin, Nov. 30. 1802, and died in Berlin, Jan. 24, 1872. He studied philosophy and philology in Kiel, Leipzig and finally in Berlin where he gained his doctorate. He was then appointed professor at the Berliner Akademie, where he quickly became the dominant philosophical personality. His major interest was in Aristotle, but he also wrote books on the thought of Hegel, Spinoza, and Herbart. He also had a great interest in mathematics and the natural sciences. Logische Untersuchungen is generally considered to be his major work, but he also published books on the history of philosophy, the doctrine of the categories (which Kierkegaard purchased and read with great zeal), Nodwendigkeit und Freiheit in der Griechischen Philosophie, and several in the field of ethics." (11n).

# ARTICLES

## THE HUNGARIAN KIERKEGAARD

BY ANDRÁS NAGY

Why shouldn't we consider the great Danish philosopher one of Hungary's most important and influential authors, not only because of his permanent presence in intellectual circles in Budapest in the last nearly hundred years, but also because of the paradox of his reception and interpretation? Let us imagine that the long and adventurous story of his mainly contradictory influence in Hungary could be the work of a "Middle-European modern Kierkegaard" who sometimes made fun of his audience: using different incognitos, changing his masks and provoking in many ways his public.

In a country where even nowadays we can't pronounce his name correctly, the first steps of his appearance were necessarily indirect, as if there were a longing for him, as well as a preparation for his arrival in modern Hungarian thinking--a place that couldn't be really filled for decades and decades. But this is just the story.

His indirect appearance in Hungary began with the enormous influence of German romanticism which later gave place to Scandinavian and Russian Literature, a literature that in Hungary meant much more than only a question of reading; it was moral, a kind of mentality, a "Weltanschauung." And while in German romanticism the determining factor was the "common questions" posed by that movement and the Danish theologian, in the later and indirect interpretation of Kierkegaard's philosophy through Russian novels and Scandinavian dramas one could already see--even if only in literary forms--an "answer," even if it was too important to forget and too difficult to understand. It is a philological problem how the second greatest Dane after Hamlet could give such an impulse to Tolstoy and Dostoevsky as he did, using what kind of transmissions for his fundamental philosophical concept on faith and loneliness which infiltrated the Russian novels, and meant a breakthrough in modern literature and thinking. (I must add that later the so-called Russian religious philosophy had the same function in the transmission

and fertilization of Western thinking: with Soloviev and Rozanov in the last century and with Shestov, Ivanov, Berdyaev in this century without whose works and influence it is hard to understand and imagine the birth of modern existentialism.)

After the Ibsen-seasons in the "fin de siècle" Hungarian theaters and with the growing interest in Scandinavian literature, together with the influence of the great Russian novelists, everything seemed to be "ready" for the reception of Kierkegaard: one might say that he was already present without his actual appearance. That concrete presence arrived very soon, through the "Hungarian Kierkegaard," whose duty and fate it was to bring to the extremes all Kierkegaardian contradictions and paradoxes. (He was even to dedicate all his life to the "absolute paradox," to the faith, by which all his sacrifices could be justified, choosing the "absurd.") He was György Lukács, for whom the spiritual meeting with Kierkegaard was a determining factor of his thinking, and who, in all of his "stages of life" had mainly determined the influence of Kierkegaard in Hungary.

First we must imagine a schoolboy, under eighteen, who asks his father for a birthday present, a journey to Norway, with the only motivation to visit Henrik Ibsen, just to see him and talk a bit: of course a symbolical act that is going to be determining his early writings (namely his important essay on the Modern Drama). The important thing for him was only just to "touch" the living Scandinavian classic: the rest is a question of the phantasy and sensitivity of the essayist. Lukács is not yet eighteen when, writing about Hauptmann, he puts down for the first time the name of Kierkegaard in 1903, considering him a romantic as he himself is, feeling that he lives in a world that opposes every kind of longing for the "absolute." That is the period when the intellectual problems of the young essayist are strongly connected with his most personal ones; in his first series of essays he mainly uses the subjects like masks, trying one after the other: German

romanticists, French novelists, Viennese storytellers, are all only pretexts for his questions again and again--what had happened to the meaning of life, what is the relation between work and life, where is the place for human values in modern civilization? And there is one more "important factor" that seems to concentrate all his questions, offering a general solution to them as well as the greatest danger to a devalued answer. The name of that "factor" is Irma Seidler, a beautiful painter just above twenty who brings the question of love to the young essayist. He may have longed just for that.

