

Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter



A Publication of the Howard and Edna Hong Kierkegaard Library

St. Olaf College

Northfield, Minnesota

CONTENTS

	Page
NEWS AND NOTICES	2
REVIEWS	
Steven M. Emmanuel, <u>Kierkegaard and the Concept of Revelation</u> Reviewed by Steven Leach	5
Arnold B. Come, <u>Kierkegaard as Humanist: Discovering My Self</u> Reviewed by Edward F. Mooney	7
ARTICLE	
Timothy Kircher, "A poetic reading of Kierkegaard: G. Heath King's new approach in interpreting and evaluating the spectrum of philosophical thought"	13

Editor: Gordon Marino
Associate Editor: John D. Poling
Assistant Editor: Cynthia Lund

NUMBER 35
JANUARY 1998

NEWS YOU SHOULD NOTE

THE KIERKEGAARD LIBRARY FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM, 1997

The Fellowship Program was very lively this year due to the International Kierkegaard Conference held June 7-11, 1997 at St. Olaf College and sponsored by the Library. A larger number of scholars participated in June and July than in the past. Several other scholars who did not apply as fellows also came before the conference or stayed later to make use of available resources.

Research fellows in 1997 included the following scholars: Jolita Adomeniene, University of Vilnius, Lithuania; Joan Cahill, University College Dublin, Ireland; Udo Doedens, Leiden University, the Netherlands; Masaya Honda, Ryukoku University, Kyoto, Japan; Mark Heidmann, Southern Connecticut State University; Karen Hoffman, St. Louis University; Javier Teira Lafuente, University of Salamanca, Spain; Tamara Marks, University of New Mexico; Steven Neumeister, Piedmont-Virginia Community College, Charlottesville, Virginia; John Lippitt, University of Essex and University of Hertfordshire, England; Brian Prosser, San Jose State University; Bernat Puigtobella, Yale University; Marcia Robinson, Emory University and Eden Theological Seminary; Tatyana Schitzova, European Humanities University, Minsk, Belarus; Zdenek Zacpal, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic; Maria Zubrytska, Lviv University, Ukraine.

Long-term scholars joining the group for various activities were Ricardo Gouvea, Westminster Theological Seminary and Sao Paulo, Brazil (visiting scholar from May - October, 1997) and Miriam Eytan, Jerusalem, Israel (visiting scholar from June - August).

In addition to working on their own research projects and/or dissertations, a number of fellows met regularly for weekly seminars. Several fellows also participated in an introductory Danish course taught by Thomas Pettersson from the University of Minnesota.

Those interested in using the resources of the Kierkegaard Library in 1998 as part of the Fellowship Program should contact Professor Gordon Marino, Curator/Howard V. and Edna H. Hong Kierkegaard Library/St. Olaf College/1510 St. Olaf Avenue/Northfield, MN 55057-1097. Tel. 507-646-3846. Fax. 507-646-3858. Email: marino@stolaf.edu. The deadline for applications, which should include a research proposal and two recommendations, is March 15. Fellowships are awarded for 2-9 weeks between June 1 and November 15. Fellows will be provided with free housing and a modest stipend. Applicants are notified of acceptance by April 15.

The International Kierkegaard Conference, June 1997

Last June (6/7-6/11) the Hong/Kierkegaard Library hosted the International Kierkegaard Conference. With participants from 16 different countries, there were approximately 160 people in attendance. After some opening remarks on the "Copenhagen Principle," Professor Bruce Kirmmse offered the keynote address, "I am not a Christian"--A "sublime lie"? or "Without Authority," "Playing Desdamone to Christendom; Othello." The next day a dissertation panel was convened in which the following presentations were offered:

Charles Bellinger, University of Virginia, *'We Have No Need for That Hypothesis: Kierkegaard's Contribution to Theological Social Science*

Dario Gonzalez, Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre at Copenhagen University, *Ideality and Determination*

Matt Frawley, Princeton Theological Seminary, *Blurring the Distinction: Vigilius Hafniensis' Critique of Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre*

Guri Gan, University of Oslo, Norway, *Psychoanalytical Object Relations Theory and Kierkegaard's Thinking about the Self:*

A Foundation for a Modern Anthropology

Ricardo Gouvêa, Westminster Theological Seminary, *Faith as Paradox: A Study of Kierkegaard's Thoughts on Faith in Fear and Trembling*

Sergia Nasby Hay, Columbia University, *The Existential Moment: Kierkegaard's Concept of Silence*

Satoshi Nakazato, Tokyo University, Japan, *The Climate of Traditional Thought in Kierkegaard*

Marilyn Piety, DIS, University of Copenhagen, *Kierkegaard on Knowledge*

John Poling, St. Olaf College, *Subjective Thinking in Kierkegaard's Thought*

Bernat Puigtobella, Yale University, *The Bachelor's Window: Poetics of Bachelorhood*

Tatyana Schitzova, European Humanities University, Minsk, Belarus, *Existential Philosophy as the Ontology of Human Being (Pascal, Kierkegaard, Bakhtin)*

Iben Thranholm, University of Copenhagen, *Kierkegaard on Divine Guidance*

There were 45 papers offered at the Conference. The speakers and topics were as follows:

Peter J. Mehl, University of Central Arkansas, *Matters of Meaning: Authenticity, Autonomy, and Authority in Kierkegaard*

András Nagy, Budapest, Hungary, *Kierkegaard's Concept of the Authority of the People: Can Democracy Be Excused before God?*

Arnold B. Come, Professor Emeritus, San Francisco, San Francisco Theological Seminary and the Graduate Theological Union, *The Implications of Kierkegaard's View of Sexuality and Gender for an Appraisal of Homosexuality*

Poul Houe, University of Minnesota, *Place and Displacement in Kierkegaard--Place and Displacement of Kierkegaard*

John Lippitt, University of Hertfordshire, England, *On Authority and Revocation: Climacus as Humorist*

Ronald E. Hustwit, College of Wooster, *Fragments in Advance of Reading Either/Or*

Hans-Erik Johannesson, University of Göteborg, Sweden, *Kierkegaard's System of Stages--Lars Gyllensten's Possible Worlds*

Geoffrey Hale, University of Texas--Arlington, *Fragmentary Prodigality: Kierkegaard, Language and Authority*

Alastair McKinnon, McGill University, *'Myndighed' in Kierkegaard's Dagbog: The Main Changes*

