

Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter



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A Note from the Editor

EDITOR MOVES TO CALVIN

I wish to inform all readers that as of September 1 I have moved from St. Olaf to become William Spoelhof Teacher-Scholar in Residence and Professor of Philosophy at Calvin College in Grand Rapids, Michigan. My wife Jan has also been appointed to the Spanish department at Calvin. During this school year, the Newsletter will continue to be produced at St. Olaf with financial support from the Howard and Edna Hong Kierkegaard Library, though I will continue to serve as editor. I need to say a big thanks to Cynthia Lund, Acting Curator of the Hong Kierkegaard Library, and to Dee Bolton, who continues to maintain the subscription lists and continues to do the work of setting the Newsletter. I will be making a decision this spring concerning the long-term editorship of the Newsletter, after consulting with leaders of the Kierkegaard Society and other Kierkegaard scholars, including Robert Perkins, the founder of the Newsletter.

So, for this year at least, correspondence concerning subscriptions and mailing list should be addressed to Dee Bolton in the philosophy department at St. Olaf. Editorial correspondence should be addressed to C. Stephen Evans, Department of Philosophy, Calvin College 3201 Burton St. SE, Grand Rapids, MI 49546. (Phone 616-957-6413; fax 616-957-8551; email sevans@calvin.edu)

SEARCH FOR CURATOR


Although we at St. Olaf College will greatly miss Stephen Evans, we congratulate both him and Calvin College on the above appointment. We have begun the search for a new Curator. Our dual position currently involves one-third time as Curator and two-thirds time teaching. The teaching includes an annual course on Kierkegaard plus several other courses. Although the Philosophy Department must approve of the Curator appointment, the teaching part of the position can involve appointment in another department or a joint appointment in several departments. Any appointment outside the Philosophy Department depends on the needs and the decision of the other department. We are open to appointment at any rank. A knowledge of the relevant languages, especially Danish and German, is important, as is proof and promise of good teaching and respected scholarship.

If you have any questions or are interested in a more detailed description of this position or if you know of someone who should receive such a description, please write Edward Langerak at Department of Philosophy, St. Olaf College, Northfield, MN 55057 or fax (507) 646-3523 or e-mail (langerak@stolaf.edu) or call him at his office (507) 646-3494 or his home (507) 645-8321).

NEWS YOU SHOULD NOTE

INTERNATIONAL KIERKEGAARD COMMENTARY NEWS

International Kierkegaard Commentary: Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, containing fresh new essays by Merold Westphal, Sylvia Walsh, M. Piety, C. Stephen Evans, George Connell and Heather Servaty, Andrew J. Burgess, Hugh C. Pyper, J. Heywood Thomas, Ronald M. Green, Stephen N. Dunning, John D. Glenn, Jr., George Pattison, and Lee Barrett along with the introduction by the editor, appeared in the summer of 1994. Copies are available from the publisher, Mercer University Press, Macon, GA 31207



The editor requests that those members of the society who have connections with book review editors solicit an opportunity to review the volume.

EITHER/OR

The two volumes for Either/Or are in process and perhaps we shall have galleys of International Kierkegaard Commentary: Either/Or, Part two in the Mercer University Press booth at the American Academy of Religion. The volume on Part One will follow. The volumes will be published together in 1995.

EARLY POLEMICAL WRITINGS

Articles for this volume are due the first of 1995. I have been in touch with several possible contributors. If you plan a contribution but have not been in contact with the editor, write soon and request a set of sigla. The advisory board will begin reviewing the articles a bit later this fall, but I will work with a prospective author about a later due date.

STAGES ON LIFE'S WAY

Papers due: Preferably 1 June, NO LATER THAN 1 SEPTEMBER 1995. This is the first call for papers for this volume. Prospective authors should write to the editor and request a set of sigla. This rich text suggests many possible studies that would break new ground: Kierkegaard and Plato; Recollection and Memory; Shakespeare; Goethe; Dreams (a number of rather Freudian topics are possible, for instance, introversion); Love and Gender Relations; Judge William's Progress, if any; JW's concept of mother-love and motherhood; the differences and likenesses between the presentation of aestheticism in Either/Or and Stages; Mill and Judge William on Gender Relations; JW versus JW: did he change his mind? Nietzsche and JW on Woman; Beauty: aesthetic and moral; Reflection, infinite reflection, and immediacy in JW; Humor in the psychology of marriage; The end of art: Quidam and Hegel; The religious exception; Suffering; The Demonic; Repentance; Guilt; Poetry and the religious, etc, etc. A well-developed article on the relation of the literary structure to conceptual structure of Quidam's diary would be a welcome contribution.

THE CONCEPT OF IRONY

Due date: 1 June 1996. Persons interested in contributing should be in contact with the editor soon.

CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT

CHANGE OF SEQUENCE OF VOLUME IN IKC; Paper due: Preferably 1 June, NO LATER THAN 1 SEPTEMBER 1996. Due to the fact that 1996 is the sesquicentennial of the Postscript, we shall move up the IKC volume on this text and the issues it raises. No doubt the Postscript will receive a lot of attention that year, and the advisory board and editor would like to consider those articles for this volume when they are finished in order to publish the volume in 1997. Articles should be submitted at any time during the year, but a due date, some time in the fall, will be announced later.

NEW SØREN KIERKEGAARD SONGWORK ON COMPACT DISC

The Danish-American composer Gudrun Lund (born 1930) has adapted and written music to ten of the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard's aphorisms (diapsalmata) from the first part of the popular work Either/Or (1843). The following are included: 'Hvad er en Digter...(What is an artist?)' 1; 'Menneskene er dog urimelige...(How unreasonable people are)' 2; 'Foruden min øvrige talrige...(Besides a great many)' 3; 'Jeg er tilmode som en Brik...(I feel like the chessman)' 4; 'Af alle latterlige Ting...(Of all ridiculous things)' 5; 'De fleste Mennesker... (Most people)' 6; 'Det, Philosopherne...(What the philosophers)' 7; 'Hvad jeg duer til?... (What am I good at)' 8; 'Hvad skal der komme?... (What will happen)' 9; 'Det hændte paa et Theater... (It happened in a theater)' 10.

The work--which has a length of 15 minutes--was composed in the Spring of 1994, and is titled '10 tankevækkende udsagn (10 suggestive utterances)'. It is for soprano, flute, cello and accordion.

Gudrun Lund's '10 tankevækkende udsagn (10 suggestive utterances)' is on The Wärme-Quartet's compact disc: New Nordic Chamber Music, which has just been published. The Wärme-Quartet's members are: Eva Bruun Hansen, soprano, Pia Kaufmanas, flute, Inger Guldbrandt Jensen, cello and Marie Wärme Otterstrøm, accordion--all Danish--and the quartet is this summer on tour in Denmark, Sweden and Finland.

The compact disc; New Nordic Chamber Music, consists of new Nordic music by female composers and is published by Danacord Records. Gernersgade 35. 1319 Copenhagen K, Denmark (DACOCD 423).

Gudrun Lund's works will--together with Kierkegaard-works by, amongst others, Samuel Barber (USA) and Niels Viggo Bentzon (Denmark)--be mentioned in 'Søren Kierkegaard. International music-bibliography,' which is under preparation by the Danish philosopher, M.A. Jens Staubrand.

NOTE: (1) Søren Kierkegaards Samlede Værker, 3.udg. København 1962, bd 2, s.23; (2) s.23; (3) s.24; (4) s.25; (5) s.28; (6) s.31-2; (7) s.34; (8) s.29; (9) s.27; (10) s.33.

CALL FOR PAPERS

RE-READING THE CANON SERIES, ED. NANCY TUANA, PENN STATE PRESS

FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS OF KIERKEGAARD

Papers are sought for a volume covering a wide range of feminist approaches to Kierkegaard's writings. Papers addressing the following works would be especially welcome: The Concept of Irony, Either/Or, Repetition, Two Ages, Works of Love, and The Concept of Anxiety. Questions that might be addressed include: Are Kierkegaard's socially inherited prejudices concerning women independent from his philosophical framework? How do gender categories function in Kierkegaard's thought? How does Kierkegaard understand the relation between the sexes? What is Kierkegaard's position on the emancipation of women, sexual difference, and sexual equality? Does Kierkegaard have anything to offer

to feminist thought? Deadline for submission of completed manuscripts is June 1, 1995. Send two copies of papers, one to Celine T. Leon, Modern Languages and Humanities, 100 Campus Drive, Grove City College, Grove City, PA 16127-2104, Fax 412-458-2181, and one to Sylvia Walsh, Department of Philosophy, Campus Box 8250, Stetson University, DeLand, FL 32720-3756, Fax 904-822-8832

SØREN KIERKEGAARD SOCIETY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE 26th-29th MARCH 1995 -- LANCASTER UNIVERSITY

Kierkegaard: Person and Polis After Modernism. The conference will seek to examine and to debate the contemporary import of Kierkegaard's writing on such issues as person and polis, individual and community, men and women, culture and society, sacred and secular. In pursuit of this aim the conference will work on an interdisciplinary basis, welcoming contributions from philosophy, theology, the social sciences, political and cultural studies. Recognizing that many of the dominant 'isms' of modernity (such as Marxism, Freudianism and Existentialism--perhaps even Postmodernism) that have influenced both the reception of Kierkegaard's work and the discussion of these substantive issues are now in critical or terminal condition, we shall seek to address the question as to how Kierkegaard may contribute to the redefining of contemporary reality 'after' modernism.