A situation that is more than analogical to the beginning of another love-story, some eighty years ago in Copenhagen. And not only just the beginning but the further steps as well. Writing his essay Søren Kierkegaard and Regine Olsen, Lukács is experimenting with the many forms that a love affair could take; he doesn't know yet how dangerous these kinds of experiments are. Following Rudolf Kassner's words he "poeticizes" his relation to his Regine Olsen: doing so he just doesn't want to hide the essence, on the contrary, to express it. The "poesy" of this relation meant also a lot of love letters to each other, long chapters in a diary never planned to be published and then a journey together to Italy, where he did not even dare to take her hand, and though a kiss "might have happened" there was nothing more. After returning to Hungary they must decide: he chooses to break the love affair and she marries another man, her "Fritz Schlegel." Lukács first plans to commit suicide, maybe just for the sake of a beautiful farewell letter that he never sends to her; instead he starts with a "dangerous fertility" to write essays, inspired and determined by this love, and that in way--just like Kierkegaard--he remains faithful. In a later letter to a close friend Lukács himself describes this series of essays as he maps out the different phases of his love to her, and when he is going to publish them, under the title of The Soul and the Forms. He wants to dedicate to her the whole book, remembering their first meeting or their first and only kiss. He hesitates only because of its unpleasant social consequences. Again a very "Kierkegaardian" dilemma, only the situation is going to be dramatically different. But the name of the Danish philosopher is mentioned already in the introduction, besides the name of Plato, Montaigne and the mystics, and there is the famous essay on the unhappy love story in Copenhagen, about which essay a little later Martin Buber, the famous philosopher who was also determinative for existentialism, writes to Lukács that in many ways he got the closest to the problem.

But this late and Hungarian "Regine Olsen," unlike her original Danish model, was sensitive to that masked confession--maybe because of her own unhappy marriage. Just to provoke the paradoxes she tries to answer him sincerely. She could love him still. And that is really dangerous for Lukács, afraid of what will happen if life takes away his unhappiness. He seems to escape to Italy to the stages of their once promising idyll. Some days later he finds in a Hungarian newspaper in Florence the short announcement of her death--she had committed suicide by jumping into the Danube on a torrid spring night. The dramaturgy of this love-story with its paradoxes wasn't Kierkegaardian any more and only anticipated the significance of later paradoxes.

But this personal tragedy seems to be only the introduction of the next "stage" that arrived for this Hungarian Kierkegaard for some years. By then he already had left Florence for Heidelberg. He had left the nostalgic loneliness for Europe's famous intellectual circle--that of Max Weber's, where he found sociologists and philosophers like Ernst Troeltsch, Karl Jaspers, Ernst Bloch, Alfred Weber. And like a "penitent" he gave up his faithful unhappiness for another kind. He married a Russian ex-terrorist, a girl who lived far beyond all kinds of social conventions. The philosophical problems, so personal and at the same time so universal in Kierkegaard, had found a new way of expression. Lukács puts away the finished chapters of his Philosophy of Art to write about the "new reality" that he found in Russian literature, mainly the novels of Dostoevsky, in whose characters and conflicts he hoped to find a solution for the contradictions and antinomies to which he was so sensitive already. According to the testimony of his sketches that never constituted a book, he planned a "Kierkegaardian" reading and analyses of these novels. The many motifs of a possible existentialist interest in this period of Lukács were widely observed (Lucien Goldmann, e.g. dedicated a whole book to the parallels between the young Lukács and the early Heidegger), as the introduction of the imagined book brought success for its author: The Theory of the Novel.