Abraham H. Khan, Harvard University, Center for the Study of World Religions, *Sin before God and Before Christ in The Sickness unto Death*

Arne Grøn, Søren Kierkegaard Research Center at Copenhagen University, *The Human Synthesis*

Udo Doedens, Leiden University, Netherlands, *The Notion of Simplicity and the Word 'Eenfold': Introduction to a Central Idea in Kierkegaard's Authorship*

Brad Frazier, St. Louis University, *Kierkegaard on Tragedy and the Self*

Yiyun Zhou, Copenhagen, Denmark, *Two Types of Authority: Kierkegaard's Concept of Authority in The Book on Adler*

Luis Guerrero, Tecnológico de Monterrey, Mexico, *The Ages of Life: Childhood, Youth, and Adulthood*

Helle Moeller Jensen, University of Copenhagen, *Søren Kierkegaard's Upbuilding Discourses as a Paradigm for Pastoral Care*

Merigala Gabriel, Georgia Southern University, *Bhakti as the Culmination of Religion Experience--Some Reflections from Ramanuja and Kierkegaard*

Gregory R. Beabout, St. Louis University, *Kierkegaard on Freedom and Inheritance*

Arthur S. Krentz, Luther College, University of Regina, Canada, *A Kierkegaardian Image of Existence*

John H. Whittaker, *Kierkegaard on the Concept of Authority*

C. Stephen Evans, *Authority and the Problem of the Criterion*

David W. Aiken, *Kierkegaard on Authority and Intellectual Duplicity*

Robert L. Perkins, Stetson University, *The Authoritarian Symbiosis of Church and Crown in Kierkegaard's 'Attack upon Christendom'*

Michael P. Plekon, Baruch College, City University of New York, *Kierkegaard at the End: Authority in the Attack on the Church*

Steven M. Emmanuel, Virginia Wesleyan College, *Revelation and Religious Authority*

John J. Davenport, University of Notre Dame, *Entangled Freedom: Ethical Authority and Choice in Kierkegaard's Either/Or II and Concept of Anxiety*

M. Jamie Ferreira, University of Virginia, *Other-worldliness in Kierkegaard's Works of Love*

Curtis Thompson, Thiel College, *From Presupposing Pantheism's Power to Potentiating Pantheism's Personality: Recovering the Roots of Kierkegaard's Anthropology*

Jacob Bøggild, Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre at Copenhagen University, *H.H. Poet or Martyr*
Jolita Adomeniene, University of Vilnius, Lithuania, *Author outside Authority*
Vanessa Rumble, Boston College, *Kierkegaard and the Uncanny*
Ettore Rocca, Rome, Italy, *Kierkegaard and Silence*
Bruce H. Kimmse, University of Copenhagen/Connecticut College, *On Authority and Revolution: Kierkegaard's Road to Politics*
Begonya Sàez Tajafuerce, Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre at Copenhagen University, *Authority in Kierkegaard's Ethical Discourse*
Jacob Golomb, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, *Kierkegaard's Present Age versus the Authentic Faith*
Sylvia Walsh Perkins, Stetson University, *Woman's Capacity for Reflection in Kierkegaard's Philosophical Anthropology*
Mark Lloyd Taylor, Seattle University, *Practice in Authority: The Apostolic Women of Kierkegaard's Writings*
Miyako Mizuta Gettysburg College, *Kierkegaard's Understanding of the Self and a Buddhist Position on the Question of Non-Self*
Wilfried Greve, Flensburg, Germany, *Against Authority: Abraham in Kierkegaard Research*
Jon Stewart, Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre at Copenhagen University, *Hegel's View of Moral Conscience and Kierkegaard's Interpretation of Abraham*
Jay Moon, Duquesne University, *Kierkegaard's Climacus, Anti-Climacus, and the Crisis of Authority*
Pia Søltoft, Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre at Copenhagen University, *Anthropology and Ethics*

Appeal: The Hong/Kierkegaard Library welcomes the donation of books on Kierkegaard and related thinkers to add to its collection and to share with other libraries and scholars.

INTERNET INFORMATION

The Library continues to sponsor a Kierkegaard listserv via the Internet. To subscribe, type "subscribe" to kierkegaard-request@stolaf.edu. For additional information on the list and its background, please see Charles Creegan's article in the November 1995 issue of the Newsletter. Our thanks to all those contributing to the discussion on the list.

The Library has a page on the World Wide Web found through the St. Olaf homepage. There are other Kierkegaard sites on the WWW as well which are helpful.

Books discussed in this issue of the Newsletter can be ordered from the following publishers:

McGill University Press, 3430 McTavish St., Montreal, Quebec H3A 1X9 Canada
The Marquette University Press, 1324 West Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, WI 53233
State University of New York Press, c/o CUP Services, P.O. Box 6525, Ithaca, NY 14851

Cynthia Wales Lund

KIERKEGAARD'S WRITINGS NEWS

The Preface, edited and translated by Todd Nichol is now available. The final volume of KW, The Point of View of my Work as an Author is due to be published on 5 May 1998.

CALL FOR PAPERS FROM THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF RELIGION

The Kierkegaard, Religion and Culture Group invites submissions on two topics:

- 1) Christian Discourse and its Critics: Possibilities and Liabilities. Papers may present a close reading of parts of Kierkegaard's Christian Discourses, or a broad interpretation of the collection (the next text in the KIC series); raise the issue of this text's place in the Kierkegaardian corpus; or discuss the Christian genre itself: its contrasts with aesthetic or moral discourse, and its standing vis a vis critique from secular or pluralistic perspectives.
- 2) The Dialectics of Possibility: Human and Divine. Papers may elaborate a specific Kierkegaardian claim (for example, that "God is that everything is possible," [F&T and SUD]); or discuss freedom and possibility as factors in self-formation (including constraints arising from history, gender, race, or social and political organization).

25 minute reading time; citations should be keyed to new Princeton translations. A wide range of exploratory and critical interpretative methods is encouraged. Proposals should be sent, in triplicate, by March 1 to Professor Edward Mooney, 1564 Milvia St., Berkeley, CA 94709.

For 1999 AAR meetings, The Kierkegaard, Religion and Culture Group will invite submissions on

- 1) The Point of View of my Work as an Author, and/or Prefaces.
- 2) Kierkegaard and Theology: The 20th Century and the Next.

