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ANNOUNCEMENTS AND NEWS

International Kierkegaard Conference

The Library will host the Eighth International Kierkegaard Conference from June 13 to June 17, 2018. The Conference is centered on the question, "The Wisdom of Kierkegaard: What Existential Lessons have you Learned from Him." Dr. Richard Purkarthofer will give the plenary lecture "Taking a Good Punch-the Impact of Kierkegaard."

For more information from the Hong Kierkegaard Library and other news from Kierkegaard scholars and related groups around the world, see the Hong Kierkegaard Library website at http://wp.stolaf.edu/kierkegaard/.

Kierkegaard and the Spatial Turn

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Talk given at Søren Kierkegaard Society Banquet American Academy of Religion, Boston, November 17, 2017

Kierkegaard was no fan of intellectual fads. He watched with amusement as one academic fashion succeeded another, asking that he be excused from conforming to "what the time demands." Nonetheless, with your forbearance, I propose tonight to consider a trendy theoretical orientation, the so-called "spatial turn in the humanities." After reviewing the broad contours of this "spatial turn," I want to ask how such a critical reorientation might bear on our shared project of reading, interpreting and applying Kierkegaard's writings.

Following Heidegger's talk of a "turn" in his own thinking, academia now faces more turns than a mountain road. We're all familiar with the "linguistic turn" of 20th century Anglo-American philosophy. More recently, there has been talk of a "cultural turn" (away from positivism in the social sciences), an "aretaic turn" (toward virtue ethics), and even an "alimentary turn" (toward consideration of food as an academically significant topic)! Broadly, "turn" has come to connote any fundamental reorientation of interpretative approach that catches on and spreads widely.

Specific talk of a "spatial turn" is quite recent, but the intellectual reorientation it names has a longer history. I've had trouble nailing down the first use of the term. Authors consistently place "spatial turn" in quotations, indicating that they are using an established term, but they never cite a source. "Spatial turn" first appears in both ATLA and Philosopher's Index in 2007, but it shows up in more general databases as early as 1995 when David Livingstone, an Irish geoscientist, used it (without quotation marks) in the abstract of his article "The Spaces of Knowledge: Contributions towards a Historical Geography of Science." Despite its recent origin, the term has caught on internationally, frequently appearing as an untranslated technical term in a variety of foreign language publications.

While Livingstone may have coined the term, he uses it to name a broad movement in the humanities toward increased attention to space and place. Throughout the 1930s, Walter Benjamin's Arcades project took the paradigmatic modern city, Paris, as his focus. (More on this later: Benjamin's flaneur bears no small resemblance to Kierkegaard's aesthetes, as George Pattison has noted.) In the 1940s, Ferdinand Braudel steered history away from its perennial focus on specific events and persons toward geohistory, looking at the ways large scale geographical and environmental settings like the Mediterranean shape the ways people live. In 1967, Michel Foucault argued that the 19th century obsession with time had given way in the 20th century to "an epoch of space." He writes, "We are in the epoch of simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed" (22). Between the 1970s and the 1990s, a number of geographers, notably David Harvey, Edward Soja, Henri Lefebvre, Denis Cosgrove and Yi-Fu Tuan, laid conceptual foundations that have supported work in spatial humanities over the last two decades. And that work is burgeoning. To illustrate the "hotness" of this topic: a single press, Palgrave MacMillan, has a series, Geocriticism and Spatial Literary Studies, that has 18 titles appearing between 2014 and 2018. (http://www.palgrave.com/us/series/15002) To speak more personally, in my erstwhile role as division chair for Humanities at Concordia, I helped write a successful Mellon grant proposal to support faculty development in digital humanities. Almost all of the sessions funded by that grant involved using technology to explore spatial aspects of the humanities. You know a topic is hot when it actually brings in grant money. (And to be candid, the idea for this talk arose as I listened fitfully to technical sessions on Carto DB and Arc GIS, tools that are quite splendid in their own ways but that I have no ambition to employ in my own research.)

Because the "spatial turn" is a broad orientation and not a specific theory, one can only speak of it in general terms. What I will highlight now are just two key aspects: one negative and one positive. Talk of a "spatial turn" is implicitly critical, calling to task a bias toward time – so called "temporocentrism" – that has purportedly held us in thrall. (Ironically, I've already shown myself guilty of this charge. Note that when I sketched out what the spatial turn is, I did so in historical terms, looking for first use of the term and citing major milestones in its development.)

What are the drawbacks of such temporocentrism? The bill of particulars is long and varied, so I'll cite just a couple of characteristic examples. The geographer, Ernest Soja, writes that the "despatialized historicism [of the 19th and 20th centuries has] occluded, devalued and de-politicized space" (Talley 12). The philosopher, Edward Casey, in turn, charges that "deplacialization," a loss of any real sense of place, befalls us in this era of temporocentrism, leading him to a mournful, Peter, Paul and Maryesque plaint, "Where have all the places gone?" (*Fate of Place* x, xii, 197) A major thrust of the "spatial turn" is to press for full recognition of spatiality as co-equal to temporality in the humanities and social sciences.

What has stood in the way of such recognition, necessitating a turn to restore spatiality to its rightful place? Casey argues compellingly that the modern conception of space, developed by philosophers and scientists from the 17th century on, reduces space to a neutral grid, a matrix of locations, a Cartesian coordinate system or Newtonian absolute space, that is a mere indifferent setting for objects and events. In place of places, Casey says we now have "sites" which he describes as "the leveled-down, emptied out, planiform residuum of place and space eviscerated of their actual and virtual powers" (*Fate of Place* 183). With such a denuded conception of space and place, it is no wonder that time emerged as regnant. So, the negative task of the spatial turn is to critique the modern conception of space that led to its eclipse.

The positive theoretical task, in turn, is to develop richer conceptions of space and place that allow them to reemerge from the shadows. Key to this effort is to recognize space as cultural. It is both constructed—a product of specific social formations—and constructing—a reality actively shaping our experience of the world. To quote Soja again, "rather than being seen only as a physical backdrop, container or stage to human life, space is more insightfully viewed as a complex social formation" (Ayers 1). Karen Halttunen writes that we need to develop "a strong sense of the constructedness of place, of place-making as an ongoing and always contested process, and of the creative variety of cultural practices employed for placemaking" (Ayers 1).

As moderns, our default is to think of space and place in broadly Newtonian terms. On such a view, space is—to quote Jeff Malpas— "a homogeneous and undifferentiated realm of pure extension," a "pure realm of 'containment,'" the whatever it is that is left when "one abstracts the thing from its enclosing surroundings," in short, something verging on a void. Place—to quote Newton—is simply "a part of space that a body takes up" (Malpas 26, 28). Against these generic, abstract, and purportedly objective construals of space and place, the spatial humanities see space and place as modalities of lived human experience. Yi-Fu Tuan opens his book, *Space and Place*, with a lapidary formula: "Place is security, space is freedom" (3). In a manner strikingly parallel to Kierkegaard's description of the self as a synthesis of finitude and infinitude, of necessity and possibility, Tuan sees place and space as poles of human experience, with place designating the familiar, protected, secure and meaningful, while space designates freedom, openness, possibility, and vulnerability. He writes, "Enclosed and humanized space is place. Compared to space, place is a calm center of established values." In contrast, "Space is a common symbol of freedom...Space lies open; it suggests the future and invites action...Open space has no trodden paths and signposts. It has no fixed pattern of established human meaning; it is like a blank sheet on which meaning may be imposed" (54). Tuan uses a telling anecdote from Paul Tillich's autobiography to make this place/space contrast vivid. Tillich speaks of the contrast between his experience of his home town—an old, closely built, intimately familiar, richly meaningful if claustrophobic place—and his experience of family trips to the Baltic Sea—where space opened up as a fluid, unstable, undifferentiated expanse extending toward a limitless horizon. Tuan, like Kierkegaard, notes that humans need both of these poles of experience. He writes, "Human beings require both space and place. Human lives are a dialectical movement between shelter and venture, attachment and freedom...A healthy being welcomes constraint and freedom, the boundedness of place and the exposure of space" (54).