But the first failure, the torso of the Dostoevsky book, meant that theoretically he could not get over these contradictions and paradoxes; they could not be resolved this way. And this failure was followed by two other disappointments. He failed very soon as a husband, and later he failed in his habilitation for the University of Heidelberg. Both can be regarded in Kierkegaardian paradigms; the normal social life and the academic career may not be written in his destiny--these

he got to know later very well, as even in the "colloquium's" subject for the habilitation the name of Kierkegaard appeared.

All this happened in the historical year of 1918 when the war was nearly over and the disappointment in modern civilization was wide spread in intellectual circles. Lukács had to return to Budapest, and he tried to reconstruct somehow the Heidelbergian atmosphere he missed so much. That gave birth to the so-called "Sunday Society," a regular meeting of friends, among them Friedrich Antal, Arnold Hauser, Béla Balázs, Karl Mannheim and Charles de Tolnay. The "two saints" of these meetings were, following the memoirs of participants, Dostoevsky and Kierkegaard. And when Lukács had to "confess" in an article titled "Book of Books" who was the most important author for him, he wrote about Kierkegaard, who, "from the very beginning accompanies my intellectual development."

But in the same article another name appeared, a very familiar one to those who are interested in the declining Hegelian tradition, that of Karl Marx, signalling the other trend of the "deconstruction" of the classical German philosophy.

And when György Lukács on a cold winter day of 1918 joined the Communist Party, surprising nearly all his friends by its suddenness, happening "between two Sundays," when only a few weeks ago he wrote on the "unsolvable moral contradiction" of bolshevism in an article published in the same month of his "conversion," the character of his choice was not inexplicable for those who observed him closely. That was the choice of Abraham--the absurd. To accept the greatest paradox, to sacrifice everything for the most important, for the faith that he was really longing for. His way can't be followed any more by theoretical efforts or by philosophical conclusions. Abraham, in the eyes of common people, is acting "irrationally." He is a murderer or a believer. He went far beyond the world of tragedy, much higher than the world of the sacrifice-offering Agamemnon.

What was anticipated by the love-story earlier now tried to enter into the history of Hungary in the short period of the communist "Republic of Councils" (of Béla Kun) in 1919. The philosopher-commissar shared his time in fighting against the "whites" (the bourgeois troops) and discussing, in cease-fires with his comrades, the Great Inquisitor of Dostoevsky and Kierkegaard. From that point, listening to the sound of bullets he could easily know that this choice for him was really an

existentialist one. It was not enough to sacrifice life; he sacrificed even his morals, his intellectual talent and all his passions in an "Abrahamian" way. And that is why there was no more choice in his life, that lasted for more than half a century, no more possibility of the revision of it.

The rest is history. The friends of the "Sunday Society," once interested so much in Kierkegaard, compromised by the "reds," after the takeover of the "whites," went to emigration. The presence of the great Dane became indirect again. One of the greatest Hungarian poets, Mihály Babits, writing about the History of the European Literature, puts down his name only once in his thick book, mentioning him as a possible model for Ibsen's Brandt. Kierkegaard's empty place couldn't be filled either by Protestant theological philosophy, which wasn't really original and significant in Hungary, or by the "official" philosophical works, though both trends produced some books on him, namely three. But his works remained unpublished here with the exception of two short theological writings. The members of the weak and isolated Hungarian pre-war existentialist movement surely did read him, but there is only one proof of that: the literary essay of Béla Hamvas, the writer and philosopher, Kierkegaard in Sicily, where the name of the Dane is more important than his works.

But the glass of poison wasn't emptied yet even by Lukács himself. The sacrifice wasn't complete until Kierkegaard himself was put on the altar for the God of bolshevism. And in his long emigration, first in Vienna, later in Germany, and lastly in the USSR, Lukács had done this as well, together with all his masters, idols and colleagues; they were all offered up as sacrifices. In his most tragic book, The Dethronement of Reason, he described the main trends of modern bourgeois philosophy of the 19th and 20th century as the forerunners of irrationality, that directly or indirectly led to fascism, which meant a total and hopeless crisis of bourgeois thinking. And Kierkegaard had his chapter here, a long one, though Lukács admitted Kierkegaard's "honesty in the subjective sense," his brilliant intellect and spirituality. But at the same time Kierkegaard in Lukács's reading expressed the general feeling of intellectual parasitism; he was an enemy of social revolution, and the pioneer of reactionary mentality. Comparing him with Marx he really got bad marks, though, paradoxically Lukács could accept Kierkegaard's significance only in a negative way; writing a long chapter about him. At the same time in the "official" philosophical lexicon edited by the Soviet Academy of

Science, that later was translated and published in Hungary, the name of Kierkegaard is not even mentioned.