INTERNATIONAL KIERKEGAARD COMMENTARY

Robert Perkins reports that the volume on the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* is out. The Commentary on *Stages on Life's Way* is in process. People interested in contributing to this volume should send Professor Perkins a proposal. His address is as follows: Robert L. Perkins, Editor, International Kierkegaard Commentary, Stetson University, Philosophy Department, campus Box 8250, DeLand, FL 32720-3756; (FAX: 904 822-8825; e-mail: Perkins@suvax1.stetson.edu)

SØREN KIERKEGAARDS SKRIFTER

A fourth edition of *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter*, edited by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Joakim Garff, Johnny Kondrup, Alastair McKinnon and Finn Hauberg Mortensen is in the process of being published. The first five volumes of *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter* were published on 10 October 1997, with three text volumes and two volumes of commentary. Volume 4 with commentaries will be published in March 1997. *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter* are published by Gad Publishers in collaboration with the Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre. For more information please contact GadPublishers, 32 Vimmelskaflet . DK-1161 Copenhagen K Phone + 45 33 15 05 58 Fax + 45 33 11 08 00 E-mail sekr@gads-forlags.dk

REVIEWS

Steven M. Emmanuel, *Kierkegaard and the Concept of Revelation* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996) Review by Steven Leach, University of New Mexico.

The pairing of terms in the title of Kierkegaard and the Concept of Revelation is apt: Emmanuel's book does two things and does them both well. Although the work focuses on the general area of Kierkegaard's concept of Christian revelation, primarily as presented in Fragments, Postscript, and Book on Adler, it also makes a positive contribution to many other technical issues of current Kierkegaard scholarship. In this way Emmanuel's book will be useful both to those who are new to Kierkegaard studies and to those with more specialized interests.

The first chapter is a good example of the book's twofold enterprise. While the beginner will find there an admirable introduction to the problem of pseudonymity, those with deeper interests will find lucid treatments of Henning Fenger, Louis Mackey, George Steiner, and others. Emmanuel steers a middle course between the common approach to the pseudonyms and that of the deconstructionists. On the one hand, Emmanuel

correctly diagnoses a problem that arises when one simply focuses on the philosophical content of each of the pseudonymous works rather than on whether Kierkegaard personally held any of these views. The solidity of the "neutral ground" that he, C. Stephen Evans and others thus attempt to establish with respect to the pseudonymous works fades away when one turns from the particular work and begins to look at the place of that work within Kierkegaard's overall intention. On the other hand, although appreciative of efforts, such as Paul L. Holmer's, to organize the aesthetic works according to Point of View, Emmanuel tries to take seriously the "alterity" of the pseudonymous texts and thereby runs up squarely against their postmodern interpreters. An example of this latter group is Mackey, who argues against the unity of the authorship and determines, according to Emmanuel, that "the distinction between the aesthetic and religious modes in discourse is strictly undecidable." Emmanuel counters effectively that

Kierkegaard would only go part way with the deconstructivist critics, in that, while Kierkegaard admits the possibility of language deceiving us, he also insists on the "existence of a grounding authenticity." Emmanuel finds this authenticity in the "implied author" of Kierkegaard's works as a whole, that is, in an idealized version of a possible author, such as what one finds in Point of View. Emmanuel returns to some of these issues at the end of the book, in chapter eight, when he takes up the 1847 lectures on communication, in response to questions about indirect communication raised by John A. Mourant.

Chapter two places Kierkegaard in relation to traditional philosophy. It provides both a general introduction to Kierkegaard's relation to Hegelianism and a response to some current critiques of Kierkegaard's use of Hegel. Emmanuel points out that, because Kierkegaard's work is performed against the backdrop of Hegelian philosophy, the only way Kierkegaard could clarify the concepts of genuine Christianity is by combating attempts to assimilate Christian concepts to the Hegelian. Kierkegaard attacks Hegel's fundamental assumption that logic can fully describe reality, on the grounds that it fails to account for the existing subject who, for Kierkegaard, is a "synthesis of irreconcilable opposites" conscious of its own selfhood. Moreover, whereas Hegel "maintains that the possible is the actual, and that freedom must be subsumed under the category of necessity," Kierkegaard thinks actuality is "constituted in freedom." Does Kierkegaard understand Hegel correctly? Whether Kierkegaard read all the works of Hegel is not in itself important. The key point is that Kierkegaard has an uncanny knack for putting his finger on Hegel's weak spot. Emmanuel argues that Mark C. Taylor's characterization of Kierkegaard's "either/or" as either monism (Hegel) or dualism (Kierkegaard) is far wide of the mark. Kierkegaard's "either/or" is not a speculative doctrine, which can be mediated *in abstracto*, but an ethical choice, which can only be resolved in one's own existence. Against the modern speculative interpretation of Christianity, Kierkegaard insists on sin and the existing individual; and against the confusion of categories represented by, for example, Adolph Peter Adler, Kierkegaard reminds us of the absolute paradox.

In chapter three Emmanuel tackles the difficult question of the absolute paradox, in the course of a defense of Kierkegaard against the charge of irrationalism. Emmanuel finds Kierkegaard adopting, in the Climacus writings and the accompanying journal entries, a "suprarational" position. The absolute paradox is not to

be interpreted as logical nonsense, Emmanuel insists, but rather as a limit set for human reason "outside the sphere of reason." Emmanuel describes Kierkegaard's position as a kind of "pragmatism," though not exactly of the kind that William James describes in "The Will to Believe."

Chapters four through six discuss Kierkegaard's concepts of history, grace, and subjectivity. In chapter four Emmanuel examines the ramifications of the paradox for faith grounded in history, and he argues against C. Stephen Evans' efforts to show the relevance for faith of an objective study of the historical evidence. Chapter five concerns the issue of grace and free will in the transition to faith. In the main, Emmanuel sides with M. Jamie Ferreira against Louis Pojman's efforts to ascribe to Kierkegaard a volitionalist position, but he also borrows some ideas from Robert Solomon to refine Ferreira's formulations. Emmanuel returns to the issue of subjectivity in chapter six, using George Lindbeck's "regulative" theory to explain how Christian doctrines, while "subjective," may still be said to be true of the world.