The obvious structural parallelism between the space/place dyad and Kierkegaard's notion of self suggests that viewing Kierkegaard from the perspective of the spatial turn has promise. I'll argue tonight that that promise bears fruit. But I have to acknowledge first that time, not space, has been the royal road in Kierkegaard studies. In terms of sheer numbers of publications, Philosopher's Index and ATLA together have over 400 citations for Kierkegaard and time, but only 40 for Kierkegaard and space. The ratio is actually much worse than the apparent 10:1 because almost all the "space" references are metaphorical: "the space of sociality," "indirect politics as negative space," "space of a concept," etc. Why such a disproportion?

If Casey is correct in his reconstruction of Western thinking about space and place, then the overwhelming emphasis on Kierkegaard and time is just what we should expect. For Casey identifies Kierkegaard as a paradigmatic temporocentrist writing in the heyday of temporocentrism. In *The Fate of Place*, he writes, "Place, reduced to location between which movements of physical bodies occur, vanished from view almost altogether in the era of temporocentrism … that has dominated in the last two hundred years of philosophy in the wake of Hegel, Marx, Kierkegaard, Darwin, Bergson, and William James" (x). Similarly, he writes in *Getting Back into Place*, "To turn to place is to effect a paradigm shift away from temporocentrist understandings of human culture and development—understandings that assume time to be the operative medium of human experience, whether in Kant's claim that the formal intuition of time is the only truly universal presupposition of such experience, in the Hegelian and Diltheyian extensions of the thesis into the realm of human history, or in Kierkegaard's and Heidegger's pursuit of the primacy of time in human existence pervasively" (xxii). Notably, both of these passages come from prefaces and neither charge against Kierkegaard is supported by textual evidence. For Casey, Kierkegaard is so obviously a philosopher of time, not space or place, that the issue needs no further pursuit. But if Casey were to make the case, what might he say?

As a first step, he could refer to Mark Taylor's 1973 article, "Time's Struggle with Space: Kierkegaard's Understanding of Temporality." In his close reading of the treatment of time in *Concept of Anxiety*, Taylor shows that Kierkegaard rejects spatializing time, that is, visualizing it as a series of points on a line deployed in space. Such spatialization fundamentally distorts lived human time, suggesting the simultaneous existence of different moments. Kierkegaard says that rather than visualizing time we must think it, and Taylor glosses this as understanding time in terms of the self's own synthetic structure, with necessity representing the past, actuality the present and possibility the future. Restated in Casey's terms, the self, in order to grasp its temporality, must turn in on itself, retiring into a self-referential interiority and refusing to let itself be distracted by extraneous spatial metaphors.

This association of time with interiority has impeccable Kantian provenance. In the Transcendental Aesthetic of the First Critique, Kant identifies time as the pure form of inner sense and space as the pure form of outer sense. If we follow Kant in this, we should expect that Kierkegaard, the consummate philosopher of interiority, would take time as his topic rather than space. And we see in Kierkegaard's texts manifestations of just such a Kantian inner/time vs. outer/space association. An example: in the Interlude of *Philosophical Fragments*, Climacus says that nature is too immediate, abstract, to have a history in any proper sense. He asserts that the realm of nature as strictly spatial is therefore atemporal. Of earthly creatures, only humans, with their relation to eternal, transcend the moment and thus have authentic temporal existence (PF 76). This idea that nature is atemporal lies behind Kierkegaard's frequent references to lilies and birds which exist moment by moment rather than regretting the past and worrying about the future as do humans (at least non-Christian ones).

With Kant's notion of time as the form of inner sense in mind, we can link Casey's charge that Kierkegaard is a temporocentrist to critiques of him as locked into an acosmic interiority. Two such critiques stand out: Adorno's *Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic* and Louis Mackey's "The Loss of the World in Kierkegaard's Ethics."

Adorno interprets Kierkegaard as a 19th century bourgeois rentier who draws back into isolated interiority from a world changing in ways that undermine his own social and economic position. For Adorno, "The image of the *intérieur*…draws all of Kierkegaard's philosophy into its perspective" (42) and such interiority excludes all that is spatial. He writes, "Space does not enter the *intérieur*; it is only its boundary. The *intérieur* is polemically posited on the boundary of space as the sole determinate being…The *intérieur* is the incarnate imago of Kierkegaard's philosophical 'point': everything truly external has shrunken to the point. The same spacelessness can be recognized in the structure of his philosophy" (43-44).

Mackey doesn't cite Adorno in his essay, "The Loss of the World in Kierkegaard's Ethics," but his conclusion is quite similar. Mackey glosses Kierkegaard's famous claim that "truth is subjectivity" as a challenge to readers to take ethical responsibility for their own lives, to engage earnestly with their own ethical realities. In truth, says Kierkegaard, their own realities are the only ones with which they can engage. When the self engages with any other reality than its own, it transforms that reality into possibility. In *Postscript*, Kierkegaard anticipates and parries a critique of this view as acosmism (CUP 1, 341). But Mackey doesn't let him off the hook. He argues that Kierkegaard's belief that we can only engage our own reality qua reality implies "acosmism—a worldlessness of the individual—that borders on solipsism" (143). He writes, "It often seems that Kierkegaardian subjectivity—the tension of inwardness within itself—far from being concrete and existential, is but an abstraction vibrating in a vacuum" (152-3). And so, in line with Casey's claim that Kierkegaard is a temporocentrist extrordinaire, Adorno and Mackey both read him as locked into a despatialized and deplacialized interiority.

Having dug myself a hole, let me try to get out of it. My brief look at Casey, Kant, Adorno and Mackey make the project of reading Kierkegaard as a philosopher of space and place seem ill-conceived. What can I say to revive the prospects of that project? First, note that the very terms used to describe Kierkegaard's purported acosmic subjectivity are themselves spatial. Kierkegaard's interiority and associated concepts such as inclosing reserve, like Kant's inner sense, use spatial language to describe a purportedly nonspatial domain. Does this persistence of spatial terminology suggest that there is a sort of spatial return of the repressed?

Adorno suggests just that, arguing that Kierkegaard's despatialized interiority ironically reproduces in thought the spatial circumstances of his life. He writes, "Kierkegaard himself turns over the key to all [his concepts and metaphors]...They revolve around the bourgeois apartment as the locus of their historical fulfillment and as their powerful cipher" (45). So, already in 1933, the suggestion was on the table that understanding Kierkegaard properly requires that we understand his material, architectural, social, spatial realities. That insight, that Kierkegaard is deeply enmeshed not just in his time but also in his place, has guided a number of important studies that already represent a sort of spatial turn in Kierkegaard studies. We see this in historical and biographical approaches to Kierkegaard. Bruce Kirmmse's *Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark*, divided as it is into two parts, "Kierkegaard's Denmark" and "Denmark's Kierkegaard," vividly makes the case that we need to grasp the circumstances of Kierkegaard's time and place in order to grasp the full significance of his texts. A vivid example of Kirmmse's use of spatial and geographical information is his observation of the different religious culture of affluent, mild eastern Denmark as contrasted with that of comparatively poor, harsh western Denmark. When Michael Kierkegaard moved from west Jutland to Copenhagen, he brought the dour west coast religious sentiment with him and he notoriously imposed that sensibility on Søren. Kirmmse helpfully reads Kierkegaard's disaffection from the state church in terms of this east-west divide in Danish society.

While (mildly put) Joakim Garff and Peter Tudvad haven't seen eye to eye on all their findings, both give us intensely detailed, local accounts of Kierkegaard. In particular, Tudvad's massive book, *Kierkegaards København*, goes street by street, house by house, institution by institution through the Copenhagen of Kierkegaard's day. This "thick description" is what spatial humanists refer to as "deep mapping." I've wondered how the tools of digital humanities could be put to the service of Kierkegaard studies, and it seems to me that Tudvad's book would lend itself to digital mapping, where users could move around a period map of Copenhagen, accessing the rich trove of background information via an interactive screen rather than in conventional book. In his preface, Tudvad encourages readers to move around the chapters as their interest in specific places prompts them rather than reading the book straight through. This is just the sort of use that digital mapping encourages.