After the second world war the life of the newborn Hungarian democracy wasn't long enough to publish some of Kierkegaard's works, though there were plans for that (by Béla Hamvas), and after the communist takeover, under the marxist-stalinist state-religion the official point of view was that of Lukács's. Kierkegaard's first writings could be published only in the early sixties, in a strongly controlled selection about existentialism, with a long introduction explaining how reactionary, irrational and confused this philosophy is, which could have had some influence only because of the "great misery of bourgeois thinking." The author of the introduction wasn't a third-level commissar but the Chief Secretary of the Hungarian Academy of Science and, some years ago, the Minister of Culture. But at least there were the texts! And in this part of Europe people had learned to read also in the "negative way," to find the truth in negations, to be sensitive in the opposite way. And slowly came the other texts: a selection of Kierkegaard's most important works with strong marxist commentaries, the part of Either-Or on Mozart's Don Juan, and finally, in 1971, the whole Either-Or. And though the postscript explained again what the choice is, either Kierkegaard or Marx (written by one of the best students of Lukács, Ágnes Heller), the importance of the original text was indisputable. The books in some weeks disappeared from the shops and in the following years were stolen from libraries.

And that was again a significant sign of his permanent presence. What the philosophy couldn't do for decades, the literature did in its own way; the special sensitivity for modern existentialism prepared the place for Kierkegaard, while he couldn't be published. It seemed to be quite necessary that the next published book of Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, was translated by a young Hungarian poet and postscripted apologetically by a popular essayist.

And after all these paradoxes, what now? We have arrived at the essence of Kierkegaard in Hungary. The real interpretation, the real understanding, based on his texts and read by a public that is familiar not only with the old and marxist Lukács but also with the young one, and knows Heidegger as well as it does other important thinkers of our century. And though it is never late for Kierkegaard the present confrontation of the Hungarian intelligentsia with the great Dane could have

good timing as well--to re-think his philosophy in the contemporary philosophical vacuum. Even for a paradox this is by no means the worst.

## News from Copenhagen

by Marilyn Gaye Piety with a Response from Arne Grøn

Kierkegaardiana, the premiere journal of Kierkegaard scholarship is no longer accepting articles in Danish. There were apparently two independent reasons behind this decision on the part of the editors of the journal. The first is that they believed they would stand a better chance of getting funding if they restricted the articles they accepted to "world languages," and the second is that they believed this decision would help attain a wider readership for the journal and hence generate more interest in Kierkegaard's thought.

To be fair to the editors, the logic behind this move is not entirely obscure. Very few scholars *do* read Danish and as a result, Kierkegaardiana has probably not achieved the recognition it deserves. It is not at all clear, however, that the decision to cease publication of articles in Danish will actually attract more readers to the journal. That is, they are going to continue to publish articles in German and French and a relatively small proportion of American academics actually read articles in these languages (witness the almost complete obscurity of Heinrich Schmidinger's outstanding book *Das Problem des Interesses und die Philosophie Sören Kierkegaards*). An English speaking Kierkegaard scholar who does not read Danish is even less likely to read German or French. There are, of course, some notable exceptions to this rule, but they are not enough to constitute an appreciable increase in the readership of Kierkegaardiana.

It is important to acknowledge, however, that even if the decision to restrict the publication of articles in Kierkegaardiana to "world languages" does not increase the readership of the journal, it may create the impression that this readership has been increased, or is likely to be increased in the near future, and this may enhance the status of the journal in the eyes of whoever it is from whom it hopes to receive funding. This question now is: At what cost is this increase in the possibility of obtaining funding secured? The quality of Kierkegaard scholarship is already erratic. No Kant scholar could ever *publish a book* on Kant without an extensive knowledge of the German language and the same is true for most other areas of scholarship. This is *not* true, however, of Kierkegaard scholarship.