Chapter seven is in some respects the capstone of the book, since it is here that the concept of Christian revelation is clarified by contrast with the views of Kierkegaard's contemporary, Adolph Peter Adler. The chapter makes plain a claim that all beginning readers should heed: despite Kierkegaard's thrust toward subjectivity and inwardness, "Kierkegaard does not endorse the view that Christian truth is a purely arbitrary matter." Adler represented for Kierkegaard the "volatilization" of Christian truth into sheer arbitrariness, and Kierkegaard's "book on Adler"--translated into English as "Authority and Revelation"--thus provides a crucial balance against a common misunderstanding of Kierkegaard's own position. Given the importance of this book for understanding Kierkegaard, Emmanuel is right to be surprised at how little attention "Authority and Revelation" has received. Unfortunately, the scope of Kierkegaard and the Concept of Revelation hardly allows for completely redressing this omission. It is nonetheless one of the merits of Emmanuel's work that he continually refers to the book about Adler throughout his analyses and thereby enriches his discussion of many of the themes raised by the Climacus writings.

Emmanuel correctly sees Kierkegaard's book about Adler as an extension of the concerns that dominate the Climacus writings. Having shown in Fragments and Postscript the futility of an objective approach to forming

a God-relationship, Kierkegaard here goes on to detail the ethical requirements for becoming a Christian. Although the revelation that comprises Christianity cannot be proven to be objectively true, one claiming to be a Christian can at least investigate how far one's life measures up to the standard one claims to believe in. Kierkegaard finds a gross contradiction between Christian claims and performance in Christendom, and the book about Adler is the beginning of his effort to chart this gap. According to Emmanuel:

[t]his book reflects Kierkegaard's belief that the age must be reeducated in dogmatic Christian concepts and reawakened to the ethical implications of their use. He wants to show that a person has no right to call himself a Christian so long as he continues to live without regard for the concerns, feelings, convictions, and obligations essential to the Christian faith.

One can possess the inwardness and passion that the Climacus books demand while lacking a grounding in what the doctrine of Christianity actually means in practice, and thereby fail in another way to become a Christian. This is, in a way, the other half of the equation the Climacus writings present, and Emmanuel's analysis of the book on Adler is therefore welcome.

Within two years, perhaps less, Princeton University Press will bring out the new Hong translation of Authority and Revelation, now retitled The Book on Adler. Steven Emmanuel's book prepares the reader for this event, pointing out, for beginning and advanced reader alike, the web of issues involved with the concept of revelation. The publication of his book is thus not only a happy occasion itself, enriching the discussion of many issues in contemporary Kierkegaard scholarship, but also an indication of some directions in which that scholarship may begin to move, once The Book on Adler begins to receive its proper attention.

Arnold B. Come, *Kierkegaard as Humanist: Discovering My Self*, (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1995). Reviewed by Edward F. Mooney, Sonoma State University

In this age of monographs, articles, e-mail, and fragmentary tracts, the first surprise on sighting this book is its pure heft. The second is that its 500-odd pages are followed by 500 more on Kierkegaard as Theologian. As good Kierkegaardians, we know that reality has the structure "that-all-things-are possible." Yet we also know our finitude. Calling from my place in Berkeley to Arnold's home in Marin County, I learned that Arnold has

taught Kierkegaard to graduate students every year for a quarter of a century. And since retirement, he has devoted a good thirteen years to the volumes before us: sempiternal blessings!

Arnold Come thinks there is a viable religious humanism in Kierkegaard. Socratic religiousness A is the natural starting point, but this Postscript stage emerges in

stronger terms when it is linked to major themes of Works of Love and Sickness unto Death. In Come's view, this religious humanism is not just a passing diversion from the main track running from the aesthetic to the ethical to full-blown Christianity. The ultimate terminus of the Kierkegaard Express--or stop-and-go Local--is uncompromising Christianity. But a powerful religious-humanism is a serious stop along the way. In fact, the discovery of the surprising detail and cross-braced integrity of this initially unassuming station forced Come to divide what was to be a single book into two. Here in Kierkegaard as Humanist we are asked to explore and test the strengths and structural stability of a humanism explicit as religiousness A but also implicit in the core themes of Sickness and Works of Love and elsewhere in the authorships.

A full account of Arnold Come's work is impossible for the excellent reason that he is so patiently faithful to so many of Kierkegaard's texts and intents. These texts set up multiple resonances: a remark from one spot in the authorship resonates with remarks elsewhere--and often nearly everywhere. Since Kierkegaard and Come adopt a broadly phenomenological method, resonances sound not only among texts but also between texts and readers. Our sense of self or loss of self, despair or hope, our sense of responsiveness in love to friends or strangers, or of excruciating loneliness, is awakened. Hence to open candidly, as Come does, with Anti-Climacus's well-known formula for self carries us sideways, backward and forward throughout the authorship--and throughout our own stock of intuitions regarding how self might weigh in--how, and by whom or what.

If there is a proto-Christian, humanistic Kierkegaard, which texts fit the case? The Concept of Irony bears comparison with Richard Rorty's Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, or David Wisdo's The Life of Irony and the Ethics of Belief.¹ Socrates is a figure to reckon with throughout the pseudonymous authorship, and surely must take a central place in any account of humanism. Either/Or's aesthete is not only proto-Christian, but proto-religious, as are those belonging to "the crowd," the mass collective depicted in The Present Age. But they could provide clues neither to a religious humanism nor to a non-religious humanism, for both the aesthete and members of "the crowd" are "proto-human"--for Kierkegaard, "not-yet-selves." Judge William speaks of choosing oneself. Could a religious-humanistic self-discovery find footing there? It might, for the Judge speaks not only in terms of self-choice but also in terms of the self as a divine bequest.² But Come does not

move step-wise through the authorship in this way. His method is "radial," or centrifugal. He starts with the "algebraic" formula from Sickness Unto Death--"self" is a relation relating to itself, grounded in a sustaining power. This is the center from which resonances fan outward in all directions.

If Come is on target, we have some access to the definition of self-hood in Sickness, say, apart from any explicit Christian creedal commitments. Kierkegaard still could call himself "a religious author from the start," in a double sense: he might use the pre-Christian works to lead a reader to the brink of Christianity--a religious task; and the pre-Christian works might also contain the embryo of a humanistic religion--and so have a religious content. Thus the Christian-theological works can be understood as a development of the pre-Christian but nevertheless religious, pseudonymous, humanistic works. This disturbs the image of the pre-Christian works being uniformly "aesthetic" or "shallow" preliminary texts, to be abruptly dropped at the onset of authentic Christianity. The "grounding power" posited in the formula from Sickness is given a religious-humanistic interpretation. Minimally, this means that access must be universal, a possibility open to any truly human self, apart from special exposure to a Christian revelation. An important corollary is that any portrait of "the truly human" that falls short of acknowledging this groundedness in the power of Another--say a secular standpoint that pointedly excludes all such "transcendent" grounding--is to that extent deficient.