So, thanks to the labors of our biographically and historically oriented colleagues, we have already seen a sort of spatial turn in Kierkegaard studies, even though they didn't speak of it in those terms. But as vivid and valuable as those writings are, they only go halfway to the goal. They show Kierkegaard to be profoundly shaped by his place as by his time; they show that understanding Kierkegaard requires that we place him in his spatial as well as temporal context. But they don't take up the task of showing Kierkegaard as a spatial thinker, as a philosopher, theologian and literary author who uses spatial concepts and metaphors in his project of sense making. It would be perfectly possible for Casey to be correct that Kierkegaard was a hopeless temporocentrist, lacking any proper sense of space and place, and for it also to be true that he was very much a product of his place as well as his time. As Nietzsche writes, "we are unknown to ourselves, we knowers" (1). A full refutation of Casey's indictment, as well as of Adorno and Mackey's parallel claims of acosmism, involves showing that Kierkegaard himself thinks spatially and placially, that he was thinking in ways anticipating or harmonizing with the spatial turn long before it was an academic fashion. To read Kierkegaard as anticipating later intellectual developments is hardly new. Merold Westphal has described Kierkegaard as a kind of postmodernist; John Davenport and Anthony Rudd see him as anticipating narrative theories of self; Sylvia Walsh Perkins and others have looked for proto-feminist dimensions of Kierkegaard's thought behind his overt sexism. I could go on. What are the prospects for an alternative reading of Kierkegaard that claims him as a spatial thinker, a fellow traveler with if not a forerunner of the spatial turn?

I turn gratefully to the work of George Pattison to show the fruitfulness of such a project. Pattison's book, *Poor Paris! Kierkegaard and the Spectacular City* makes the case not only for seeing Kierkegaard in the context of his place but for reading him as a thinker of place, specifically the city. Pattison's book came out in 1999, just about the same time as Tudvad's *Kierkegaards København*. But the two projects are radically different. In his preface, Pattison says specifically that he isn't undertaking a project of "antiquarian topography," he isn't interested in the city as "a mere ensemble of streets and buildings." Rather, he aims "to explore the representation of the city in Kierkegaard's writings" so as to "illuminate Kierkegaard's critical response to the condition of modernity" (1). Pattison notes that Kierkegaard never systematically theorizes the city. He even suggests that he lacked the conceptual tools to achieve such a goal. But Pattison finds the city as a ubiquitous element in Kierkegaard's writings. As he puts it, "the topic of the city was, as it were, on the tip of his pen" (19). He writes that "the image of the city does contribute towards establishing an important element in the architectonic structure of Kierkegaard's thought" (17). That is, Pattison sees the city, specifically the spectacular city of modernity, as the link that connects Kierkegaard's critique of aesthetic existence with his critique of modernity. The modern city, the spectacular city, the city of flaneurs who live to see and be seen, is the natural home of aestheticism. "The city is the concrete unity of Kierkegaard's aesthetic individuals and 'the age'… the city functions as the epitome of modernity in Kierkegaard's work" (18). As his book unfolds, Pattison enriches his spatial reading of Kierkegaard by looking at his representations of the micro-spaces—home, church, university, theater—that together make up the encompassing place, the city. He also shows that the country figures in Kierkegaard's thought as the city's other, its opposite.

Pattison not only shows that spatial and placial concepts shape Kierkegaard's thought and writings; he also shows the interpretive difference it makes to pay attention to those concepts. By attending closely to Kierkegaard's critique of the modern, spectacular city, Pattison shows us a Kierkegaard intensely engaged with and sharply attuned to his social context. Against the image of Kierkegaard as locked into acosmic interiority, he gives us a Kierkegaard moving through his urban landscape, sharply alert to its changing moods, flows, and character. So, Pattison has demonstrated, I take it, that there is value in reading Kierkegaard as a spatial thinker.

In the remainder of my talk, I want to extend Pattison's bridgehead by sketching out six ways in which I see a spatial orientation as either present or latent in Kierkegaard's thought and writings.

First, the notions of place and space so important to humanistic geography are clearly present in Kierkegaard's writings. Recall Yi-Fu Tuan's place/space dyad: place denotes contained, secure, defined, meaningful spaces while space represents open, uncharted, ambiguous, vulnerable expanses. Kierkegaard masterfully evokes both experiences. Throughout his texts we find vividly drawn portraits of places, of spaces that are particular, defined, replete with meaning. A few examples from *Either/Or*: the shop where Victor Eremita spies the escritoire, Victor's bachelor apartment where he places and ultimately attacks said escritoire, the Royal Theater where Don Giovanni is performed, and ultimately the many scenes, on the streets and in the parlors, where Johannes seduces Cordelia. Think also of these vividly drawn scenes: the Berlin theater in *Repetition*, the site of the symposium in "In Vino Veritas," the cemetery in *Postscript* where Climacus overhears a grandfather speaking with his grandson (a nod here to Ed Mooney for his poignant exploration of this scene), journal entries describing Gilleleje, Jutland, street scenes of Copenhagen and even his childhood home where his father took him on imaginary walks. Kierkegaard has a keen sense of place and the literary skills to evoke that sense in readers. But he also—perhaps especially—has a sense of space, an experience of oneself not as securely and definitely implaced but as literally displaced, left disoriented in what Locke called the "the undistinguishable inane of infinite space" (*Essay* Bk. 2, Ch. 2, Sec. 10), the infinite space that so terrified Pascal. The persistent metaphor of being out over 70,000 fathoms evokes this as does his description of Abraham as walking "a lonesome trail, steep and narrow," that winds higher up above the "friendly abode" of social life, with its well-defined roles and rules (FT 76). But no passage more vividly evokes the experience of space in Tuan's sense than the lament of the young man in *Repetition*: "One sticks a finger into the ground to smell what country one is in: I stick my finger into the world—it has no smell. Where am I? What does it mean to say: the world? What is the meaning of the word? Who tricked me into this whole thing and leaves me standing here? Who am I? How did I get into the world? Why was I not asked about it, why was I not informed of the rules and regulations but just thrust into the ranks…? How did I get involved in this big enterprise called actuality?" (R 200). So, as a first step, we see that key concepts in the spatial humanities are pervasively present in Kierkegaard's writings.

Second, Kierkegaard's insists that we own up to being existing, subjective thinkers rather than pretending to have access to a divine, eye in the sky, view from nowhere perspective. This aligns nicely with the emphasis on emplacement in the spatial humanities. As I noted earlier, the spatial humanities arose in protest to universalist conceptions of space that treated all points in space as indifferent, identical sites. When space is—to quote Casey—"homogeneous, planiform, monolinear, and serial," where one is doesn't really matter when it comes to knowing (*Fate of Place* 186). True knowledge is universal knowledge, the same wherever you are. 2+2 =4 both here and on Alpha Centari. Against this universalist impulse, the spatial humanities reassert the significance of locality. When we recognize that space and place are culturally constructed, and when we acknowledge cultural variation, locality reemerges as critical. The spatial humanists such as Casey remind us that to be is to be in place. And that in turn means that to know is to know from a given place. Jeff Malpas nicely links the familiar Kierkegaardian category of subjectivity with the category of place, writing: "Place is that within and with respect to which subjectivity is itself established—place is not founded on subjectivity, but it is rather that *on which* subjectivity is founded" (35). His point is that we shouldn't think of subjectivity as existing prior to and independent of place which is just a by-product of that more fundamental subjectivity. Rather, subjectivity and implacement are inextricably bound up with each other. We become aware of ourselves as selves, we achieve subjective awareness, only by moving within, exploring, coping with the world that opens up around us. Knowledge of self is wrapped up with knowledge of place in a seamless way. Merleau-Ponty's work on the essentially embodied character of consciousness is a nice resource for linking up Kierkegaard's notion of subjectivity with the spatial humanists' insistence on implacement. There is work to do here, but I hope I've convinced you that the two sets of ideas have similar inspirations and orientations.

Third, the notion of life as a journey is a fundamental metaphor in Kierkegaard's thought and writings. When he speaks of "stages on life's way," he is using "stage" in a spatial as well as a chronological sense. The Danish, "*Livets vej*," means literally "life's road," and so "stages [*stadier*]" carries the same associations as in "stagecoach," nodes along the course of a journey.