In addition to hearing speakers from Britain, Europe and the United States, delegates will have opportunities to contribute subsidiary papers and to engage in discussion of important Kierkegaard texts.

Cost (Full-board) L110 per person--L25 booking fee (non-refundable) to be sent to: Dr. George Pattison, King's college, Cambridge, CB2 1ST.

KIERKEGAARD SOCIETY MEETING AT AAR

The Kierkegaard, Religion and Culture Group of the American Academy of Religion will hold two sessions at the AAR annual meeting in Chicago, Nov. 19-22, 1994:

1. Saturday, November 19, 1:00-3:00 p.m.

Theme: Kierkegaard and the Poetic Imagination

David Wisdo, Susquehanna University, presiding. Panelists: Sylvia Walsh, Stetson University; George Pattison, King's College, Cambridge; M. Jamie Ferreira, University of Virginia; David J. Gouwens, Brite Divinity, Texas Christian University; Ronald L. Hall, Francis Marion University.

George Pattison will begin with a response from the point of view of his work to Sylvia Walsh's newly released book. After Sylvia Walsh's response to Pattison, the other panelists will respond from their own works and there will be open discussion. (Penn State Press is offering members of the Society a special pre-conference discount on Sylvia Walsh's book, Living Poetically: Kierkegaard's Existential Aesthetics. Identify yourself as a society member when you call 1-800-326-9180, for Visa or Mastercard orders, or write to Penn State Press, USB 1, Suite C, University Park, PA 16802. The book is offered at \$32 plus \$3 postage and handling; regularly \$39.50)

2. Monday, November 21, 9:00-11:30 a.m.

Theme: Practice in Christianity and Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses

Vanessa P. Rumble, Boston College, presiding. Speakers are as follows: Jim Perkinson, University of Chicago, "A Socio-Reading of the Kierkegaardian Self"; Robert L. Perkins, Stetson University, "Christology, Aestheticism, and the Established Order"; Wanda Warren Berry, Colgate University, Practicing Liberation: Feminist and Womanist Dialogues with Practice in Christianity"; Timothy P. Jackson, Stanford University, "Arminian Edification: Kierkegaard on Grace and Free Will."

KIERKEGAARD SOCIETY DINNER AT AAR

A dinner will be held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the AAR (see above) on Friday, November 18, 1994. The dinner will be at the Berghoff Restaurant, 17 West Adams St., Chicago. There will be a cash bar from 6:00 to 7:00 p.m. and dinner will be at 7:00 p.m. George Pattison of King's College, Cambridge, will be speaking on "The Cry of Love and the Language of Edification." For reservations, send a check for \$20 per dinner (includes tax and gratuity) made out to the Kierkegaard Society to Mark Lloyd Taylor, School of Religion, Seattle Pacific University, 3307 Third Ave. W, Seattle, WA 98119. (email address mtaylor@spu.edu) Indicate the number of dinners requested and specify whether you prefer Sauerbraten, Chicken Schnitzel, or Vegetable Brochette. Reservations must be received by November 14.

KIERKEGAARD SOCIETY MEETING AT EASTERN APA

The Kierkegaard Society meeting at the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association will be on Wednesday, December 28, 5:15-7:15 p.m. at the Boston Marriott Copley Place, Bentley.

Topic: Kierkegaard's Prefaces

Chair: Merold Westphal. Speakers: Stephen Crites, Wesleyan University, "The Unfathomable Stupidity of Nicolaus Notabene"; Louis H. Mackey, University of Texas, Austin, "The Preface of the Question: Nota Bene, Notabene."

This session will be followed by the Annual Meeting of the Kierkegaard Society.

KIERKEGAARD SOCIETY BROCHURE

The Kierkegaard Society has developed a new brochure describing the history of the organization and its purposes. For copies, write to Mark Lloyd Taylor, School of Religion, Seattle Pacific University, 3307 Third Ave. W, Seattle, WA 98119. (email address mtaylor@spu.edu)

SESSION AT SOUTHWEST REGIONAL AAR MEETING

The Søren Kierkegaard Society and the AAR Philosophy of Religion and Theology group are again planning a joint session at the Southwest Regional AAR meeting for March 1995. For that session papers have been invited on any topic dealing with a theological or religious aspect of Kierkegaard's thought. Papers that directly focus on Kierkegaard's Early Polemical Writings, Stages on Life's Way, or The Concept of Irony may be considered for publication in the International Kierkegaard Commentary, edited by Robert L. Perkins.

KIERKEGAARD'S WRITINGS NEWS

Works of Love will be published in March 1995.

INTERNET BULLETIN BOARD

The Kierkegaard Library at St. Olaf announces that in addition to sponsoring the Kierkegaard list (bulletin board) on the Internet, it can now receive scholarly articles for request by members of the list. Please notify Cynthia Lund at lundc@stolaf.edu if you wish to forward an article. The article should be sent to her email address. It will then be put into a special file for access through Gopher by list members at their request. The accepted rules of copyright apply to all materials distributed in this way. This procedure also prevents list members from receiving lengthy unwanted postings of articles. Special thanks to Charles Creegan for submitting the first article, "Kierkegaard's Ecclesiology," and assisting us with developing this method of sharing scholarly work."

ARTICLES

The Challenge of McGill's Second Kierkegaard Collection

This paper identifies and describes the Collection and its challenge. It shows how different studies done in the last 30 years constitute an attempt to meet the challenge. In that respect it is a survey of critical computer based projects and their significance to Kierkegaard studies.

McGill University has two distinct, different and important Kierkegaard collections. The first is the Kierkegaard-Malantschuk Collection which contains approximately 1500 volumes, a few actually from Kierkegaard's own library and many in the editions he owned and used. This collection was acquired in June 1980 and is now located in the Department of Rare books in the MacLennan Library. The other consists of computer files of and about Kierkegaard's own writings, is for use on PC and compatible computers, and is available at the faculty of Arts computing laboratory on the first floor of the Leacock Building. This collection was created over the past 30 years by Alastair McKinnon and it is he who has described it as McGill's Second Kierkegaard Collection.¹

Appearances notwithstanding, both these collections have the same aim, viz., to foster and deepen traditional, humanist scholarship. The Second Collection offers a challenge to Kierkegaard studies, and indeed to those engaged in understanding a mind that has seen through the philosophical myths and, to use Kierkegaard's phrase, "monstrous illusions" hindering religious belief in present day western culture. Before turning to spell out the challenge I present a summary description of it.

The Second Collection has approximately 110 files of electronic texts and software for their display, search and analysis. These include one file for each of the 35 titles found in the third and most recent edition of Kierkegaard's Samlede Værker (Collected Works). They also include a separate page correlation file for each of these titles which enables the search and display program to show the number of the page and line corresponding to the "current" line in the Danish first and second editions and in English, French and German translations. There are also approximately 45 program and 12 supplementary data files to facilitate the analysis

and modelling of concepts and books in Kierkegaard's corpus. Finally, there are two versions of the Dagbøger or Papirer A material found in 16 of the volumes of the Papirer, the first similar to that of the Samlede Værker but the second also containing the earlier editors' footnotes and so not suited for close statistical analysis of Kierkegaard's writings. In short, the Collection is an extensive data base made up of machine readable texts of more than three million words, programs for their display, search and analysis. Central to these files as a Kierkegaard collection is a traditional notion of the canon of reading --- stay with the text. The notion is, in fact, required and presupposed by the challenge which the Collection raises for scholars in Kierkegaard studies and even those in religion who give priority to the written language or realize the power of language to structure our apprehension of the world.

Simply put, its challenge is how does this form of information technology help the Kierkegaard researcher to ask better questions, and where does it belong in the context of passionate academic discussions in Kierkegaard studies.² Without doubt, the database is word-oriented, and therefore permits the use of it as a concordance giving word frequencies and textual location for each word occurrence. But it is not a tool only for those according greater significance to words in comparison to others who understand the fundamental unit of discourses as a larger element: sentence, paragraph, chapter or entire book. Avenues of research and verification that were hitherto inaccessible are now explorable by virtue of the size of the Collection and the range of queries that the software permits. In fact, it is possible through the use of this collection to break down the boundaries that separate texts and reshuffle those texts to apprehend them non-linearly or to treat the pieces as new objects of knowledge and try to put them back together again.

The rest of this paper shows how this challenge is met through studies that are available. The examples represent investigations carried out in two phases. The year 1964 might well mark the inception of the first phase which represents work done primarily on a main frame

computer, while 1981 marks the inception of the second which represents a shift to the use of a personal computer and to the use of additional files that increased the collection to its present holdings. The studies described summarily show how the challenge is met in practical and substantive ways. The interlude between the two sets of examples provides a summary description of the additional files whose availability help to heighten the challenge.