Necessity. How do the relata of the relation grounded in another--freedom, necessity, the eternal, the finite, etc.--get defined? Does Kierkegaard change or grow in his understanding of these terms? Is the freedom of Anti-Climacus more complex than the freedom of Judge Wilhelm? Come is meticulous in tracing subtle changes. Some of Arnold Come's most rewarding sections trace growth, mark development, say, in Kierkegaard's notion of necessity. The shift in "necessity" between Fragments and Sickness unto Death is from a necessity linked to historical, natural endowments--gender, talent, political milieu, and the like, factors which seem largely given and linked to our finitude, to another necessity in some ways contrary to the first. This second necessity is linked not to natural constraints but to moral imperatives. It is the necessity of morally inescapable and utterly compelling ethico-religious demands. It is the necessity discovered in moments of crucial decision, seeing "the one thing I must do."

We live in this age and not another, in this body and not another, offspring of these parents and no other. These inescapable factors shape the limits of our freedom, its outer edges. But the moral necessity that animates "the one thing I must do" is of a different order. It is a necessity expressive of freedom, not constrictive of it. Only the most free of creatures can be confronted with a demand, a call, which in its singularity and focused power, diminishes whatever multitude of alternatives had previously bewildered, distracted, or paralyzed our capacity to act. As one confronts such inescapable necessity, competitor options are swept away. This necessity defines the center of freedom's ultimate power and effectiveness in shaping a truly human integrity and identity.

Similar changes can be traced in other relata in the formula for self: for example, the concepts of possibility and of the eternal change from text to text. "Possibility" as an array of "merely possible" options approached with observational detachment or aesthetic indifference becomes "possibility" as constitutive of the ground of our being, not something held at arm's length. If God in Sickness is "that all things are possible," then to rest transparently in "the power that constituted us" is to rest in the embrace of possibility, the bracing power of "all-things-are-possible." (KAH,288) We become aware of our own self-structure as possibility at the moment we find it affirmed by and continuous with a "deeper dynamism of reality," the power that constitutes us and in which we are transparently grounded.

Love. A major constructive step in Come's account is to show how the love of Works of Love provides content for a self's freedom. "That-all-things-are-possible" is given a more specific meaning now, namely that love is always possible, and its imperishable possibility is related to its eternity. In any love relation, there are at least three terms: two lovers, and the relation of each to love-itself. Love grows on itself. Loving parents increase the capacities of children for love. And giving out our love is somehow linked (not through calculation or expectation) to getting back a love. In loving our children we can come to know the blessedness of a love returned--if not directly from the child, then from the source that empowers our own capacity for love. We feel and are informed by love-itself--as we exercise it. But how does this renewal of love between persons, and between persons and the divine, get started? If we believe our initial and primordial state is an inert lovelessness, what "jump-starts" the reciprocating engines of Love? Come answers by questioning the premise. Our initial and

primordial state is NOT inert lovelessness if we accept a definition of the human (as elaborated in religiousness A and in Sickness) as positing that we are always already inextricably related to a dynamic process--say the dynamic of love-itself. "*The universal human resource of religious love ... is built into the fundamental structure of human nature.*" (KAH, 373) And some degree of access to this love is present (however occluded) even in despair. This answers one conundrum and introduces another.

The new conundrum is: How did we ever manage to fall away from, or out of, such love? And this becomes the question: How is self-deception possible? If we are not in vibrant contact with the loving power that saves, how did we get deceived away from our reality? One can get clear about what the paradox of self-deception amounts to; but those acquainted with the vast literature on self-deception will know that its paradox has by no means been dissolved. Perhaps we don't so much eliminate paradox in our existential or humanistic or philosophical development as trade in shallow and deadening paradoxes for deeper and more animating ones.³

There is reduplication in love: each person gets what she or he gives. Perhaps love is an arc flowing between two poles--all the while dependent on love-itself as an ambient potential of encompassing reality that, when sparked, arcs from lover to beloved and back again. In this image the movement of resignation can be pictured as disappointment that one cannot sustain the spark of love through human powers alone. Hence one directs love toward another world, a transcendent object, giving up on worldly love. But for one who has faith, there is assurance that even if worldly loves temporarily fail, there is love-itself, an ambient third already in place, part of our reality to which we and others have sustaining access. Faith is then the trust that love arcs out from the self and arcs back to the self as a self recognizes itself as grounded in the power of another, the third in the triad, love-itself, or god as love. This trust is based on the corollary that love itself, God, is that-all-things-are-possible.

Ethics. Our kinship with the ethical is connected not only to the familiarity of basic precepts and behaviors of a moral life, but also with the notion that we are close enough to these precepts that we can found our identity on the pursuit of them. If they were too alien, too distant, we could not "internalize" them as our own. Yet the ethical can appear as the uncanny, the strange, a demand or gift that seems incommensurable with the

familiar everyday. We seek the gift of repetition, but its bequest will be a surprise, a "wonder at the border of the transcendent."⁴ Abraham's response to the terrifying divine demand for Isaac is perhaps a suspension of role-ethics, the ethics of the familiar, but not suspension of ethics in its presence as uncanny transcendence of the familiar.

On Come's account:

Basically, a human being has the experience of being 'religious' whenever the object of one's passionate interestedness is nothing less than one's 'eternal blessedness' and in such a way that one's interest is 'ethical,' that is to say, 'expressed by the fact that I actively transform my whole existence commensurate with the object of [my] interest.' ... [I] concentrate ... my whole ... being on what is ultimate, absolute, essential in the definition of who I am. (KAH, 289)

So the ethical is not exactly suspended by the religious. Rather, the truly religious takes an ethically transforming shape within our lives. You need the absolute, uncanny connection to be sure that all the ordinary (and necessary) ethical constraints are seen as grounded in something deeper than themselves. They have their claim as relative constraints and aspirations, and can be decisive, powerful claims. Murderers, robber chiefs, or cheats are not candidates for religiousness A or B.⁵ Resignation gets inserted to make the distinction between these necessary "garments of finitude" and a deeper Other /Source of my being, an absolute with its own demands not always congruent with the demands of finitude. Resignation's replacement by faith is the reinstatement of the ordinary ethical. There are serving maid and shopkeeper knights of faith to recollect.