My fourth point is closely tied to my third and follows rather obviously. In describing life as a journey, he suggests that his thought and writings constitute a map by means of which to orient ourselves on that journey. In his book on spatiality and literary criticism, Robert Tally devotes a chapter to "literary cartography," an approach to literature that conceptualizes the writer as map-maker. "The act of writing itself might be considered a form of mapping or a cartographic activity. Like the mapmaker, the writer must survey territory, determining which features of a given landscape to include, to emphasize, or to diminish; for example, some shadings may need to be darker than others, some lines bolder, and so on" (45). The application of this idea to Kierkegaard is pretty straightforward. For example, Mark Taylor's *Journeys to Selfhood*, which contrasts Kierkegaard's and Hegel's accounts of human development, can easily be seen as a comparison of two rival maps of human life. Developments in literary theory have often opened the way for new ways of reading Kierkegaard, and I find it plausible that new spatial conceptualizations of narrative might lead us to new questions and new insights. Given that more temporally-oriented narrative theory has figured so significantly in Kierkegaard studies recently, it is likely that further spatial developments in narrative theory would similarly bear fruit.

My fifth linkage of Kierkegaard and the spatial humanities both gives rise to an interpretive problem and suggests how to resolve it. Time-oriented readings of Kierkegaard have identified distinctive temporalities associated with the different stages. For example, while Don Giovanni lives in a sort of perpetual present, an endless series of moments of immediacy, Judge William commits himself to life-long marriage, a project of continuity and consistency. Much work has been done looking at such temporal signatures of various Kierkegaardian characters and stages. It is inevitable that a spatially-oriented interpretation of Kierkegaard would similarly ask about the spatial profiles are of the aesthetic, ethical and religious stages. When I began trying to identify the distinctive spatialities of the various stages, I immediately bumped up against an apparent paradox. Each of the stages seems to be marked by two distinct and diametrically opposed spatial characteristics. On the one hand, aesthetes are homeless wanderers, never able or willing to settle anywhere. *Either/Or* 1 abounds with expressions of displacement, exile, and restless, hopeless, directionless movement. No surprise here given that Ahasverus, the Wandering Jew, is one of the "three great ideas" that Kierkegaard had in mind as he limned the aesthetic stage. Ahasverus doesn't get the overt treatment that the other two ideas, Don Giovanni and Faust, receive, but he is clearly the model for "the Unhappiest Man," and his particular curse, endless wandering, haunts *Either/Or* 1 as a whole. How surprising, then, that Kierkegaard also uses images of sequestered interiority, of inclosing reserve [*Indesluttethed*], to describe his aesthetes. Especially in the Diapsalmata, A repeatedly refers to his sorrow as his castle, as his home, as the place where he is able to seek solitude, solace, and comfort.

We see a similar polarity in Judge William's spatial profile. On the one hand, he insists on living as a public person, as one whose life is an open book, readable by all. But on the other hand, he recommends married life, family life to A by describing its privacy, its domestic enclosure. After his day's work in the public realm, the good Judge retires to a sort of bourgeois sanctum sanctorum, a domestic holy of holies.

Similarly, Kierkegaard describes religious, especially Christian existence, as having contrasting spatial features. On the one hand, as Mark Taylor notes, Kierkegaard's descriptions of religious existence seem to align splendidly with Hegel's "Unhappy Consciousness," the mindset of those who are profoundly alienated, who experience themselves as radically separated from the substance of their own lives. "By the waters of Babylon, we lay down and wept when we remembered you, O Jerusalem." How often Kierkegaard echoes the exilic anguish of Psalm 137 in his religious writings, rejecting Christendom's readiness to settle in and make itself at home in this world. But the same Kierkegaard beautifully describes religious existence as sheer presence, as existing entirely in the here as well as the now. Earlier, I mentioned his frequent use of lilies and birds as icons of presence, which he, following the gospels, describes as figures of Christian existence. Our society's next president, Sheridan Hough, has vividly described this Christian presence in the here/now in her book, *Kierkegaard's Dancing Tax Collector*. From a few brief pages in *Fear and Trembling*, Sheridan develops a rich and suggestive account of the knight of faith who looks like a tax collector. Even as this remarkably unremarkable figure makes the movement of eternity, resigning all that is worldly for the sake of the eternal, he is able, in the words of Ram Das, to **BE HERE NOW.** Kierkegaard evokes this total presence in the here and now through telling detail. His knight of faith sits in a window at dusk, watching a rat in the gutter; he tucks in with gusto to his modest meal; he bestrides the earth with a firmness utterly unlike the half absent knights of infinite resignation. So, once again, we see contradictory spatial markers—here, absence and presence.

When I first noticed that each of the stages is marked by discrepant spatial characteristics, I didn't know what to make of it. But then it occurred to me that each of the dialectical pairs—homeless/enclosed, public/private, absent/present—recapitulates the fundamental spatial binary, space/place. Recall Yi Fu Tuan's formula: "Place is security, space is freedom" (3). I glossed this earlier by saying that place designates the enclosed, familiar, and protected, while space designates freedom, openness, and possibility. Each of the stages has a spatial signature to that corresponds to these two poles. The homeless wandering of the aesthete corresponds to the space pole, while inclosing reserve, his comfort in the castle of his melancholy, corresponds to the place pole. Similarly, the Judge's public, open side represents the space pole while his private home life constitutes his way of dwelling in place. Finally, the "unhappy consciousness" dimension of Kierkegaard's phenomenology of religious consciousness bears the marks of Tuan's notion of space while the complementary description of the knight of faith as radically present fits the profile of place. The usefulness of the space/place polarity in making sense of initially confusing aspects of Kierkegaard's portraits of the stages is significant. The anthropology Kierkegaard sketches out in *Sickness Unto Death*, with its notion of the self as a synthesis between a series of polarities—the finite and infinite, the necessary and the possible, the temporal and the eternal—is an extremely helpful guide in making sense of his portrayal of the stages. The similar usefulness of the space/place polarity suggests its implicit presence in Kierkegaard's dialectical theory of self. After all, many have glossed each of Kierkegaard's explicit polarities in terms of an expansive dimension (possibility, eternity, infinitude) and a constrictive dimension (necessity, temporality, finitude). Space is the expansive modality of spatiality just as place is the constrictive modality.

I'll close by suggesting an intriguing application of this spatially-inflected reading of Kierkegaard to our current social-political situation. Many of you will remember that last year, when we met in San Antonio, Sylvia Walsh Perkins opened her talk with somber observations about the unexpected Trump presidential victory just a few weeks previously. Over the last year, many pundits have tried to make sense of that surprising outcome. Among them, I've read with particular interest the comments of David Brooks. A week ago, in the wake of Democratic victories in off-year elections, Brooks published an op-ed piece titled "The Existing Democratic Majority." That title sounds odd when Republicans hold the presidency, both houses of Congress, and most governorships and state legislatures. Brooks argument in the piece is that the American population is sharply polarized between "somewhere people" and "anywhere people," a distinction he credits to David Goodhart. Brooks explains these terms in this way:

> Somewheres are rooted in their towns and have "ascribed" identities—Virginia farmer, West Virginia coal miner, Pennsylvania steelworker. Anywheres are at home in the global economy. They derive their identity from portable traits, like education or job skills, and are more likely to move to areas of opportunity.
>
> Somewheres value staying put; they feel uncomfortable with many aspects of cultural and economic change, like mass immigration. Anywheres make educational attainment the gold standard of status and are cheerleaders for restless change.

Brooks' "somewheres" are clearly citizens of *place*, of a particular, familiar, defined locus, while his "anywheres" are cosmopolitan inhabitants of *space*. Brooks' argument for an existing Democratic majority is that anywheres are clearly in the ascendant in this country while somewheres have turned toward populist nationalism out of frustration at their increasing marginality. Reading Brooks' piece as I was putting finishing touches on this talk, it jumped out at me that Kierkegaard would read both ways of being as types of despair. The somewheres manifest the despair of excessive implacement. Their rootedness in a place and in the cultural identity of that place is robbing many of them of an ability to understand and empathize with people not of that place and culture just as it is constricting their educational and vocational opportunities. This is recognizably a form of the despair of finitude, of necessity, which Kierkegaard describes as a sort of narrowness. The anywheres, in turn, manifest their own sort of despair. To be utterly placeless, to find any place pretty much the same as every other place, to drift unmoored in space, is to be in Wendell Berry's term, "unsettled." This is Kierkegaard's despair of infinitude, of possibility. Already in the 1970s, in the novel, *Love in the Ruins*, Walker Percy used Kierkegaard's theory of despair to diagnose the pathologies of the American right and left. The left, suffering from what Percy's protagonist, Dr. Thomas More, calls angelism, has lost touch with their finitude, their embodiment. Alas, they suffer epidemic impotence. The right, in turn, has succumbed to bestiality, becoming absorbed without remainder in finitude and necessity. They are afflicted with bouts of rage and chronic constipation. Percy's reading of the distinctive despairs of the American right and left bears striking similarity to Brooks' diagnosis of our division between somewheres and anywheres. Kierkegaard's word to both groups would be to remind them of the need for balance, for staying in touch with both poles of our existence. To quote Yi-Fu Tuan again, "Human beings require both space and place. Human lives are a dialectical movement between shelter and venture, attachment and freedom…A healthy being welcomes constraint and freedom, the boundedness of place and the exposure of space" (54). This passage is so aligned to Kierkegaard's dialectical conception of self that it is as if Tuan had just finished reading *Sickness Unto Death* before writing this.