FIRST PHASE

The "pseudonymous project" marks the first phase of the investigations meeting the challenge. Its intention was to rank the eight most important pseudonyms Kierkegaard employed and to determine whether there was independent confirmation of Kierkegaard's own account of his authorship and the status of the pseudonymous works. The study compared all vocabulary items in each pseudonymous work with those in eight comparable samples of Kierkegaard's own writings. On the basis of paired vocabulary ratios, the study found that the Climacus of the Postscript is much closer to Kierkegaard than the Climacus of the Fragments, that anti-Climacus asymptotically approximated their creator.³ This project tested Kierkegaard's account of his authorship using words rather than sentences as its fundamental unit of discourse. Two other investigations in the same genre of study (word as the basic unit) illustrate the kinds of word study that the collection allows. One by McKinnon, "The Central Works in Kierkegaard,"⁴ reports all word types whose frequencies in a given volume differ significantly from their frequencies in the corpus as a whole. The aim of this investigation is to determine which of Kierkegaard's writings are typical and most representative of the corpus as a whole. It shows very briefly that most of the works at the top of the rank are from Kierkegaard's later writings and concludes that the development of this thought is not primarily chronological. The other is my own, treating similarities and differences between Religion A and Religion B.⁵ It achieves its aim which was to find independent evidence that was consistent with the claim by Kierkegaard of a difference between the two forms of religion. All three of these studies mentioned so far underscore a fundamental assumption of literary scholarship. That is, "behind every study is a hidden but well-explored field of verifiable information allowing the scholar to affirm that the particular text or group of texts...is either exemplarily different or profoundly representative."⁶ Similar strategies which the Collection permit might be adapted

to study of some of the pseudonyms or to verify claims and the viewpoint expressed by the creator of the pseudonyms.

Some other investigations show how the Collection helps to improve our overall grasp of particular areas of the Kierkegaard corpus and to lay the groundwork for more serious studies. This is the case with McKinnon's report, "Theological Focus in Kierkegaard's Samlede Værker,"⁷ which traces nine key theological terms in the entire corpus. Its data show that the term "Gud/God" is approximately three times more frequent in the second volume of Either/Or, than in The Eighteen Edifying Discourses, and that "Christus/Christ" occurs in the latter title 59 times more frequently than "Gud/God." A sequel study "The Increase of Christian Terms in Kierkegaard's Samlede Værker,"⁸ showing the distribution of 13 Christian terms in the authorship indicate that there are significant "drop-offs" in the years 1851 and 1855, from previous years. A third study, "Kierkegaard's Literary Production by Quarterly Rates,"⁹ shows the number of words from both the Samlede Værker and the three different groupings of the Papirer written during each quarter of the years spanning 1834 to 1855. This study indicates that most of the early writings are from the Papirer, and that his authorship peaks in 1842, 1844-45, the third quarter of 1847, and virtually ceases in 1850. This study tells a great deal about the connection between his life and work, and provides a background against which questions about the connection between the two may be answered more precisely.

The Collection is quite suited to studying various accounts of a subject or figure in the Kierkegaard corpus. A multi-dimensional study¹⁰ of Socrates sentences in the texts Concept of Irony, Fragments, Postscript, shows words that distinguish Kierkegaard's account of Socrates in each of those books. For example, in Irony, Socrates is strongly and uniquely associated with Xenophon, the Sophists, The Apology, Aristophanes, etc. In the Fragments, he is associated with Prodicus, Theætetus, contemporary, proof, contemporaneity, the historical, etc. And, in Postscript, the distinguishing words are speculation, analogy, misunderstanding, conversation, appearance, certainty, etc. A similar study was done for Hegel. This kind of investigation might be done also for Jesus, Paul, Job or for ideas that are the pillars of a text or ideological discourse. For example, what rhetorical devices or ruling metaphors does the Postscript employ to expose the appeal to Reason as an immorality of Kierkegaard's age?

My own study,¹¹ of Salighed did just that. Taking a cue for the work done on Socrates, and on Hegel, it sought to give an account of the concept Salighed. It traced the definitions of the word Salighed/happiness, and determined whether there is shift or development in the crystallization of the idea Salighed in the authorship. To achieve its purpose, it employed the sentence as the basic unit of discourse and constructed a mini-text comprised of all sentences containing the key term "Salighed" or one of its three variants. It relied also on information supplied by other files and available in the Kierkegaard Indices to settle on three sets of titles in the corpus: Edifying Discourses, Postscript, and the Religious Works (Works of Love, Christian Discourses, and Training in Christianity). The findings of the study indicate that there are vocabulary shifts that suggest change but do not rule out a continuity of meaning, and that the term relates to the spiritual aspect of life for Kierkegaard. Further, its conceptual meaning for Kierkegaard implies an ethic whose basic motif is gratitude, that Salighed is not simply "happiness or "bliss," or the happy condition attained by those enjoying divine favor, and that Kierkegaard's meaning of the term preserves a New Testament understanding of the Greek "makarios."

The Kierkegaard corpus makes constant reference to the Bible, to other texts, persons, and places. The Second Collection is ideally suited to locate references to such items and thus enable the reader to discover the coherence of the text and establish a common discourse with it. The study "Kierkegaard's Perception of the Bible,"¹² was done with the use of a multi-dimensional program which is part of the Collection. The results show that Kierkegaard regarded the Synoptic Gospels as the heart of the Bible. On the basis of the results the study concluded that Kierkegaard read and interpreted the remaining books in light of the three gospels and considered the Bible as concerned primarily with the historical Jesus and his teachings. That conclusion seems consistent with Kierkegaard's own emphasis upon Jesus as teacher.

The challenge of McGill's Second Collection, stated differently, is to discover new dimensions of texts or areas of thought hitherto inaccessible in our endeavor to gain a better and deeper understanding of that mind which has provided us with the most radical critique of our religion and culture to date. Those who see the Postscript as an ideological critique would be interested in identifying the lexical choices and rhetorical figures that play a role in structuring a text so that it becomes an argument against a Hegelian system of philosophy. The

Collection makes such investigations possible and allows one to make use of computer statistical routines to identify the rhetorical strategies Climacus employs to unmask the use of Reason as an immorality of the age. It allows us to juxtapose texts about Hegel and Abraham, or investigate variation in rhetorical strategies employed in titles such as Either/Or, Repetition, Two Ages, and Attack. This work awaits anyone who believes that no effort is too much to understand a great mind, one that has made it possible for modern western culture to understand what it means to become a genuine individual. The study of the lexical history of Kierkegaard's attack upon Christendom¹³ puts in relief another area of thought. Its conclusion topples the assumption that Kierkegaard's attack on Christendom is identified with the death of Bishop Mynster, and that the attack literature is a distinct break from the early authorship. It contends instead that the Postscript is an integral part of the attack literature, and that Kierkegaard saw as early as 1843 that an attack was inevitable. Indeed it suggests that almost the entire authorship can be read as a radical critique of Christianity and culture.

To glean more insight into Kierkegaard's philosophical and religious thought, a study¹⁴ of place names in the writings was undertaken. It was based on the assumption that everyone has a unique and private world view that reflects his own experience and interpretation of that experience, and therefore the topography of the author's space was considered to be an important and revealing aspect of his thought. It included producing a model of the data for 33 place names meeting specified conditions. Closest to the center of this set of names was Greece and not Copenhagen or Denmark where Kierkegaard was firmly rooted. Ties among names in sub-clusters indicated that though Kierkegaard was firmly rooted in Copenhagen, he was really part of European intellectual tradition, that the German names were reminders of his trip to Berlin in search of personal refuge and philosophical insight, that the presence and proximity of the names China and Persia were reminders of the nature of his attack upon Hegelianism, and that names of Greek cities such as Athens and Delphi indicated the extent to which Kierkegaard looked to Socrates for inspiration. As for Biblical names, Sodom and Gomorrah are one of the few pairs to meet the specific conditions for inclusion in the study. Textual ties suggest that Abraham is presented as praying for those two cities and that judgment passed on the world in the destruction of them is much less severe than that expressed by the innocent death of Christ. The association of Jerusalem is with Jericho rather than

Bethlehem or Calvary. The context of that association is the Good Samaritan parable and suggests that Kierkegaard's emphasis is more on the teachings of Christ rather than his birth and death.

INTERLUDE:

The studies mentioned so far employed files from the Collection created prior to 1981. The work was done on a main frame computer in roughly three steps. The first step, after conceptualization of the project, uses texts and page correlation files and programs to divide and edit the text and to extract fragments relevant to the particular investigation. The next step involves those program files which do word counts, produce word lists showing raw and relative frequencies for a given number of words, and compare those frequencies to those of the same words in the entire corpus. A third step uses programs which create matrices having words as row heads and texts or sections of texts as column heads. These matrices are used as input to a KYST program for multidimensional scaling, and to both McKinnon's and Greenacre's correspondence analysis program. McKinnon's version can analyze matrices only up to 60 rows and 36 columns but is also able to produce a useful cluster plot.