Despair. Climacus is climbing the scala paradise; Anti-Climacus is climbing down into despair.⁶ Climacus shows how high, by repeated striving, we can climb toward the religious; Anti-Climacus shows how far we can descend and the extent of our need; and he shows the ground, the base, beneath self and all its striving, a base that can arrest our fall.

How can despair be a religiousness B or theological-self notion (not a religious humanist notion), as Come claims in the first few pages of his book, if despair figures already in Either/Or and Sickness? The theological self may be embryonically present as early as the Judge, making the humanist/theological contrast more complex, a matter of emphasis or salience or detail of articulation, within any particular work, or a matter of that work's contextual nearness to other works. There may not be a

single, unmistakable, abysmal fault-line between the humanist and the theological self. From most angles, religiousness A is an advance on the Judge. But religiousness A is a position that has gradually emerged through the interplay of the Judge, the Jutland Priest, Abraham, Socrates, the god of the Fragments, the love of Works of Love, and the empowering ground of Sickness. The great strength of Come's account is his following up resonances between Sickness, Postscript, and Works of Love. Yet the pursuit of resonances undercuts the idea that there are simple dramatic lines of demarcation between, say, religious and prereligious selves, or between ethical and ethico-religious selves. There can be differences in concepts without there being sharp and explicit lines of division, for not all concepts have sharp edges.

Transitions. Perhaps viewing the texts, and the concepts indigenous to them, as steps on a ladder is misleading. Ladders can be thrown away when we get to the top; rungs beneath our feet can be cut off, once we are above them. The structure of a developing faith, or of Kierkegaard's texts, may be more like a climber's rope, made of continuous and overlapping strands, with no sharply demarcated hand-holds, or excess rope at the bottom to discard, and no chance of leaping free at the top--"the top" being an utter illusion.⁷ If we slide between interwoven texts and concepts rather than climb up or down them through discrete steps, then a more general question arises. Is there a steady standard for evaluating degree or extent of change from stage to stage, concept to concept, or text to text?

Let's say Kierkegaard has a constantly evolving stance, with previous positions taken up into successor positions. If we take this line, however, it becomes increasingly difficult to say that Kierkegaard makes a radical change in his use of "necessity," say, in the period between Postscript and Sickness. The idea that there are three stages, incommensurable, spanned only by a wild leap, has been adequately discredited.⁸ So the question is how much punctuation or gradualism exists in the evolution of concepts, or between religiousness A and religiousness B, or between necessity in Postscript and necessity in Sickness. In the midst of stage- or concept-shift, all may appear chaos, incommensurable gaps. But once we absorb the shift, and have achieved some equilibrium, and have the leisure of looking backward, the shifts may seem less severe, less incommensurable. The upshot, in my view, is that we just don't have a single stable standard for measuring degrees of change.

The comparative degree of significance between a shift, say, from religiousness A to B, or from Judge William's ethics to Postscript's ethics, is largely unmeasurable.⁹

Two other points. First, in depicting changes or transitions, what is the role of indirect communication and pseudonyms? Why have pseudonyms at all? And with regard to indirection, is there something about humanistic communication specifically, conversations between friends, say, which requires distance, or is it only communication of religious content to an impersonal public that requires the "masking" of an authorship?¹⁰ Second, there is the conundrum of activity-intertwined-with-passivity in stage or concept shifts. For example, in such transitions do we turn attention, or is attention turned? In conceptualizing the preparation for gestalt changes, Arnold Come stays with the active construction: "our attention turns." (KAH, 238) But I wonder. Perhaps there is a parallel here to the self-choice/self-reception contrast found as early as Either/Or II, and the contrast in Fear and Trembling between the first and the second "movements" of faith (the second being not really a movement but a reception). If attention turns to what it cannot turn, it will be turned back.

The (infamous) Leap. I confess to what has become (for me) an antipathetic sympathy and sympathetic antipathy toward "the leap"—it has become an albatross, a shibboleth, however fascinating its attraction. Arnold Come does much to tone down the simplistic interpretations. We are certainly divested of the pop-cult silliness that by leaping, a lá Harrison Ford, into the abyss, the rock of faith will spring out miraculously from the cliff-side to arrest our fall. And we have new insight into the great variety of texts and contexts in which Kierkegaard (or his pseudonyms) invoke "the leap." In the long run, "the leap" is less a helpful image than a rather technical term with numerous contrasting meanings. And Come brings us to see this term of art as the broad and multifaceted complex notion that it is within the Kierkegaardian corpus. Nevertheless I can't resist making a comment about the failure of "the leap" to capture very much of significance as an image of faith. Certainly, as Come knows, it should not be our primary image of Kierkegaardian faith.

Kierkegaard never penned the exact expression "leap of faith." But the major problem, to my ear, lies elsewhere. The idea of a leap blinds us to the "receptive" pole of faith. If faith is a "double movement," then, as Johannes de silentio discovers, only the first movement is in our power. If there is a second movement, it is initiated by

another: we are moved, we receive back. Contrast a leap with the image mentioned in discussing love, the "Arc of faith"; or contrast the leap with "the Grip of faith." We can grip and be gripped, arc toward and receive an arc from, but not leap and be leaped, or "get leaped." Yet faith as gift requires that we be open to "receive a gift from" or "be given a gift." there can be a gift or arc or grip of faith, but linguistically faith cannot be received as leap, whether a leap into faith, or a leap of faith. The impossible expression would be "we are leaped into faith."

This problem is noted by Johannes de silentio some time before Climacus' discussion of leaping Lessing's ditch. In an image to my knowledge strangely overlooked in accounts of "the leap," Johannes refers to the dancing leaps of knights of faith and resignation. His goal is to distinguish (conceptually and perceptually) the knight of resignation from the knight of faith. Each knight has an equal ability to leap—that is, equal with regard to self-initiated power. Each soars effortlessly upward and forward towards a landing spot. But the knight of infinite resignation in the finish to his descending arc stumbles—ever so slightly. He cannot quite receive his grounding in the everyday. He wishes, we might suppose, that the leap could continue upward endlessly, and so resents his land on common ground. His finish does not stick. The knight of faith, in contrast, does not stumble but lands gracefully. He has toes and soles to receive the gift of solid ground. As de silentio has it, "It is great to grasp hold of the eternal but greater to stick to the temporal after having given it up."¹¹ Unlike the knight of resignation, who is unhappy in the garments of his finitude, the knight of faith is at home in the humanistic world.