If reading Kierkegaard from the perspective of the spatial turn helps us to use his thought to better diagnose our current fractured social and political scene, then I submit it proves its worth. My hope is that this new way of approaching Kierkegaard will help keep his texts fresh, rich and relevant as other new approaches to reading him have in the past.

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Not Elves Exactly: Direct Communication in Kierkegaard's Upbuilding Discourses

Michael Au-Mullaney

I could say "Elves" to him,

But it's not elves exactly, and I'd rather

He said it for himself.

—Robert Frost, "Mending Wall"

Introduction

The method of indirect communication Søren Kierkegaard employs in his pseudonymous works from *Either/Or* to *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* has been the subject of detailed scholarship. However, relatively little attention has been paid to Kierkegaard's method of communication in the signed works from the same period. George Pattison touches on this issue in his book *Kierkegaard's Upbuilding Discourses*, in which he argues that Kierkegaard's unfinished lectures on communication and moral education can help us interpret the mode of communication at work in the upbuilding discourses. While the discourses may at first appear to be direct communication, Pattison warns we cannot take such a label to mean that the discourses are a clear statement of Kierkegaard's own philosophical positions. Instead, he shows that these texts share many of the same features Kierkegaard ascribes to indirect communication in his lectures. Pattison concludes that this connection should lead us to read the upbuilding discourses as primarily focused on the ethical education of his readers through indirect means, rather than focused on answering doctrinal or philosophical questions.

In this paper, I argue that the discourses employ a method of self-effacing direct communication of Kierkegaard's open theoretical positions. I will argue that while Pattison's position offers insight into Kierkegaard's concerns about moral upbuilding, his analysis overlooks important elements of Kierkegaard's self-understood purpose and method in writing the upbuilding discourses. While Pattison is correct that the discourses are animated by Kierkegaard's understanding of ethical learning that is operative in his indirect works, the discourses employ a different method of writing to accomplish similar goals. After summarizing Kierkegaard's understanding of learning ethics, we will see how he applies this understanding to his direct writings through acute attention to the limits of such communication. As a remedy for direct communication's shortfalls, he explicitly admonishes his reader to appropriate for herself what she learns.

If the discourses turned out to be another form of indirect communication, the question of whether Kierkegaard himself endorsed the positions presented in the discourses would be a serious concern for exegetes of these texts. If we can trust that Kierkegaard wrote the upbuilding discourses as direct communication, we could engage these texts with relative confidence that Kierkegaard would have recommended at least something like the positions articulated therein. This clarification would influence both scholars' readings of the discourses as well as situate the discourses as potential interpretive keys to understanding themes in the pseudonymous works in a new light.

The Lectures on Communication

In his abandoned lectures on indirect communication, Kierkegaard addresses common confusions about teaching ethics directly, which Pattison draws upon to argue that the discourses may be more indirect than they appear (Pattison 16-19). In this section I will look at two of these confusions Pattison uses to support his claim.

First, Kierkegaard claims that in his time the difference between learning an art and learning theoretical knowledge has been erased. He writes, "Everything has become science and scholarship, and art is understood only esthetically as fine art" (*Journals and Papers* 268). However, Kierkegaard argues that knowledge of the ethical is not a science, but its own kind of art form. This means learning the ethical must be taught not the way a body of theoretical knowledge is (by direct instruction) but the way a craft is (through practice). His reason for this is that since the ethical demands that everyone obey it, ethical obligation assumes each person has sufficient understanding of what ought to be done. The proper form of ethical instruction is not to teach conceptual ideas but to enable the student's ability to perform the ethical requirement. For Kierkegaard, everyone is ethical *κατὰ δύναμιν* (potentially) and the goal of ethical communication is a Socratic one: to lure this latent capacity out of a person rather than to pound knowledge of the ethical into her. Kierkegaard does make some distinction between ethical education and distinctly Christian ethical education, with the latter including some conceptual content before returning to the same Socratic relationship.

The second and related confusion to the difference between art and knowledge communication is a misunderstanding about who is authorized to teach someone else how to be ethical. In teaching an art, Kierkegaard argues, one is qualified either by competence or by authority (*Journals and Papers* 272). A teacher of an art must have mastered what he teaches. For example, in order to teach painting a person should have some qualifications as a painter, otherwise no one will accept his authority to teach. In the case of the ethical, every person relates to the ethical as an apprentice and no one is considered a master of ethics. Each would-be teacher is still on her way to becoming ethical. For Kierkegaard, God is the only master-teacher, and each person relates personally to God as God's student. Therefore, the person who wishes to teach the ethical always teaches without authority, effacing her own qualifications and pointing the learner instead to God as the master-teacher (*Journals and Papers* 272-273). By communicating indirectly, a teacher can remove the presumption of her own authority and leave the reader with only himself to work out his moral upbuilding before God.

Indirect Communication and the Upbuilding Discourses

Pattison offers substantive insight by connecting Kierkegaard's ideas about ethical communication to the discourses. He helpfully directs our attention to Kierkegaard's desire to deflect authority in his upbuilding works and reminds us how Kierkegaard encourages his reader to appropriate what is discussed in the discourses to her own situation (Pattison 20-21). However, he concludes his discussion of the communication lectures by suggesting that, due to these shared concerns with the discourses, we should not read the latter looking for Kierkegaard's own perspective. As he puts it, "The point of view [that the discourses] collectively constitute...[does] not contain Kierkegaard's finished 'answer' to his own crises or the common crisis of modernity or to the question posed by the pseudonyms, but they are engaged with all these in an open-ended way in order to clarify the matter at issue" (21). Here Pattison seems to be claiming that the discourses offer simply another indirect perspective on the same issues raised in the pseudonymous works and that they ask the reader to judge for herself where she finds herself in this host of opinions.

In the remainder of this paper, I will argue that Pattison's reading misses the way Kierkegaard's method of direct writing in the discourses guards against the confusions listed in his communication lectures without relying upon indirect means. I suggest we should read the discourses as a genuine moment of candor from Kierkegaard and that in the discourses he expresses his own views directly and breaks with his practice of indirect communication. However, he does so with constant reference to the dangers of this purely speculative way of writing. In writing the lectures on communication he was well aware of the irony of telling us directly what his purposes were when writing indirectly. He wrote, "Here in these lectures I really do not follow this through; I show you in a direct way how one behaves, but I am not in character" (*Journals and Papers* 288). I suggest we read the discourses in a similar mode and assume that in them Kierkegaard is not practicing his indirect method. This does not mean he is unconcerned with luring out the ethical in the individual, nor is he blind to the dangers of speculative discourses. In fact, his obsessive concern with these issues dominates the tone of the upbuilding discourses. With this in mind, let us turn to how the two concerns discussed above appear in the discourses.

1) The limits of conceptual knowledge in the discourses. Pattison connects the distinction between communication of knowledge and the communication of art to the fact that the discourses are not concerned with doctrinal exposition. Rather, he argues, the discourses assume the reader already knows the ideas the discourses discuss and focus instead on "how" we are to appropriate what we already know and make it a part of our own character (19). While Pattison is right that the discourses are not primarily about teaching doctrine, it would be a mistake to say that they are not concerned with clarifying conceptual distinctions for the reader. In the discourses, Kierkegaard is concerned about preventing the reader from losing sight of important concepts he wants her to apply to her own situation. For example, Kierkegaard writes in the first of his signed discourses about helping his reader to understand the nature of faith. He knows that he cannot help another person have faith by writing about it, but he does think discussing the conceptual elements of faith can still be helpful. As Kierkegaard puts it,

> If he does not possess [faith], then I can be very helpful to him, because I will accompany his thought and constrain him to see that it is the highest good. I will prevent it from slipping into any hiding place, so that he does not become vague about whether he is able to grasp it or not. (*Eighteen* 15)

In this passage he is claiming that while he cannot help another person have faith by explaining the concept to her, he can at least prevent his reader from becoming self-deceived about what faith is. By clarifying for the reader the concept of faith he can remind her of what she already knows, and this can still be helpful to her.