Even if Kierkegaard did achieve wider recognition as a result of the collective wisdom of the editors of Kierkegaardiana, it is not at all clear that this would, in itself, be a good thing. There is hardly a thinker in history whose name is as widely known as is Kierkegaard's and hardly a thinker in history whose views are less well understood or to whom more fallacious or irrational views have been mistakenly attributed. It ought to be clear to anyone that it is not simply exposure that Kierkegaard (or even Kierkegaardiana) needs, but rather *rigorous and responsible, scholarly treatment*. There is, for example, virtually nothing written on Kierkegaard's epistemology despite the fact that epistemology is one of the most important areas of contemporary philosophy and absolutely indispensable for understanding the role of faith in existence according to Kierkegaard, or any other thinker for that matter. The reasons for the dearth of literature on Kierkegaard's epistemology are probably various. What is clear, however, is that it is impossible to distinguish Kierkegaard's epistemological theory if one is forced to rely on English translations of his texts. That is, there are at least four Danish expressions that may be, and have been, translated into English as knowledge: '*erkendelse*' or '*erkendelsen*,' '*kendskab*,' '*kundskab*' and '*viden*,' yet each of these expressions has a slightly different meaning in Danish and each is used by Kierkegaard in a slightly different manner (or sometimes even in a markedly different manner as is the case, for example, with '*kendskab*' and '*viden*' in *Works of Love*).

Kierkegaard's stature as a thinker will never be enhanced until the standards of Kierkegaard scholarship are raised to the extent that rigorous treatment of issues such as the one detailed above become the norm rather than the exception. Such scholarship would generate its own publicity while at the same time doing genuine service to the character of Kierkegaard's thought. We will never achieve this level of scholarship, however, until every individual who aspires to becoming a Kierkegaard scholar is made to accept as a matter of course that he or she *must* learn Danish. But if the premier journal of Kierkegaard scholarship refuses to publish anything in Danish, the message that will be sent to these aspiring scholars, as well as to other philosophers and theologians, will be that a knowledge of the language in which Kierkegaard wrote is not essentially significant for

an understanding of the substance of his thought and that is not a thesis that *any* responsible scholar in *any* area of scholarship would ever accept!

This issue actually has broader significance, however, than that of its impact on Kierkegaard scholarship. Denmark is such a small country that there is a very real danger that the Danish language could quickly disappear. All one need do, in order to establish the truth of this claim is to spend a little time here in Copenhagen. It is not all uncommon for advertisements, both on television and on billboards, to be in English, just as it is not uncommon to hear English spoken by Danes to *each other*. This is due, in part, to the Danes' own appreciation for the size of their country and, as more than one Dane has expressed it to me, the subsequent "necessity" of their knowing a language other than their own. Before the second World War this language was German; now, however, it is English, although many Danes fear that, with the unification of Germany and what is expected to be the subsequent growth of the German economy, German will gradually displace Danish on the Jutland peninsula.

Danes are among the most nationalistic people in the world. Care must be taken, however, to distinguish Danish nationalism from the *offensive* forms of nationalism that characterize many other peoples of the world. When I say that Danes are "nationalistic," I mean that they are *fiercely proud* of their cultural and intellectual heritage. And they have a great deal of which to be proud.

Much of Danish cultural and intellectual history is unknown, however, to the rest of the world because of the barrier which the language represents. It is, therefore, not unwise for the Danish government to encourage the publication of materials not intrinsically related to the Danish language in languages other than Danish--i.e., in languages that are more widely read and spoken. A distinction must clearly be made, however, when the material in question *is* intrinsically related to the Danish language, as in the case of Danish literature and philosophy! The failure to appreciate this distinction and to systematically impose it upon policies relating to the funding of scholarly journals, is to number the days of the Danish language as surely as if it were an animal whose habitat one systematically destroyed. A language does not merely live in the mouths of those people whose language it is, it lives in their literature as well. The

written word is a very vital part of any language; kill it and the rest of the language will eventually die.