Notes

1. Rorty, Richard, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Cambridge University Press, 1989; David Wisdo, The Life of Irony and the Ethics of Belief, SUNY Press, 1993.
2. See my discussion in Selves in Discord and Resolve: Kierkegaard's Moral-Religious Psychology from Either/Or to Sickness unto Death, Routledge 1996, Chapter 2.
3. See Thomas Nagel's "paradox" of living with "double vision" in The View from Nowhere, Oxford University Press, 1986, and its connection to Kierkegaard's Postscript in Selves in Discord and Resolve, Chapt. 7, "The View from Here and Now."
4. The phrase comes from Repetition.
5. Postscript, Swenson trans. p. 447.
6. "Anti-Climacus" is so named ("Anti- ") because he reverses the upward climb toward faith. In addition, he is "Anti- " because he is a negation to any subsequent particular name, not excluding "Climacus" but including endless others. By this negation of any proper name whatsoever, we are prevented from merely looking at another, at another's name, as if despair attached to someone else's condition. But Kierkegaard does not want us, in this case, to consider another whose condition bespeaks despair. He wishes us to consider, to be receptive to, to acknowledge our own despair, our own name as pointing to the location of our own as yet unnamed (and unowned) despair. (See Gillian Rose on this point in Mourning Becomes the Law, Cambridge University Press, 1996).
7. The allusion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus ladder and Investigations rope is intentional. For a general discussion of how transitions can be understood in their continuity and discontinuity, see Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, Harvard University Press, 1995, Chapter 3, "Explanation and Practical Reason."
8. Several refutations of this idea, prominent in Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue, are found in International Kierkegaard Commentary: Either/Or II, ed. Robert L. Perkins, Mercer University Press, 1995.
9. To continue the thought from a different angle: imagine tracing the idea of ethics (or art or despair) from E/O to F&T to Postscript to Sickness to Works of Love to The Present Age to the Attack on Christendom. Do these shifts describe ever-more-complex conceptions that are nevertheless inextricably linked, the previous views "renewed" with suitable changes in the successor view? Or do we have here breaks that cut deep, that make reconciliation between prior and successor views next to impossible? As framed, this question is probably unanswerable, because too decontextualized, too unspecific.
10. In Repetition: Getting Back the World," in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, I claim that indirection involves a morally required freedom transfer. Do we have, by analogy, morally required indirection in proper love-transfers? Perhaps conferral of independence or freedom requires both a gesture of love, and the reserve, the withdrawal characteristic of indirection.
11. Fear and Trembling, Hannay trans, p. 52.

ARTICLES

"A poetic reading of Kierkegaard: G. Heath King's new approach in interpreting and evaluating the spectrum of philosophical thought"

Recently Marquette University Press published the English edition of G. Heath King's *Existence Thought Style: Perspectives of a Primary Relation, portrayed through the work of Søren Kierkegaard*. The title makes, I believe, two original assertions: that the "primary relation" existence-thought-style lies at the heart of Kierkegaard's work; and that this relation, being so fundamental, has significant implications for re-assessing not only Kierkegaard's place in the history of ideas, but also that of other thinkers in the Western philosophical tradition.

What is clear from the outset of his book is that King parts company from the long-standing effort to view Kierkegaard's work from within the frame of reference of German Idealism. The author has taken seriously for the first time Kierkegaard's self-designation as "poet and thinker" and has answered his call for a reader "who has an eye for a profoundly executed artistic design." King notes that in *The Point of View for my Work as an Author* Kierkegaard states that it would be a "poet" who would one day understand the full depth and scope of his mission. In pursuance of Kierkegaard's intention, King reads his work poetically and brings new observations to bear on the structure and meaning of his writings. Attending to their appeal to the reader's acoustical and optical sensitivity, he discerns an overall musical composition, a fugue-like design in the point-counterpoint relation between the pseudonymous mode of communication of Kierkegaard's aesthetic works and the direct mode of his religious writings published under his own name. The acoustical qualities of Kierkegaard's prose, moreover, have their optical correlative. The critical image, "the cipher," King posits, "in which the essence of Kierkegaard's thought is concentrated," is that of *spinning and weaving*, and he identifies this weaving as the poetic way of thinking *par excellence*. Kierkegaard's own place in the history of ideas, King continues, can only be grasped if one reads his work as the supreme integration of poetic and philosophical modes of thought, which already reveals the attempt to place it in the framework of German Idealism as untenable. King is able to uncover, by thinking poetically, the "dialectic of impressions" evoked by the

power of Kierkegaard's imagery. This dialectic can be completed by tracing the imagery's web of associations, which in Kierkegaard's work connect and clarify the aesthetic and ethical forms of existence.

King's study, however, is not restricted to a re-evaluation of Kierkegaard's work. His book brings to bear the role of the poetic sensibility in the analysis of philosophical thought. The poets, he points out, have long communicated the truth or falsehood in a character's utterance not solely through its content, but also by the way it is expressed, which in turn illuminates the character's basic personality. Taking his examination of Kierkegaard's writings as his impetus, the author brings forth independent, far-reaching observations on the relation between thought and style in a thinker's work, and on how this relation illuminates the thinker's way of relating to existence. As the thinker's mode of existence is brought to light, we are able, upon this new foundation, to interpret and weigh the integrity of his assertions. For example, it is not simply that the difference in stylistic and conceptual qualities of Kierkegaard's work distinguishes it from the writings of the German Idealists, in particular Hegel, but that these very qualities show forth, according to King's thesis, a different way of relating to the exigencies of existence.

Thus King's pursuit of the primary relation existence-thought-style penetrates beyond the level of *conceptual* assertion, where most philosophical and scholarly efforts have been limited, to include evidence disclosed through a thinker's form of expression. As King has explicated (citing Lichtenberg): "the metaphor is much more subtle than its inventor." A thinker's use of metaphor can indicate qualities of character otherwise masked by a mannered style and by a veiled, abstract form of expression. More generally the way a thinker uses metaphor can yield, to the attentive reader, facets of his experience and personality that his conscious intention may not encompass. King has identified two primal metaphors that reveal a thinker's courage to expose himself to the hazards of existence: the metaphor of the sea, and the metaphor of light. Both metaphors figure prominently in Kierkegaard's writings--e.g. "the waves of

the substantial sea;" "the splendor of eternity." They underscore, according to King, Kierkegaard's resolute contemplation of "the breach of the ideal identity of thought and being in the flow of existence," a breach which precludes objective intellectual certainty. Thus we are brought back to the inherently poetic nature of Kierkegaard's work. King explains that the poetic has been the "perennial home" of the awareness of this breach and that it was Kierkegaard's accomplishment to integrate this poetic sensibility with philosophical thinking.