In a similar way, many of the discourses are focused around taking a concept the reader thinks she already understands and showing her how the superficial understanding of that concept fails to do justice to its full meaning. The discourse "To Gain One's Soul in Patience" provides a good example of this common move. In this discourse Kierkegaard challenges the everyday understanding of patience and shows how what we normally think of as having patience actually lacks any necessary connection to patience. For instance, a fisherman appears patient for a fish to take his bait. Once he has caught the fish he puts aside both his fishing rod and his patience as no longer necessary. If the fish would only bite sooner, patience would not be needed. Likewise, if the fish did not bite all day, at some point the fisherman would justifiably become impatient and give up his attempt. The fisherman does not have genuine patience so much as he has a reasonable judgment of how long catching a fish ought to take. In the case of genuine patience, however, what patience helps a person acquire is not some external benefit, like a fish, but a patient spirit as a formed disposition of character that is able to remain steadfast through suffering (*Eighteen* 168). This line of discussion, like many others in the discourses, appears to be a theoretical clarification of a concept. To put it another way, Kierkegaard is engaged in direct communication of conceptual knowledge. We should note here that in this example Kierkegaard appears to be trying to teach his reader about an important ethical concept that she may be confused about. What should we make of this kind of passage in light of Kierkegaard's presumption in the discourses that everyone essentially knows what the ethical is? One suggestion I would offer to this puzzling question is that Kierkegaard may see the confusion about patience as stemming not so much from ignorance as from self-deception. We might say that he is interested in removing illusions about the meaning of important character traits, or that he wants to clear up muddle-headedness.

The discourses are certainly concerned with how the reader is to appropriate this conceptual knowledge in the art of ethical living.

The discourses are concerned about the possibility of a reader mistaking conceptual knowledge with the art of ethical living. However, unlike in the pseudonymous works, in the signed works Kierkegaard does not use indirect communication to guard against this possibility, but lets the reader in on this concern directly. At the conclusion of "To Gain One's Soul in Patience" Kierkegaard addresses his worry about the limits of his own speculative approach by offering an extended warning that knowing what it means to gain one's soul in patience is not the same as doing it. He writes,

> To know what a human soul is, what this means, is still a long way from beginning to gain one's soul in patience. . . And even though this knowledge may have its significance, it often deceived a person the very same way the world does, in that he thought that he possessed it, whereas it was his knowledge that possessed him. (*Eighteen* 172-3)

This is strongly reminiscent of what we've seen Kierkegaard argue in his lectures on communication: the mistake of his age is that it confuses conceptual knowledge with being able to live ethically. But in this passage he is also suggesting that the discourse itself is about "what this means" to have a human soul. At best, the discourse "may have its significance," but it cannot help someone gain one's soul in patience.

In the discourses, Kierkegaard's method of removing the risk of confusing the learner about ethical learning is by issuing direct warnings rather than by writing an indirect text that expresses embodied poetic personalities to whom we can compare ourselves. He simply warns his reader openly about the difference between conceptual knowledge and the art of ethical living. Pattison is correct that in the discourses Kierkegaard is concerned about his readers becoming ethical, but his method of doing so is a through a mixture of theoretical exposition and adamant warnings to his reader about the limit of such exposition.

2) Discourses without authority. A similar pattern of open address rather than indirect communication appears when we turn to the issue of authority in the discourses. Pattison points out that Kierkegaard explicitly disavows authority in the prefaces to each book of discourses. In the prefaces, Kierkegaard downplays the significance of his "little books" in myriad ways. In one of these prefaces he writes that his book of discourses "is nothing for itself and by itself, but all that it is, it is only for [the reader] and by him" (*Eighteen* 295). In another he claims the discourse only becomes what it ought to be by means of "that favorably disposed person" (*Eighteen* 107) who reads aloud to himself and appropriates the discourse by his own earnestness. Kierkegaard thinks the discourse is meant to be only the vanishing occasion for the reader to be reminded of the requirements of the ethical on his own life, not the words of a teacher meant to instruct his reader in the ethical. Kierkegaard writes word for word in the preface to each book of discourses that his work "is called 'discourses,' not sermons, because its author does not have authority to *preach*, 'upbuilding discourses,' not discourses for upbuilding, because the speaker by no means claims to be a *teacher*" (*Eighteen* 5).

While Pattison sees in these self-effacing remarks the signs of indirect communication, notice how Kierkegaard's approach to the problem of authority actually contrasts with his approach in the pseudonymous works. In the indirect works he removes authority by hiding behind other voices whose claims we are encouraged to question, evaluate, or compare ourselves against. In the discourses, by contrast, he simply states directly that he is without authority, and asks the reader to take the discourses in the proper spirit, for her own upbuilding, not as if he were her teacher. He tells us in his own voice to watch out lest we take his word for it on what we find in these discourses. He shares his own position, but warns us not to attach ourselves to his position as if he were an authority, but to shape our positions ourselves.

Conclusion

Through engaging with Pattison's insightful connections between the discourses and Kierkegaard's theory of educating the ethical, we've seen that even in these speculative works Kierkegaard is concerned about the limits of direct writing in helping his reader to become ethical. However, he deals with this problem by direct warnings to his readers, rather than by indirect communication that hides his own positions. Perhaps this difference in method between the discourses and the pseudonymous works should signal a different intended audience for each type of work. Perhaps the pseudonymous works are intended for those who are not yet "favorably disposed readers" who are can appropriate the discourses in the proper spirit. Kierkegaard may choose to risk some of the pitfalls of direct communication in the discourses on behalf of a reader who is already psychologically prepared to understand his warnings not to confuse conceptual knowledge with ability or to confuse Kierkegaard's voice with the voice of an authority.

When we examine the considerable conceptual heavy-lifting Kierkegaard does in the discourses, we should keep in mind Kierkegaard's understanding of the limits of what one person can do for another through speculative writing. In articulating what patience is, he cannot help us become more patient. At most, he can help prevent its meaning from slipping away from us so that we are reminded of the task of what it would mean for us to be patient. We should practice vigilant self-examination as we read the discourses, to watch ourselves, lest we make fools of ourselves by denying in deed what we might affirm in word.

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"The Outward is not the Inward": Kierkegaard's *Either/Or* as a Core Text

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Søren Kierkegaard is clearly one of the important and influential writers of the modern West, but also one of the most difficult to read, even for well-schooled readers. His love of irony and paradox, the astonishing variety and complexity of his "aesthetic" writings with their diverse pseudonymous authors, and his digressively prolix style would seem to make him all but inaccessible to the general undergraduate student and even the philosophy major. I want to try to make a case for using an excerpted version of Kierkegaard's first (and longest!) book, *Either/Or*, in a "great books" humanities course or an introductory philosophy course organized around influential thinkers from the Western tradition. I believe that the experiment would fruitfully introduce students to Kierkegaard and to certain provocative psychological, philosophical, and literary themes that are at the heart of his authorship.

The theme I want to highlight is enunciated at the very beginning of the Preface to *Either/Or* by Victor Eremita, the "accidental editor" of the papers of "A" the aesthete and "B" the ethicist: "the outward is not the inward." The theme is central not only to *Either*/Or, but, in various guises, to all of Kierkegaard's writings, and I believe it can raise for students—for all of us—profound and challenging "real life" issues. We know, both from introspection and from sensitive observation of and engagement with others, that there is a difference, often a dissonance, and sometimes an outright contradiction between a person's outward demeanor and behavior and her inner self. This inner/outer split may be unconscious or conscious, hidden or obvious, self-deceptive or deceptive for others. A cheerful or insouciant demeanor, for example, may conceal deep-seated feelings of fear, melancholy, shame, guilt, or despair. For Kierkegaard, this fact about human beings—who are dialectically complicated selves or "spirits"—had significant implications for understanding what it means concretely to be a self in a world of other selves.