After 1981 many of these programs were adapted for use on a personal computer and new ones added. They included programs for the construction of abfreq lists (a list of words showing aberrant frequencies or z-scores), for a change point detection method, and for the correspondence analysis program just mentioned. Some others allowed for comparison of abfreq lists, and for converting numerical data to graphic representations. Altogether, the adaptation for PC use and expansion of the Collection meant a greater degree of freedom to manipulate and view the data from different angles and heightened the challenge to ask better questions and reach more trustworthy conclusions. Even if particular conclusions might seem problematic to those Kierkegaard scholars not yet hospitable to information technology, it is obvious that this Collection is very useful as a laboratory for examining theoretical hypotheses related to Kierkegaard's writings. The challenge of the Collection remains: to think creatively of hypotheses to explore in that laboratory of files.

SECOND PHASE

An example from the second phase, which makes use of the new files as well, is the study "Dating Kierkegaard's

Battles with Fate."¹⁵ It assumes that Kierkegaard's writings reflect his own personal struggles and seeks to date the various stages in his continuing battle with his inherited sense of Fate. It uses a change-point method to analyze the frequencies of the various forms of the three words "Skjebne/Fate," "Forsyn/Providence," and "Styrelse/Governance" in different works of the corpus. The results show four clear change points or cuts in the data and makes plain the dates and nature of the stages in his battle with Fate. They indicate that Fate is much more prominent than Providence or Governance from spring 1843 to June 1844, that he appears to rely on Governance rather than Providence to overcome Fate from September 1844 to March 1846, that he experiments with Providence and temporarily gains the upper hand over Fate from May of 1846 to November of that year, and that he shifts his focus from Providence to Governance and thus achieves a draw with Fate during the end of 1847 to May 1848. Finally they showed that during the last period of the authorship, April 1948 to September 1855, he relied entirely on the idea of Governance to overcome his preoccupation with Fate.

As noted, various programs in the Collection enable the user to create matrices for input into several correspondence analysis programs, Michael Greenacre's SimCA. These can aid the researcher to recover the vision or recreate the space of a concept or literary object of study, help him to name the underlying structural dimensions suggested by the arrangement of the data in multidimensional space, and plot the argument for the text(s) yielding the data. I applied the latter program to a study¹⁶ of the concept Herlighed/Glory in seven titles in the corpus. The light it sheds on the underlying oppositional structure of the data led to the conclusion that the meaning complex of the term included at least two strands: one secular, the other religious. The latter incorporates the Hebrew "kavod," and the Greek "doxa" whose use in the corpus suggests as well a philosophical dimensions. Following the plot of the argument, when Kierkegaard ascribes glory to the human character, he is making reference to transcendence as a constitutive factor in our being and not to any perceptible characteristics of our humanity. The oppositional structures characterizing the concept includes four dimensions identified roughly by the following pairs of names; Lily and Christ versus Suffering and Weight of Glory, Lily and Solomon versus Return of Christ, Christ and Lily versus Obedience, and Patience versus Obedience.

The SimCA program, not included in the Collection, yields many dimensions and allows the use of very large matrices. For example, the study "Mapping the Dimensions of a Literary Corpus"¹⁷ employs as its data the 250 most common nouns in 34 books and displays the results in eight dimensions, representing a polar contrast or opposition within these books as a whole. The primary dimension represents the opposition between the early aesthetic writings and the middle religious ones. The second dimension reflects the entire authorship and places the aesthetic and religious writings in polar contrast to the attack literature. The third dimension reflects the ethico-religious aims of man: love of neighbor and worship of God. The fourth represents the contrast between Kierkegaard's pathology of society and the pathology of the self. The fifth shows that the extremes of the God relationship are despair and faith. The sixth represents the individual with respect to his status and task. The seventh contrasts the objects of devotion: the Good and God. The eighth reflects Kierkegaard's preoccupation with time and contrasts the individual in time and the God in time.

This view of the corpus is remarkably different from ones traditionally suggested or employing categories such as the aesthetic, ethical, and religious; or the pseudonymous and the acknowledged works; or the early and the later writings. It does not eschew those categories but subsumes them under others which are more comprehensive and indicative of fundamental themes in the corpus. It offers different possibilities and combinations, breaking down the boundaries separating texts and reshuffling them to apprehend them non-linearly. Thus, the challenge of the Second Collection is now as follows: essentially to understand Kierkegaard's writings not as strings of linear texts, but as visions he wishes to transmit from his mind to that of his reader.

With the challenge grasped firmly, a project¹⁸ to re-create the space of Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling was done. It applied programs in the Connection to identify the spatial, overall, and role/sense contexts of "Abraham," "resignation," and "paradox" as used in the Danish text. Its identification and description of these contexts and their importance offer a literary microscopy

that only a multi-dimensional concordance makes available. The power of this entirely new kind of concordance is illustrated by the fact that it allows the user to tease out distinctions which are not made clear by the text. For example, it shows that the Danish word "anfægtelse" is used in two quite different senses: spiritual trial and temptation, roughly in connection with Abraham and Agamemnon respectively. Briefly, it does this by going "behind the book to the space of the book, which apparently is more consistent than the book itself."¹⁹ In short the idea of a multi-dimensional concordance raises new standards of what may count as explanation and understanding of Kierkegaard's texts, and for that matter any literary text.

The concept of this concordance, admittedly, has to be tested rigorously. Its significance for Kierkegaard studies, or for the meshing of literary studies and computer technology, is enormous. It underscores the fact that a computer can do much more than produce prints of linear concordances, word counts, and graphic representation of numerical data, even if the concept proves less promising in providing a better grasp of issues. It shows beyond doubt that we have to begin to see the computer as an aid in testing hypotheses which previously we could not have conceived.

To those who take the academic study of Kierkegaard seriously but imagine this Collection too difficult to comprehend or too complicated to use the challenge might be stated differently. In a word, no effort seems too great and no cost too high, if it helps one to understand the mind that has made Christianity possible in the twentieth century.²⁰ Alastair McKinnon's work at McGill University over 30 years seems to suggest that no effort is too great to understand the philosophical and religious thought of Kierkegaard.

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Notes

1. See: Alastair McKinnon, "McGill's Second Kierkegaard Collection," Fontanus, V (1992), pp. 173-215.
2. Robert Morrissey asks these questions about the ARTFL database. See his "Texts, and Contexts: The ARTFL Database in French Studies," Profession 93, p. 30.
3. See Alastair McKinnon, "Kierkegaard's Pseudonyms: A New Hierarchy," American Philosophical Quarterly, 2/6(1969), p.123.

4. Alastair McKinnon, "The Central Works in Kierkegaard's Authorship," Revue Internationale De Philosophie 103(1973), pp. 84-94.
5. Abraham H. Khan, "Kierkegaard's Religion A and Religion B," Studies in Religion, 6/2(1976-77), pp. 63-66.
6. Morrissey, p. 32.
7. Alastair McKinnon. "Theological Focus in Kierkegaard's Samlede Værker: Some Basic Data," Studies in Religion, 4(1974-75), pp. 58-62.
8. Alastair McKinnon, "The Increase of Christian Terms in Kierkegaard's Samlede Værker," Kierkegaardiana (1974), pp. 147-162.
9. Niels Jørgen Cappelørn and Alastair McKinnon, "Kierkegaard's Literary Production by Quarterly Rates," Danske Studier (1982), pp. 21-34.
10. Alastair McKinnon, "A Method of Displaying Differences Between Various Accounts of an Object," CIRPHO Review (19740, pp. 31-57.
11. Abraham H. Khan, The Concept of Salighed, (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1985).
12. Alastair McKinnon, "Kierkegaard's Perception of the Bible," Kierkegaardiana XI(1980), pp. 132-147.
13. Alastair McKinnon, "Kierkegaard's Attack on Christendom: Its Lexical History," Toronto Journal of Theology, 9/1 (1993), pp. 95-106.
14. Alastair McKinnon, "Some Place Names in Kierkegaard's Writings," Thought, 218/55 (1980), pp. 333-345.
15. Alastair McKinnon, Dating Kierkegaard's Battles with Fate, (København: Munksgaard, 1986).
16. Abraham H. Khan, "Kierkegaard and the Glory of our Common Humanity," Joyful Wisdom: Glory and an Ethics of Joy, pp. 14-29 (in press).
17. Alastair McKinnon, "Mapping the Dimensions of a Literary Corpus," Literary and Linguistic Computing, 4/2(1989), pp. 73-84.
18. Alastair McKinnon, "The Multi-Dimensional Concordance: A New Tool for Literary Research," Computer and the Humanities 27(1993), pp. 165-183.
19. Ibid., p. 178.
20. This note about the mind that has made it possible for Christianity in the twentieth century, that has seen through the philosophical myths and riddles destroying our culture, and that no effort is too much to understand a great mind is one that is credited to Alastair McKinnon. See his "God in Kierkegaard's Dagbøger: The Key words and Their Distribution," (Unpublished mss.)