The decision of the editors of Kierkegaardiana simply does not make sense, both in the narrow context of the good of Kierkegaard scholarship and in the broader context of the value and future of the Danish language. Even if the Danish government or the other organizations from whom Kierkegaardiana might want to seek funding would look favorably upon such a decision, that does not compel the editors to make it. It is my hope that they may yet be persuaded by the arguments presented here, or by other, perhaps even more compelling, arguments which other scholars may want to offer.

### Response from Arne Grøn

(Editor's Note: Grøn's reply was written to an earlier version of Piety's article, and some of the quotes are not present in the published version.)

Til Marilyn Piety.

Kære Marilyn.

Tak for din tilsendte skrivelse. På vegne af redaktionen for Kierkegaardiana vil jeg kort svare. Jeg griber med kyshånd pointen i din artikel og svarer på dansk. Hvis jeg skulle svare på engelsk, måtte jeg have f.eks. Bruce eller dig til at foretage en sproglig revision. Men jeg er sikker på, du vil gøtere, at jeg sparer jer for den fornøjelse.

For det første er sammenhængen mellem det at kende originalsproget og det at have indsigt i den pågældende forfatters tankegang ikke så entydig, som du gør den til. Hvis den var det, ville det at oversætte være en mere betænkelig affære, end det allerede er.

Men selvfølgelig er det vigtigt at kunne læse Kierkegaard på dansk. Alt andet lige. Det forhindrer blot ikke, at der gives spændende fortolkninger/aktualiseringer af Kierkegaard, som bygger på oversættelser.

For det andet er der ikke nogen modstrid mellem at hævde, at det er vigtigt - og i nogle sammenhænge afgørende - at kunne dansk for at læse Kierkegaard, og så at fastlægge, at artikler til Kierkegaardiana skal være på engelsk, tysk eller fransk. For den sidste afgørelse hviler på en forståelse af, hvad der er opgaven for

Kierkegaardiana: at præsentere centrale artikler om Kierkegaard i en international sammenhæng. Der findes talrige artikler eller større arbejder på dansk om Kierkegaard, som ikke oversættes, selv om de fortjener det. Der er gode muligheder for at få afhandlinger om Kierkegaard offentliggjort på dansk. Blot ét eksempel er serien Søren Kierkegaard Selskabets Populære Skrifter, som ligeledes opprioriteres for tiden. Sigtet med Kierkegaardiana er ikke at føje endnu en mulighed til, men så vidt muligt at formidle studiet af Kierkegaard i en international kontekst. Og her vil vi gerne nå ud til forskere, som måske ikke mestrer dansk, selvfølgelig med det lønlige håb, at de engang kommer til det. I stedet for at stille hindringer op vil vi gerne invitere indenfor. Vi håber således, at I vil føle jer velkomne i København. I hvert fald er det Kierkegaard-afdelingens sigte at intensivere den hjælp, som gives til dens gæster, f.eks. ved at tilbyde flere kurser, hvor vi læser Kierkegaard på dansk.

Jeg er derfor ked af at høre, at beslutningen om, at Kierkegaardiana kun skal publicere artikler på engelsk, tysk eller fransk, virker som et "slap in the face...to everyone who has ever tried to learn Danish in order to better understand Kierkegaard" (s. 3). Det har i hvert fald aldrig været meningen. 'Belønningen' for at kunne dansk er vel netop, at man - i det her tilfælde - forstå Kierkegaard bedre. Og er det ikke vigtigt? Vi vil gerne agitere for, at man læser Kierkegaard på dansk, og vi er villige til at gøre det på engelsk. Således kunne det være en idé at bringe en artikel i Kierkegaardiana, der konkret viser betydningen af at kunne dansk, f.eks. ved at påvise fejl eller mangler i eksisterende oversættelser.

I håbet om, at du fortsætter dit studium af Kierkegaard på dansk.

med venlig hilsen

Arne Grøn

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