The difference between the inner and outer person may also take the form of deliberate deception, of which lying—with all its varied motives and degrees of moral seriousness—is the obvious example. But there is also the familiar literary theme of hiding one's identity behind a fictitious persona, often in a good cause, in order to be free to say and do things one could not say or do otherwise. Kierkegaard, writing in the service of presenting Christianity to "Christendom," adopted just such a strategy, which he called "duplexity." He systematically concealed himself behind a variety of pseudonyms, which functioned as masks or personae. Pseudonymity enabled him to speak in different voices, to assume various "disguises," in order to "seduce" his cultured contemporaries into the serious self-reflection that was the first step toward seriously considering the claims of Christianity. This was the aesthetic strategy of "indirect communication" that he employed in most of his books. Indeed, Kierkegaard tells us in the section of *The Point of View for My Work as an Author* entitled "Personal Existing in Relation to the Esthetic Writing" that in the first stage of his authorship he even practiced it personally. He wrote that he was living "in the cloister"—praying and reading the Bible in solitude—while writing *Either/Or* (hence the name of the pseudonymous editor, Victor Eremita or "victorious hermit"), but making sure he was seen in very public places during the day and showing up during the intermission at theater productions in order to be seen by others as nothing more than an aesthete and *flâneur* (Kierkegaard, 1998, 58-63).

In this short study, I want to focus on how *Either/Or* might be made an accessible text for students. I'll add a brief mention of a well-known recurrence of the outward/inward theme in *Fear and Trembling*, and conclude with its appearance in Kierkegaard's summing up of his own life. I begin by recommending the Alastair Hannay one-volume abridged edition in the Penguin Classics series (Kierkegaard, 1992; quotations will be cited only by page number). Victor Eremita's Preface (11 pages) is the essential first reading. It introduces students both to the book as a whole and to the theme of the difference between the outward and the inward. Victor also introduces students to the complex, "Chinese-box-puzzle" literary structure of the book, raising provocative general questions about the relationship between authorship and narrative "voice" and specific ones about Kierkegaard's use of pseudonyms and indirect communication. At the very beginning of his Preface Victor speaks of "the inwardness which is incommensurable with the outer" (27). He characterizes the two sets of papers that have accidentally come into his possession in terms of that incommensurability:

> These papers have given me the opportunity to gain an insight into the lives of two men which corroborated my suspicion that the outward was not, after all, the inward. This applies particularly to one of them [referred to by Victor simply as "A"]. His exterior has been in complete contradiction to his interior. To some extent it is true of the other [designated "B," but also identified by name as Vilhelm, a magistrate] inasmuch as he concealed a rather significant interior beneath a somewhat ordinary exterior. (28)

After the Preface I would assign, from the papers of "A" the young aesthete, the "Diapsalmata" (15 pages), a miscellany of broadly aphoristic personal reflections that introduce the reader to the full range of "A's" aesthetic sensibility—his lyrical "highs" and despairing "lows," his clever satire and his deep melancholy—polarities that reveal the contrast between his "inside" and his "outside." Indeed, he begins the "Diapsalmata" by drawing attention to an example of the self's duality: "What is a poet? An unhappy man who hides deep anguish in his heart, but whose lips are so formed that when the sigh and cry pass through them, it sounds like lovely music" (43). A few aphorisms later "A" confesses his melancholy—a malady that Kierkegaard knew all too well in his own inner life—as his "intimate confidante": "In the midst of my joy, in the midst of my work, he waves to me, calls me to one side, even though physically I stay put" (44).

As a second reading from "A's" papers, I would select "Crop Rotation" (14 pages), a sardonically funny summary of what Victor Eremita calls "A's" "attempts at an aesthetic view of life" (36). The challenge for the aesthete is how to avoid boredom ("a root of all evil") in a world full of boring people. The advice is to vary one's pleasures as a farmer rotates his crops, and "never to stick fast" to anything—friendship, marriage, work. This refined, highly reflective "public" aesthetic life requires, it turns out, a good deal of private self-discipline and calculation. The most important characteristic of the aesthete is social prudence, "and it is always more prudent to keep one's rules of prudence to oneself." Since "all people are boring" (230), either to others or to themselves, to avoid boredom the devotee of pleasure must vary his pleasures according to the "principle of limitation," which centrally involves cultivating the internal art of *remembering* and *forgetting*. "A" writes that "it is essential to have control over" (233) these two activities in order to enjoy life. "Every life-situation," he says, "must possess no more importance than that one can forget it whenever one wants to; each single life-situation should have enough importance, however, for one to be able at any time to remember it." Inner cultivation of this art "will . . . prevent one's sticking fast in some particular circumstance in life and ensure perfect suspension" (236). There follows "A's" counsel to avoid friendship, marriage, and work—which, he hastens to add, of course doesn't preclude useful human contacts, erotic relations, or a satisfying engagement in "breadless skills." The whole secret of constantly changing one's pleasures in such a way as to avoid both boredom and the usual entanglements and commitments of life, "A" concludes, is that "one must necessarily have control of [one's] moods." The chief way to achieve this is the cultivation of arbitrariness, such as seeing the middle of a play or reading the third part of a book, which "requires deep study to succeed . . . without losing oneself in it" (239).

From the two very long letters of "B" (Judge Vilhelm) to "A," I would have the students read excerpts from "Equilibrium Between the Aesthetic and the Ethical in the Development of Personality" (specifically pages 477-487 and 490-503; about 25 pages in the Hannay edition). Here Judge Vilhelm articulates most explicitly the meaning of the ethical stage of life in terms of *either/or*: *either* acknowledging and unifying the inner self or personality through the power of choice, *or* scattering the self in the ever-changing pursuit of the immediacies and contingencies of pleasure. The choice of the ethical, Vilhelm insists, "dethrones" but does not reject or exclude the aesthetic; hence the title Victor Eremita has given the letter. Vilhelm contrasts the ethical with the aesthetic as ways of life, depicting the different forms of the aesthetic life and centering on that of his friend "A," whom he is trying to persuade to "change his ways." The earnest Judge Vilhelm is of course not nearly as much fun to read as is "A," but he is an eloquent and penetrating writer.

I'll focus only on Judge Vilhelm's characterization of "A" and his appeal to him to "get serious" about life. The older friend makes unmistakably clear the dissonance between the outward and the inward in the younger man's life:

> Life is a masquerade, you tell us, and this, for you, is an inexhaustible source of amusement, yet still no one has succeeded in knowing you; for all your revelations are constantly illusions. . . . Your activity is designed to keep yourself hidden, and in that you succeed, your own mask is the most enigmatic of all . . . (479)."

Vilhelm adds that "he who cannot reveal himself cannot love, and he who cannot love is the unhappiest of all" (480). He pleads with "A" "to win yourself, to take possession of your life" (482)—that is, to recognize that "choice is decisive for a personality's content" (482) and thus to live in terms of the category of the ethical. "The question here is," says the judge, "under what categories one wants to contemplate the entire world and would oneself live. . . . the aesthetic is not evil but indifference . . . it is the ethical that constitutes choice" (486-487).

I can offer only a single fleeting glance at the persistence and prominence of the outward/inward theme in others of Kierkegaard's writings. Perhaps the best-known example is pseudonymous author Johannes de Silentio's portrait of an imagined Knight of Faith in *Fear and Trembling*: a denizen of 1840s Copenhagen whose inner life is precisely the opposite of the aesthete's but who seems outwardly ordinary and undistinctive. Johannes imagines meeting him and exclaiming, "Good Lord, . . . is this really the one—he looks just like a tax collector (Kierkegaard

1983, 39)!" The knight "belongs entirely to the world; no bourgeois philistine could belong to it more," and "yet this man has made and at every moment is making the movement of infinity. . . . drains the deep sadness of life, . . . has felt the pain of renouncing everything. . . . and yet the whole earthly figure he presents is a new creation by virtue of the absurd"—through faith in the God who is beyond all human calculation and in whom all things are possible (40).

Strikingly, on his deathbed Kierkegaard summed up his own life and work to his good friend Emil Boesen in terms of the difference between the outward and the inward. When Boesen asked what he would like said on his behalf after his death, among his replies was a very personal message: "Yes, greet everyone for me—I have liked them all very much—and tell them that my life is a great suffering, unknown and inexplicable to other people. Everything looked like pride and vanity, but it wasn't" (quoted in Garff, 788).