REVIEWS

Ronald L. Hall, *Word and Spirit: A Kierkegaardian Critique of the Modern Age* (Bloomington, IN; Indiana University Press, 1993) xiii + 218 pages, including notes and index. \$27.95. Reviewed by Steven M. Emmanuel, Virginia Wesleyan

Poststructuralism poses a serious challenge to traditional views about the relation between word and action, and in particular the attempt to understand ourselves in and through our use of language. Terry Eagleton summarizes this challenge in the following passage:

Paul de Man...speaks of the discrepancy or aporetic relationship between the grammatical and the rhetorical (or performative) in literary discourse; but, drawing on Nietzsche's notions of rhetoric, he also strives to deconstruct the very idea of performativity itself. For if performance is caught up in language, and if language is irreducibly figurative or tropological, then there may come a point, so de Man argues, when *we cannot know whether we are doing anything or not*. "Rhetorical" discourse, in the sense of language intended to have definite public effects, is marred and insidiously undone by rhetoric in the sense of verbal figuration.¹

The problem, according to Eagleton, is not merely that human action can be seen as a *text*, and is therefore subject to all the dangers inherent in the linguistic medium, but rather that the traditional view presupposes a certain ideological model of action, namely, that "at the source of all practice lies a well-defined, autonomous subject whose behavior lies entirely within its affirmative mastery."² The central point of his provocative essay is to show that neither the traditional humanistic agent, nor the "ecstatically decentered and disseminated subject" of poststructuralist thought, offer adequate models of human action. The possibility of becoming an integrated self requires a kind of subjectivity that is "centered enough to act decisively yet constituted to its core by the sense of some ineradicable otherness."³

David Wisdo makes a similar suggestion in his new book, *The Life of Irony and the Ethics of Belief*.⁴ Drawing on recent work by Richard Rorty, Wisdo contends that true spiritual inquiry is a process of critical self-reflection that involves a willingness to question even our most cherished beliefs. To do this, he says, one must cultivate a sense of irony. As Rorty puts it, ironists are "always aware that the terms in which they describe themselves are subject to change, always aware of the

contingency and fragility of their final vocabularies, and thus of their selves."⁵ To take the ironic stance seriously, however, is to see that we may finally have to reject faith in order to make sense of our lives."⁶ Wisdo and Rorty both recognize that this type of solution moves significantly away from Kierkegaard, who believes that "we have built-in criteria which enable us to recognize the right final vocabulary when we hear it."⁷ Kierkegaard firmly adheres to a theological criterion of self-understanding that alone ensures the possibility of authentic selfhood.

Ronald L. Hall's recent book, *Word and Spirit*, develops what may be called a Kierkegaardian reply to the poststructuralist challenge. The key to this reply is found in Kierkegaard's critique of the modern age, a critique which focuses on the concept of spirit. Hall sets out in this study to analyze the phenomenon of spiritlessness that Kierkegaard associates with Christendom. His contribution to our understanding of this phenomenon is both insightful and illuminating.

Central to the concept of spirit are the related concepts of self-consciousness and freedom. For the task of realizing one's spiritual nature, becoming an authentic self, requires the free decision to choose oneself, to realize one's essential telos. Authentic selfhood (spirit) is constituted in the double-relation of faith: being at once absolutely related to God and relatively related to the world (what Hall refers to as a sundered/bonded relation). The main point is that the relation in which the self "relates itself to itself" is grounded in felicitous speech. That is, spirit is manifested in an ethical use of language, when we "own and own up to our words, when we are present in them, when we say what we mean and mean what we say" (201). The model for this is found in the ancient Hebrew understanding of speech as *dabhar*.

Making capital use of Thorleif Boman's classic study, *Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek*, Hall shows that on the Hebrew conception, spirit is *pneumatically* qualified. The Hebrew word *dabhar* derives from *dibber*, which is translated as "speak," but has the literal

meaning of being behind and driving forward, thus expressing dynamic movement. Although the sounds of speech are themselves fleeting, there are reflexive and semantic resources within language that allow a speaker to say something, to take a stand in the world. Through language the speaker gives expression to the spiritual. The Hebrew posits an intimate connection between speech and action, between word and deed (*dabhar* also means "deed"). Language is on this view inherently performative, or at least it has the capacity to be performative. Of course, some words do not become deeds. As Boman points out, this failure lies not in the fact that only words were produced, but that only counterfeit words were produced: empty, lying words, which did not have the inner strength and truth to accomplish anything worthy. For to speak authentically is to speak as God speaks. Through the use of language we not only imitate God's creative power, but when we speak truly we actually participate in the divine.

On the Greek conception, by contrast, spirit is *psychically* qualified, and hence rests in a state of harmony and accord with the sensuous world. This world-picture, which is framed by an understanding of speech as *logos*, is essentially static, thus preventing spirit from becoming fully actualized and speech from being fully ratified. Lacking a pneumatically qualified world-picture, "temporality and contingency were terrifying; indeed it is no wonder that the Greeks sought to flee into eternity, necessity, fate, stasis, and silent contemplation" (73). It is in this sense that ancient Greek culture was essentially "spiritless."

The Greek and Hebrew models provide contrasting ways of viewing the relation between spirit and world. As Hall explains in the prologue, they provide competing world-pictures which

operate at both the tacit and the explicit levels of our awareness. At the tacit level, they thematize our historically given, concrete, embodied existence for us; and at the explicit level, they provide the resources necessary for us to appropriate as our own a coherent and meaningful account of our existence, an intelligible self-understanding. In such an appropriation, we come to relate ourselves to ourselves.(6)

In a fairly detailed discussion of these models, he points out that the psychical figures the self-world relation in terms of a visual analysis, while the pneumatic prefers the auditory. Hall employs this distinction to clarify three senses of immediacy: sensuous and reflective (aesthetic immediacy), and existential (the immediacy of the

historical present). The first two can be either psychical or pneumatic, while the latter can only be pneumatic. More specifically, the latter form of immediacy, which expresses historical process and continuity, finds its perfect medium in felicitous speech. Hall then uses this model to explicate religiousness B, in which the self as spirit is revealed (and relationships to God and neighbor are constituted) in the act of speaking authentically.

However, authentic speech is possible only within a world-picture (thematic conception) which presupposes that self and world are essentially historical. To be the kind of reflective individual that "relates itself to itself," one must exhibit both self-consciousness and choice: this is what the pneumatic model provides. I must see the consequences of my actions and accept them as my own, and further, I must presuppose the freedom necessary to make this appropriation meaningful. Such a thematic conception was first made possible by the advent of Christianity, which posited spirit in its full existential reality as a force in world history. Thus, Hall provides support for Kierkegaard's claim that Christianity provides the only framework within which the self can be fully realized.

By introducing spirit into the world, Christian revelation did not thereby make spiritlessness impossible. Rather, it brought with it the possibility of a new and different kind of spiritlessness: the spiritual denial of spirit. Kierkegaard refers to this form of spiritlessness as *the demonic*. Hall identifies this spiritually qualified spiritlessness, which finds its most perfect expression in music, as the modern (and postmodern) predicament. His contention is that the musical-aesthetic is at the heart of the religious confusion of the modern age. As the pneumatic form of aesthetic immediacy, music

provides a model for thematizing a very different self-world relation--a relation that, from the Christian point of view, is a *mis-relation*. Even though this *mis-relation* is pneumatically determined,...[it is] a perversion of spirit in its positive (Christian) sense. Following Kierkegaard, I will call this spiritually determined perversion of spirit *the demonic*. (8)

In the central chapters of the book, Hall discusses the two chief representatives of the demonic: Don Giovanni, who represents the sensuous form of immediacy, and Faust, who represents the reflexive form of immediacy. Even though both figures are pneumatically qualified, they fall outside the category of existential spirit, which is as much qualified by historicity, continuity, and reflection as by immediacy. More specifically, they are both

qualified by the musical-aesthetic (Faust's speech is here analyzed as a kind of music). The way in which they deny spirit is by denying authentic speech, by their unwillingness to "own and own up to their words" and the consequences they entail.

The problem of the modern age is that it is no longer rooted in the dynamics of the speech-act, but in the dynamics of music. As Don Giovanni and Faust clearly illustrate, the musical medium gives us no resources to establish the self-world relation that spirit demands. As a result, spirit withers away without being noticed. This helps us to understand Kierkegaard's claim that his task is to reintroduce Christianity into Christendom: to reeducate in Christian concepts, so that it is once again possible to live (and speak) within authentic Christian categories.

In Chapter 5, Hall diagnoses the main problem with poststructuralism, which is now construed as an extreme expression of the aesthetic-demonic retreat from the flux of existence. In its criticism of the logocentric idea of presence, poststructuralism denies "the possibility of *constancy, stability, or reliability* in the *midst of the flux*" (190). However, Hall argues that our understanding of constancy need not be limited to the static ideal of the logocentric hypothesis, and he points to the possibility of an ethical as opposed to an aesthetic idea of presence. He explains: "The kind of constancy I am talking about here is the constancy of faithful speech, the presence of a speaker in her words before some other" (190). But this theory of reflexively integral speech, which emphasizes the ethical dimension of language, is not complete until it is "tempered by the spirit of mastered irony" (199). For there is always the threat that in the attempt to fulfill one's responsibility to the other, one will upset the balance that a sundered-bonded relation to the world demands, and that one's ethical-religious commitments will collapse into a form of spiritual bondage (203). What prevents this from happening is irony--not in the sense in which Wisdo and Rorty intend that term, nor in its purely Socratic application, but rather as *mastered irony*.