Following King's hermeneutic, we perceive how various thinkers within the course of the Western tradition have given voice, often unwittingly, to their willingness or refusal to contend with the existential limitations on epistemological certainty. For the first time students of the history of ideas come upon an understanding of the decisive precognitive relations among thinkers in the course of Western history and of the actual diversity and coherence within a historical period. King's method of inquiry offers us a new approach in determining a thinker's individuality and originality.

I can affirm King's hermeneutic breakthrough in philosophy and history by citing an example from one who may well be the very first Renaissance thinker: Petrarch. Renaissance historiography has struggled to determine his place in the cultural context of the fourteenth century. What can King's hermeneutic and research provide us as a means for achieving a new and more accurate definition of the Renaissance's inception?

Consider what historians have portrayed as a prime facet of the Renaissance's religious expression: the emphasis on subjectivity. If it was Kierkegaard's accomplishment to articulate most fully the place of authentic subjectivity in the "process of appropriation" of religious belief, a task he fulfilled in the fusion of poetic and philosophical forms of expression, we still may take note of the development of subjectivity in the writings of the original Renaissance thinkers. "Ego sum unus utinamque integer [I am one and wish to remain one]," Petrarch wrote. But should we take him at his (conceptual) word--or probe further? Here King's study of metaphor comes to our aid, and his analysis of its use in the essays of Montaigne is especially helpful.

King observes that the new genre of the essay, with its subjective mode of inquiry, is closely akin to the poetic. He sees it as a "historical prefiguration" of Kierkegaard's existential communication, not least with regard to its divergence from the procedures of rational scholasticism,

which asserted an objective, impersonal observation of reality. "For it is [in Montaigne's essays] as if the dissolution of objective certainty, observed from without, awakens and intensifies the need for subjective verity, lived from within," he writes. Thus he discerns in Montaigne's writings that the sea-metaphor expresses his scepticism toward the certainty and stability of human knowledge, as when Montaigne writes: "...we, and our judgment, go on flowing and rolling unceasingly." We may see an analogous scepticism surfacing in the writings of Petrarch, recorded more than once by his use of the sea-metaphor:

[We] seem good for nothing else but to be tossed back and forth like balls, being creatures of the briefest moment yet of infinite anxiety, still ignorant of how to steer our boat to shore, how to reach decisions, and overcome our ever present doubts....[N]othing is more uncertain, nothing more fluctuating, from its entrance to its exit, than mortal life.

If we follow King's study, we recognize this image as more than an aesthetic trope or moral symbol: it possesses existential value, declaring the inherent insecurity of the human *ratio* when confronted by the passions and precariousness of existence. In contrast to the medieval tradition, the sea for Petrarch no longer mainly symbolizes a frail and faulty moral condition that may be strengthened through penitential ritual ("the state of sin has a watery nature," writes a contemporary Dominican). He instead uses the sea-image as a metaphor for human existence in its mutability and transience: hence his appreciation of Heraclitus's maxim that "everything exists by strife," that all things, in this world, are inescapably subject to conflict and alteration. Do we not see in Petrarch, apart from the differences in historical occasion, an affinity to Montaigne's sense of flowing, rolling change among all things, the observer and the observed, and to Kierkegaard's later formulation of the flux of existence--the "waves of the substantial sea"--as dissolving the ideal identity of thought and being? "It is in the communication of this flux that philosophical thought becomes more aware of its *poetic* and *rhetorical* capacities," King has concluded. Therefore a study of style and metaphor, which probes into a thinker's relation to existence, allows historians to unearth important affinities between thinkers that an exclusively conceptual analysis will not detect, and conversely to test those oft-repeated assertions of intellectual lineage that rely upon no more than citations from common sources. Noting Montaigne's remark that the first philosophers were poets, King makes manifest through his stylistic inquiry the important kinship between Kierkegaard's mode of thought and that of the essayist.

His investigation brings to light the decisive "congeniality of spirit," which, he explains, is the pre-condition for all authentic receptivity between thinkers through time, a precondition that has been overlooked in the scholars' usual "peripheral pursuit of influences."

One primal insight of taking notice of the particular presence of the sea-and-light-metaphors in a thinker's work, King demonstrates, is that it indicates the thinker's relation to the religious dimension, and his ability to uphold "the infinite outlook," as Kierkegaard called it, while having "70,000 fathoms of water beneath him." Both metaphors show the thinker's acceptance or denial of powers outside his conscious reckoning, which is all-important, for the self is constituted in its relation to the Transcendent. King has detected and examined the *reversal* in the use of these metaphors in the writings of Hegel and Nietzsche, for example in their shared metaphor of the "islands of philosophy," demonstrating these thinkers' hidden fear of and retreat from the voyage of the individual spirit. By contrast Montaigne, like Kierkegaard, through an act of inner appropriation, professes God to be the source of all stability, "according to an eternity immutable and immobile." Petrarch introduces a similar turn of vision towards the heavens. Speaking of the imminent shipwreck, he states that "I see no hope of rescue before me, unless the Almighty, moved by mercy, grants that I may direct the helm with ultimate effort before I die...." God, he writes elsewhere, is the "faithful, most loving pilot of our salvation." Petrarch communicates an ultimate shift in perspective from the aesthetic to the religious, from the temporal to the eternal. His use of the sea-metaphor conveys his inner, personal awareness of the instability of existence and then of the need for spiritual resolution.

It was Kierkegaard's design to present his reader with the ethical decision by way of the "incognito of the aesthetic." It is King's accomplishment to uncover the "subtle knittings" and substance of this design and to point to the primary relation existence-thought-style as its center. His study, through which the reader's poetic eye and ear are awakened, presents us with a new method of discerning the personalities within the Western philosophical tradition, and the validity or failure of their assertions.

Timothy Kircher
Guilford College

**Howard and Edna Hong Kierkegaard Library
St. Olaf College
1510 St. Olaf Ave.
Northfield, MN 55057-1097
Address correction requested**

**Non-Profit Organization
U.S. Postage**

PAID

**Permit No. 115
Northfield, Minnesota**