The master of irony recognizes that the positive determination of spirit requires the power of withdrawal: the ability to temper the commitment and responsibility implied by reflexively integral speech with the reminder that one can (and in some situations must) let go. The ironic posture reveals the radical relation of freedom that we bear to our words. This form of irony is a "teleological suspension of the ethical" which has as its

telos the ethical. Hall expresses the same idea when he explains that the master of irony "withdraws from his words in order to be all the more present in them" (205).

In conclusion, I shall mention two brief critical considerations. Hall focuses exclusively on the spoken word as the act that constituted the relation of the self to itself (spirit). But this exclusive emphasis may be questionable for two reasons. First, even though it is true that our ability to establish an identity is facilitated by the ability to speak with reflexive integrity, it is not evident that the manifestation of spirit can or should be limited to the speech-act. From a Kierkegaardian point of view, the profundity of Abraham's example (his ability to understand himself in his faith, as an individual before God) may be expressed most poignantly not in what he says, but in which he does not say. One might argue that his love for Isaac and for his God are just as clearly known through his non-verbal actions. The words "Here I am" add nothing to the extraordinary example of his silent resolve to obey God's command. Furthermore, there does not appear to be any direct textual evidence to support the claim that Kierkegaard limited the concept of spirit to felicitous speech.

In a similar vein, Hall's exclusive emphasis on the spoken word may unnecessarily limit his reply to the poststructuralist. He concedes that writing is an inherently defective medium, observing that the written word is "a demonic perversion of spirit since it is...a perpetual breaking, a perpetual *sundering*, a perpetual hovering, a perpetual play of signs" (190). As he says later, "a speech act that is not connected to someone who speaks before some other in some singular context of enactment is essentially indeterminate in its meaning" (205). Yet one might wonder whether the act of speaking actually makes meaning more determinate. Saussure's claim about the primacy of the spoken word was, after all, one of the first casualties of postmodernist criticism. Hall purports to save the efficacy of the spoken word by grounding it in an ethical context: "Whenever I speak with reflexive integrity, I give my word to some other, that is, make a promise and enter into a covenant with the other...In my responsible speech-acts, I take a *stand* in the world, a stand before others. To take this stand is to stop hovering over the abyss and to live in an ethical existence" (191). But if it is possible to achieve authenticity in ethically grounded speech, why not then in ethically grounded writing? There is a precedent for this view in Kierkegaard. As Christopher Norris points out, Kierkegaard embraces a providential ethics of reading which presupposes presence.⁸

More recently, George Steiner and others have argued persuasively for an ethically grounded theory of textual interpretation.⁹ Without the crucial assumption of presence, Steiner contends, "certain dimensions of thought and creativity are no longer attainable...We must read as *if*."¹⁰ On this view, the act of interpretation involves a kind of commitment. A serious reader must be willing to take risks, to be open to the spirit of the text, allowing himself to be touched by the presence of the other. These remarks echo Kierkegaard's own view, expressed in the *Point of View*, that the "true explanation" of his activity as an author "is at hand and ready to be found by him who honestly seeks it."¹¹ Kierkegaard seems to presuppose a wider conception of presence than Hall's analysis allows.

These criticisms aside, Hall presents one of the very best discussions of the demonic available in any language, and an account of Kierkegaard's critique of modernity that is both timely and relevant to the current debate.

Notes

1. Terry Eagleton, "J.L. Austin and the Book of Jonah," in *The Book and the Text*, edited by Regina Schwartz (Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 234.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 235.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 235-236.
4. David Wisdo, *The Life of Irony and the Ethics of Belief* (SUNY Press, 1993).
5. Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 73-74.
6. Wisdo, p. 67.
7. Rorty, p. 76.
8. Christopher Norris, *The Deconstructive Turn* (London and New York: Methuen, 1983), p. 102.
9. George Steiner, *Real Presences* (University of Chicago Press, 1989).
10. *Ibid.*, p. 229.
11. *Point of View*, p. 16 (SV XII, p. 525).

Roger Poole, *Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication* (Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 1993) Reviewed by George Pattison.

Roger Poole's book has been a long time coming, incorporating as it does thirty years of research and reflection on the life and works of one known to posterity as "Søren Kierkegaard". In the course of those thirty years Poole has arrived at some highly disturbing and provocative questions about this "Søren Kierkegaard." For instance, whereas librarians are happy to place side by side on their shelves the works of Johannes Climacus, Vigilius Haufniensis, Anti-Climacus and company (and, of course, those signed by the said "S. Kierkegaard" himself) as the works of "Søren Kierkegaard", Poole has doubts. "If this study of the indirect communication has one central concern," he says, "it is to state that it is high time that we did Søren Kierkegaard the courtesy of reading his pseudonyms in the way he desiderated of us--as possibilities, as *idealities*, different from one another." (p. 163) In this spirit he insists repeatedly that we may not draw conclusions from what any particular pseudonym wrote as to what S. Kierkegaard meant. More seriously still, Poole has doubts as to whether the pseudonymous texts themselves (or even such a non-pseudonymous text as *The Concept of Irony*) "mean" anything at all. On the contrary, they are deliberately written in such a way as to subvert and (one hundred and fifty years before Derrida!) "deconstruct" the conventions and conditions of what are normally taken to be "meaningful" writing. Thus, Poole says of an extract from *The Concept of Irony*, "in an obvious sense, this use of words is unintelligible." (p. 55) Of the concept of repetition (as explored in the book of that same name) he writes "the basic category of repetition remains successfully undefined until the very last...there is, therefore, no Kierkegaardian doctrine of repetition." (p. 82) As for *The Concept of Anxiety* ("a gay spoof of the academic textbook" (p. 84), it ends not in meaning but in the long drawn out disseminated sibilant hiss of the serpent of whom Vigilius Haufniensis claimed disingenuously to have no particular thought; "Who knows anything about Original Sin? Who but a systematic theologian would even pretend to? Ironically, Vigilius Haufniensis conducts his enquiries into primal guilt with a phonetic Geiger counter. Wherever he encounters an s he centers suspicion." (p. 107)

Such "conclusions" are provocative--and deliberately so, for Poole leaves us in no doubt that, as far as he is concerned, most of the secondary literature on Kierkegaard has entirely missed the point because, instead of taking

"Kierkegaard" at his work, it has plundered the signed and pseudonymous works indiscriminately in order to construct a systematic philosophical or theological position that is then represented as Kierkegaard's own distinctive point of view. Walter Lowrie serves as a convenient scapegoat on to whom to load the accumulated sins of this tradition of weak misreading and is repeatedly brought on stage as a supreme exemplar of how not to relate life and literature, text and meaning in dealing with "Kierkegaard". And if we are inclined to shrug our shoulders and comfort ourselves with the thought that Lowrie (all honor to his departed shade) is no longer at the forefront of Kierkegaard studies, Poole will doubtless remind us that the tendencies which Lowrie represented are still lively temptations confronting every new generation of Kierkegaard readers (especially those among them who happen to be theologians and philosophers).

The provocative nature of Poole's central theses can, of course, easily bring about the dismissive knee-jerk reaction that characterizes a recent review by Professor David E. Cooper in *The Times Literary Supplement* (No. 4760, 24.6.94) who accuses Poole of incoherence, lack of sense, arbitrariness and all the vices that British philosophers might be expected to find in one whom they regard as "saddled...with the crazy deconstructive ambition of perpetually deferring meaning." (TLS 4760, p. 8) One can add other fairly obvious objections to Poole's project. Why, for instance, if what he says is true and if each pseudonym is to be regarded as a more or less autonomous author, does he write a book about this particular collection of authors and not one about, let's say, F. C. Sibbern, Vigilius Haufniensis, P. M. Møller, Johannes Climacus, H. C. Andersen and, just for good measure, S. Kierkegaard? In other words, if his principle of keeping the pseudonyms apart holds good, why does he nonetheless bring them together in the covers of a book and associate them with the name of S. Kierkegaard? And how can he do this unless there is some kind of coherence among them or some kind of continuity between them--even if it is only the coherence of a variety of distinctive viewpoints on a shared problematic? Indeed, as Professor Cooper also points out, Poole not infrequently has great success in "telling us what works which 'do not mean but are' actually mean."

There *is* meaning, there *is* coherence among the books you find shelved together by your librarian as "The Works of S. Kierkegaard". Yet this is not simply to dismiss the

seriousness or even the importance of what Poole is doing. Read as a corrective (or even "supplement") to other aspects of the readerly tradition *The Indirect Communication* warns us against a too easy identification and appropriation of that meaning. Writing as one whom Professor Cooper associates with what he regards as Poole's errors, I am minimally obliged to stand by Poole in this: that the "what" of his works cannot be adequately represented unless we also take into account the "how" and that the unity of the *oeuvre* is not the kind of unity aspired to by, perhaps, an A. J. Ayer or even a Habermas--it is the kind of unity developed and articulated through a polyphony of voices, a complex texture of genres and the whole circus of irony, humor, satire, deception, seduction and so on that Kierkegaard puts on show. Poetry cannot be paraphrased, we know: but does that mean that poetry can't be interpreted? Surely not. It does, however, mean that the task of interpreting must be carried through with all the patience and all the craft of the poet himself. The critic must wrestle, as the poet has wrestled, with language, meaning, situation and existence, if he is to enter into the space and *Fragestellung* of the poet's work. When the life and life-world of the poet are, moreover, removed from us by a hundred and fifty years then we must also engage the efforts and methods of historical research and reconstruction. But that is only the beginning--and it certainly doesn't preclude our going on to questions as to the importance of the insights, aspirations and claims stated or implied in the poetry. To acknowledge the literary dimension of Kierkegaard's work is not then to deny the possibility of going on to discuss its religious and philosophical significance. Indeed, all three interpretative tactics must be worked through side by side and in constant interaction with each other if our interpretative strategy is to get anywhere at all.

At this point, however, a second wave of questions sweeps into view. For now we must ask whether Poole's book works in its own terms. Is the "Kierkegaard" whom he represents the "Kierkegaard" who wrote the books we know he wrote and who wrote them out of a singular personal passion and a specific historical situation?

Firstly, it must be said (so let it now be said!) that many of Poole's analyses challenge us to a stimulating re-reading of the texts under discussion and throw a new and illuminating light on things that had, by reason of familiarity, grown old and disregarded. Here, for example, I would mention his attention to the significance of the language and academic procedures connected with *The Concept of Irony*, the complexities (personal and literary) of the "ending" of *Repetition*, the analysis of the "insets" in *Quidam's Diary*, the significance of Kierkegaard's walks

and the presence of Thorvaldsen's sculptures in the later religious discourses. Even his discussion of the serpentine sibilants of *The Concept of Anxiety*, though not in my view convincing, is absorbing and provocative--and were we meant to take it too seriously anyway?

Yet (and even in connection with some of his more brilliant readings) there is a troubling tendentiousness that shows itself both in the selection of texts discussed and in what emerges as Poole's view of Kierkegaard's intellectual background. These things are sometimes connected as, for instance, in the case of *Either/Or*, a book to which he devotes only a few passing comments. This omission is both extraordinary (in an interpretation devoted to "the indirect communication") and significant. One of the few references Poole does make to it is when he speaks of "the entire joke against Hegel that is *Either/Or*." (p. 152) But in what sense is *Either/Or* a joke against Hegel? Surely, Hegel is only marginally targeted here--for Kierkegaard has quite other foes in view, namely the tendency in romantic aestheticism that he saw represented in one age by Schlegel and in another by "Young Germany," a tendency that he regarded as intrinsically self-deceptive and ultimately atheistic. (And, of course, beyond these particular, localized movements he detected a universal human problematic.) But Poole has little time for this particular dimension of Kierkegaard's polemics. He only has eyes for what he regards as "The Big Fight" itself, i.e., "Kierkegaard versus Hegel (or, more precisely, those he regards as Hegel's Danish simulacra: Martensen and Heiberg)."

This, however, is a narrowing of perspective that does little justice to the Danish intellectual scene of Kierkegaard's formative years and excludes a significant range of Kierkegaard's own authorial concerns. For it is simply not the case that Hegelianism was ever dominant in Denmark in the way that Poole assumes it was. Heiberg himself, as the leading representative of Hegelianism, was not a philosopher of the calibre of either Sibbern or Møller, both of whom had committed themselves in print to the rebuttal of key aspects of Hegel before the opening of Kierkegaard's authorship. Martensen, as Poole notes, was already moving away from a rigid adherence to the Hegelian party-line before the defence of Kierkegaard's dissertation. Schleiermacher was not unknown in Denmark (indeed, Kierkegaard studied him with Martensen), nor should we (could we?) forget Grundtvig! Romantic idealism, of a moderate, balanced and empirically directed kind, was far more representative of the Danish establishment, "the men of 1804", than the Master in Berlin ever was--and Kierkegaard's own critique of Hegel bears

ready comparison (in content if not in form) with their position.

Coupled with this one-sided characterization of Kierkegaard's intellectual background is a puzzling (puzzling, that is, in the case of a critic concerned with the "how" of Kierkegaard's writing) lack of interest in Kierkegaard's own scattered theorizings about art, literature and communication. When, for instance, we are told that (in 1846) "a literary review was for Kierkegaard a new form" (p. 225) this is to ask us to ignore the considerable amount of writing that Kierkegaard has already done in the form of a review and his own reflections as to what a review should be. This is doubly peculiar in that Poole began with a careful study of Kierkegaard's Andersen critique--itself every inch a review and one that espoused essentially the same viewpoint and values as were to be found in the later *Two Ages!* Kierkegaard had a highly reflected and coherent understanding of the nature of art and literature that embraced both historical and analytical aspects and, I would argue, some attention to that is a *sine qua non* of studying his own writings from a literary point of view. (This is not to say that his own writings necessarily embody his principles: simply that the relationship between literary principle and literary practice is, in this case, illuminating.)

This is not merely to dig about trivially in the footnotes of history, for there are important interpretative consequences. The first is that a deeper attention to context and a more extensive analysis of Kierkegaard's own aesthetic theory enable us to locate the cultural space of his authorship in a way that begins to make sense of many of the otherwise disparate and apparently unconnected elements in it.

For example: Hegel was important for Kierkegaard--how could it be otherwise?--but chiefly in the negative sense that he represented a failed attempt to address the fundamental problematic of the age and, by virtue of that very failure, gave a further impulse to the unfolding of the scenario of cultural, intellectual and religious nihilism for which, in Kierkegaard's view, "the year 1848" was a fateful instantiation. Rather than Hegel himself, Kierkegaard had in aim the fundamental scepticism of all idealistic philosophy, the radical irony of romanticism and the materialistic "levelling" of the revolutionary 1840s. (Not, we must immediately add, that Kierkegaard thereby becomes classifiable as a representative of bourgeois reaction; for, as is increasingly clear in the later development of his authorship, the "establishment" too is implicated in the history and advent of such nihilism--just as, for Heidegger, metaphysics itself fuels the very nihilism against which it claims to offer protection.)

All this suggests a coherent authorial strategy--and, I would argue, one that can be traced across a variety of pseudonyms as well as through the signed works; moreover, it is one that works itself out at the literary, philosophical and religious levels that are constantly interacting throughout Kierkegaard's authorship as a whole. The relationship between pseudonyms and genres in the authorship is not arbitrary but reflected and constructive.

So, to return to Poole, the discussion of the "inset" in *Quidam's Diary* entitled "A Possibility" may, as Poole interprets it, be read as a piece of peculiarly baffling literary hide-and-seek, in which the agonized secret of Kierkegaard's life glimmers between the lines only once more to be extinguished in impenetrable darkness. On the other hand, I would argue, it is not irrelevant to the discussion of necessity and possibility and their relation to despair that we find in *The Sickness Unto Death*. Indeed, had Anti-Climacus so wished, he could well have referred to it as a highly pertinent case-study--and, conversely (I know Poole disagrees), both "A Possibility" and the Diary as a whole anticipate the religious crisis of the self that the Anti-Climacus writings were to make more explicit. Just as importantly, they do so in a manner that is of a piece with (though not in the manner of) the Climacean writings, *The Concept of Anxiety*, the upbuilding discourses and so on.

The mention of this inset moves us on, however, to another important aspect of Poole's book. For, on his reading, the insets point us towards (though ultimately concealing) the painful mystery of Kierkegaard's relations with his father. In fact, as the book progresses, Kierkegaard the author gives way to Kierkegaard the man, with the "Corsair Affair" marking, in Poole's view, a definitive turning-point in Kierkegaard's life and thought. As "indirect communication" yields to "reduplication" we are swept, with Kierkegaard, into "a lived ethics that is peculiarly of our time." (p. 1) The "Life of Kierkegaard" that takes shape in this second half of Poole's study is passionately and compellingly written. Strangely, in a work devoted to undermining the thesis of authorial omnipresence, the Kierkegaard-who-lived emerges as a singularly dominant, authoritative and self-creative figure whose multiple pseudonyms are incorporated into a single overarching existential project. The conclusion of the life-story is most thought provoking of all. It is, as Poole tells the tale, "the perfectly managed performance, both written and existential, of the *Imitatio Christi*", evoking "the very words, the very accent, of *consummatum est*." (p. 281) Is the dying Kierkegaard, then (three times denied by "his" Peter), for us a new Christ? Poole would almost leave us with that question (and, to be philosophically awkward, it is one that his relatively "weak" interpretation of Anti-

Climacus's concept of the "sign of contradiction" greatly facilitates, since it leaves out the very singular qualifications that can only apply in the one unique instance of the God-Man). But what sort of question is this? And how might we begin to answer it? And where is the Kierkegaard who never claimed to be able to bring such a thing about--and, indeed, claimed precisely that he couldn't?

As one reads through the second, more biographically oriented, half of *The Indirect Communication*, one begins (as Heiberg might have said) to wonder what kind of book it is Poole himself is writing. Here too, perhaps, we are being duped and led into the impossible tension of contrasting form. Is this an "academic" or "scholarly" book at all? Or is it (and Poole's previous collaboration with Henry Stangerup might give us pause for thought) perhaps a kind of novel? My closing suggestion is that, if read from the beginning in that way, *The Indirect Communication* will bear readerly fruits (not least fruits of enjoyment) that remain out of reach of a doggedly pedestrian academic reading. However, everything I have said should indicate that I do not take this as meaning that it is thereby removed from the sphere of legitimate criticism, question and, on occasion, rebuke. Philosophers and theologians can go along with the fun, but they have no cause to be ashamed of their trade. I have little doubt that *The Indirect Communication* will serve them as a stimulus to re-think their own Kierkegaard interpretations for a long time to come and, by way of return, they will be challenged to bring their own insights and skills to bear on Poole's work. For our generation he has established one of the poles between which Kierkegaard interpretation will always move.

George Pattison, *Kierkegaard: The Aesthetic and the Religious* (London: Macmillan, 1992), xiv + 208 pp. Reviewed by Michael Strawser.

Although *Kierkegaard: The Aesthetic and the Religious* is interesting reading for a number of reasons, what is perhaps most appreciated is that here is a tightly written text which attempts to deal with Kierkegaard's writings as a whole. Pattison competently covers the vast distances within the Kierkegaardian corpus in order to disclose "the tension between the aesthetic and the religious--a tension which runs throughout virtually every line of the authorship" (p. 155).

Given the arguably irreducible nature of this tension, many readers will be surprised to find Pattison stressing "the negative implications of Kierkegaard's work for aesthetics...such as to demand the final sacrifice of poetry, art and imagination" (pp. x-xi). However, although Pattison prefaces his study with his primarily theological concerns (and here one cannot help but think of Nicolaus Notabene's amusing condemnation of prefaces as superfluous), he goes a long way in validating the impression that within Kierkegaard's writings the aesthetic and the religious form a dialectical knot. Consequently, with some minor modifications it may be possible to read this interpretation as not so damning for aesthetics--which, of course, includes language and textuality--such that it would be impossible to read Kierkegaard qua author as untying the dialectical knot while within the dialectical knot.

Nevertheless, not only does Pattison's work--developed from his doctoral dissertation (Durham University, 1983) and published in the series "Studies in Literature and Religion"--mark a significant contribution to British Kierkegaard research, but it also carries the discussion of comprehensively interpreting Kierkegaard further. Thus *Kierkegaard: The Aesthetic and the Religious* stands out among many narrowly focused works within the field of Kierkegaardology, and should be praised for this approach. Pattison insightfully treats of both the pseudonymous and the "veronymous" writings, from the less commonly discussed "Lectures on Communication" and "The Book on Adler" to the discourses written for the Friday service of communion.

Pattison's study is timely as hermeneutical questions of reading and rhetoric are central to his work. Yet, while he is clearly well aware of postmodern critical theory (an earlier work of his, *Art, Modernity and Faith*, started "from the standpoint of the contemporary search for a

postmodern aesthetic"), Pattison does not let this knowledge overwhelm his interpretation of Kierkegaard--and nowhere does he explicitly discuss Kierkegaard and postmodernism--although he does appear to have appropriated some of the language.

As indicated, Pattison covers a lot of material in this book's six chapters, and I shall only be able to remark on a few of them. In the first two chapters, "Idealism and the Justification of the image" and "The Genealogy of Art," Pattison presents a detailed look at the historical and intellectual background of Kierkegaard's writings. Here he describes the historical movement in Germany from idealism (he starts his study with Fichte, a philosopher that carried considerable weight with Kierkegaard) to romanticism and Hegelianism, and he explains how this development was received and appropriated by Danish men of letters. Pattison has clearly acquainted himself well with the original Danish sources, as he penetrates quickly into lesser known sources, and he has interesting things to say on Heiberg, Martenson, Sibbern, and Möller.

For the remainder of this review I shall focus on chapters three and six, for it is in these that Pattison's argument reaches its most interesting peaks. Chapter Three, "The Dialectics of Communication," is central to Pattison's study, as the difference between direct and indirect communication is treated here. Pattison explains how the relationship between direct and indirect communication is much more intimate than is usually perceived. As far as Kierkegaardology is concerned, this is a novel view. Consider this passage:

The Kierkegaardian apostle, then, despite the vocabulary of "authority" which encompasses him, does not occupy a safe house, immune from the complex and problematic dialectics of communication. This situation is, on the contrary, extremely complex and dialectical and his message is disturbingly direct-indirect. Its directness (its claim to divine authority) means that we cannot comfortably dismiss it as a literary game, a thought-experiment (and, in this respect, it is quite distinct from the altogether indirect communication offered by the pseudonyms). On the other hand, its indirectness (its "failure" to substantiate its knowledge element) means that we cannot evade our responsibility for interpreting it the way we interpret it. The authority of the apostle does not therefore overrule the freedom of the recipient of the message. The communication of the paradox expects and requires the full activity of the

freedom of the recipient of the message. The communication of the paradox expects and requires the full activity of the freedom and interpretative responsibility of the recipient (as is also the case with the indirect communication contained in the pseudonymous authorship) (p. 86).

Here Pattison leads one in the right direction, for it is important to be made aware of the indirect nature of the veronymous discourses, so that one may later grasp their deep significance. But Pattison stops short of invalidating direct communication altogether, for he wishes to maintain an element of directness, one which, it may be argued, is lacking in the writings signed by Kierkegaard.

Perhaps the greatest confusion resides in the awkward, oxymoronic designation "the Kierkegaardian apostle." Given the state of the modern world, a world that Kierkegaard would call "levelled" (which means approximately what we do today when we speak of our "postmodern" world), the religious apostle cannot directly express himself as such; he cannot be known as an apostle, for the claim to divine authority cannot be legitimized. While Kierkegaard does not hesitate when speaking of Paul as a Christian apostle, nowhere does he seem prepared to accept any modern day apostles, although he does not thereby deem it absolutely impossible that such a person could appear. Clearly, Kierkegaard himself is no Kierkegaardian apostle, for there is no direct claim to divine authority within his project.

Quite the contrary, Kierkegaard repeatedly denies any possible misreading by strictly maintaining that he is "without authority." This designation serves as a clear characteristic of a given work's indirectness, for by claiming his lack of authority Kierkegaard absents himself from his veronymous texts, such that, to quote a later paper by Pattison, he "is no more directly present in the text of the religious discourses than in the case of the pseudonymous works (or, to put it another way, there are comparable structures of absence)" (See Pattison, "'Who' is the Discourse? A Study in Kierkegaard's religious Literature," *Kierkegaardiana* 16, p. 42). Here Pattison seems to take one step closer to abandoning any claim of directness in Kierkegaard's veronymous writings when he writes:

This paper might contribute to supporting the suggestion that his (Kierkegaard's) best works and most fruitful insights transcend this duality in such a way that even the direct is indirect, that is, that even the "direct communication" of the religious writing turns out to be somewhat "indirect" after all (p. 43).

Consequently, even when the "vocabulary of authority" cannot be altogether avoided in the veronymous writings, Kierkegaard makes sure that it gets expressed under the incognito of irony--the jest of earnestness. (I have attempted to make the case for the indirectness of Kierkegaard's veronymous writings more explicit in my article, "The Indirectness of Kierkegaard's Signed Writings," forthcoming in the *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*.)

The subtitle of Pattison's text is foreboding: "From the Magic Theatre to the Crucifixion of the Image." Ultimately, Pattison wants to argue that the realm of aesthetics, language, and textuality will have to be sacrificed so that a real presence of meaning can be communicated. Not until the brief closing section of this text's final chapter, "Reading, Repentance, and the Crucifixion of the Image," does Pattison raise the question of "a real presence." Now, the fact that Pattison appends a question mark to the section's title would suggest, along with many postmodernists, that any idea of a real presence of meaning is highly questionable. Notwithstanding, in his brief look at Kierkegaard's discourses written for the Friday service of communion, the argument seems to be that the sacrament of the communion discloses a real presence for faith (without question mark) which transcends the limits of language, textuality, and aesthetics. The "direct communication" (sic) in bread and wine goes beyond the limits of communication in language to reveal the presence of divine meaning.

While Kierkegaard does indicate in *Johannes Climacus* that truth lies outside language, the suggestion that there is a realm of communication beyond language (and everything that we would call a language) is highly problematic, if not contradictory, for to communicate is to make something common to another through signs. Moreover, it is not difficult to see how the meaning and significance of the holy act of communion is embedded in textuality, in the text of texts if you will, and it is only through its relation to this text that a real presence may be imagined.

Pattison is persuasive when arguing that the religious writings are not direct in the sense of "knowledge-communication," but he is less persuasive when concluding that "the Communion shows us that neither the limits of language nor the limits of the visual image are the limits of communication?" (p. 188). For is it not easy to view communion as an overtly aesthetic act (involving direct sense perception and a keen sense of imagination) that does not imply the crucifixion of the

aesthetic, but rather its resurrection, and the reaffirmation of its intrinsic tension with the religious, such that the question of a real presence is left undecided?

In conclusion, *Kierkegaard: The Aesthetic and the Religious* is a very stimulating book. Despite the few points of disagreement sketched out above, there is much to like about Pattison's work, and it is to be highly recommended, especially to readers who are concerned with a comprehensive interpretation of Kierkegaard's writings.

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