I've attempted to suggest one way (there are certainly others) to include Kierkegaard in the "usable canon" of core texts, by selecting a small portion of *Either/Or* and focusing on a single theme. That theme, the dualities between inner self and external behavior, is a particularly good one for stimulating student reflection and discussion on issues—philosophical, psychological, and ethical—that are a matter of direct personal experience, human relations, and the most fundamental pondering of who we are, these maddeningly and profoundly complex human creatures.

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Egoisme y *Egoitet* en los Papirer

Matías Tapia Wende

Andrés Roberto Albertsen

En una de las reuniones semanales de lectura y discusión en la Hong Kierkegaard Library con el Prof. Gordon Marino, tratamos algunos pasajes de los *Papirer* de 1854 en los que Kierkegaard habla de la relación entre Estado y cristianismo. En contraposición a la tradición hegeliana que considera al Estado como un instrumento para el desarrollo moral de los individuos, Kierkegaard sostiene que el Estado es lisa y llanamente el "egoísmo humano (*menneskelige Egoisme*) a gran escala y en grandes dimensiones,"[1] en el que confluyen los egoísmos particulares y "se entrecruzan unos con otros correctivamente."[2] En este contexto, la subjetividad del cristiano, tal como la define Kierkegaard, aparece ante los ojos del Estado como un "egoísmo culpable (*strafværdig Egoisme*)"[3] que debe ser perseguido y ante el juicio de la cristiandad como un "egoísmo errado (*misforstaaet Egoisme*)"[4] que no debe ser imitado. Esta diferencia entre lo que parece ser para Kierkegaard un egoísmo en sentido positivo y otro en sentido negativo, nos llevó a explorar el uso de *Egoisme* en otras entradas de los *Papirer* y a descubrir una original distinción terminológica que hace Kierkegaard entre este término y *Egoitet*.[5]

En 1834, Kierkegaard hace la primera mención en los *Papirer* sobre *Egoisme*. Aludiendo a la contradicción en que la predestinación pone al ser humano respecto de sí mismo, Kierkegaard construye el caso hipotético de alguien que creyera que toda acción tiene su origen en el egoísmo. De ser así, esta teoría tampoco se sostendría, toda vez que aun los actos producidos a partir de "un noble sacrificio"[6] deberían atribuirse al egoísmo.

Un pasaje con algo más de sustancia, y sintomáticamente en una línea similar al anterior, aparece entre los borradores de *Tres discursos edificantes* de 1843. En medio de diversas referencias a las Escrituras en las que se muestra a Cristo escondiendo transgresiones por amor, Kierkegaard añade un comentario en el que critica la búsqueda de algún tipo de recompensa o reconocimiento cuando se hace el bien por alguien. Kierkegaard previene que "el amor propio es egoísmo, a menos que sea también amor a Dios – y, por lo tanto, amor a todos."[7]

Cuatro años más tarde, en 1847, encontramos de nuevo el uso de *Egoisme*. Ya en este tiempo, Kierkegaard está desdeñando el poder que ha adquirido lo numérico y reclama que, en una época en la que lo que cuenta es tener adherentes y pregonar la posibilidad de una vida más fácil, "soy constantemente acusado de ser un egoísta (*Egoist*)."[8] Enseguida, casi reconociendo la necesidad de dar una explicación sobre esta cualidad, Kierkegaard afirma que el egoísmo "es hacer la vida personal tan ardua como sea posible y no querer tener una vida confortable."[9] En 1848, con la revolución golpeando el corazón de la monarquía danesa, Kierkegaard repite esta idea de haber sido, con Dios como testigo, "acusado de orgullo y egoísmo,"[10], siempre con la intención de privilegiar la interioridad por sobre la preocupación externa. Lo interesante es que en agosto de ese mismo año Kierkegaard le comenta en una carta a J.L.A Kolderup-Rosenvinge que la política se ha transformado en un vórtex y que se necesita "un punto fijo en el que pueda parar."[11] Kierkegaard hace gala de su notable manejo del danés cuando le comenta a Kolderup-Rosenvinge que justamente el *freno* (*Bremse*) que requiere la vorágine política es una nueva versión del *tábano* (*Bremse*) socrático o, dicho en otras palabras, la sangre de un mártir que

[1] XI 2 A 108, 1854 (JP 4, 4238; NB33:34).
[2] Ibid.
[3] X 2 A 111, 1854 (JP 4, 4501; NB33:37).
[4] Ibid.
[5] Según el Meyers Fremmedordbog, *Egoitet* es un neolatinismo equivalente a *Jeghed* y *Selvhed*, términos que remiten en sentido amplio a la subjetividad individual. Ni en inglés ni en español hay una forma unívoca de traducir *Egoitet*. No existen traducciones al español directas del danés de los textos en los que Kierkegaard utiliza este término.
[6] I A 22, 29 de noviembre de 1843 (JP 3, 3545; Papir53:2).
[7] IV B 147, 1843 (JP 3, 2399).
[8] VIII 1 A 124, 1847 (JP 5, 6006; NB2:17).
[9] Ibid.
[10] IX A 74, 1848 (JP 6, 6170; NB5:71).
[11] LD, 186 (260).

conquiste a partir de la “superioridad de sacrificar su vida.”[12] Así, para 1849, Kierkegaard está diciendo que “en su vida, el mártir va a ser acusado, odiado e insultado por egoísmo, vanidad, misantropía, etc.”[13]

1849 no sólo es importante para ver cómo la acusación de egoísmo que en un principio caía sobre Kierkegaard cae ahora sobre el mártir, aquel que está llamado a convertir lo político en religioso,[14] sino también porque Kierkegaard comienza a gestar una distinción terminológica en torno al real carácter del ensimismamiento del sujeto cristiano. En una entrada del cuaderno NB9, Kierkegaard escribe que “en relación con el bien tanto como con el mal, con lo demoníaco como con lo religioso, el asunto se trata de ser un *egoísta sustancial* (*stor Egoist*) – esto es, un *yo sustancial* (*stor Egoitet*), una *subjetividad* (*Subjektivitet*).”[15] A estas alturas, Kierkegaard considera que *Egoisme* es un sinónimo de *Egoitet*, en el sentido de una interioridad desarrollada que puede tender tanto a la rebelión como a la obediencia respecto de Dios. Sin depurar todavía diferencia alguna, Kierkegaard determina en 1850 que “la forma más alta de devoción, el abandono completo de todo lo terrenal, puede ser el *más alto egoísmo* (*høieste Egoisme*).”[16] Esta condición, que Kierkegaard ve como uno de los requerimientos de la doctrina, vuelve áspero el vínculo con otras personas, en tanto que les muestra que “no son en realidad religiosas en el más profundo sentido de la palabra.”[17] De aquí a la imagen martírica no hay mucho trecho.

Poco después Kierkegaard introduce un matiz crucial. En una entrada del cuaderno NB23 de 1851, Kierkegaard se enfrenta con la reticencia de los seres humanos al momento de aceptar que el cristianismo es “una invención de Dios”[18] y que, por lo mismo, no puede ser moldeado “egoístamente”[19] (*egoistisk*) para calzar con los requerimientos de comodidad externa. Esta porfía se da porque “la gente se olvida que el *egoísmo* (*Egoisme*) es una cosa y el *yo* (*Egoitet*) es otra, y dado que Dios está infinitamente exento de ser un *egoísta* (*Egoist*), es de hecho un *yo infinito* (*uendelige Egoitet*) (y no puede ser de otra forma).”[20] La igualación de *Egoisme* y *Egoitet* que veíamos en 1849 se cancela en 1851, y la primera categoría pasa a significar la forma inauténtica de la

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12 LD, 186 (263). Andrew Burgess nota que Kierkegaard debe suspender las consideraciones que pone en la pluma de H. H. en *Dos breves tratados ético-religiosos* para mantener su proyecto de convertirse en el mártir cuya sangre puede detener el vórtex político. Cf. Burgess, Andrew. “Kierkegaard, Moravian Missions, and Martyrdom.” *International Kierkegaard Commentary. Volume 18: Without Authority*, editado por Robert L. Perkins, Mercer UP, 2007, 196-198.
13 X 2 A 58, 1849 (JP 1, 387; NB12:188).
14 Cf. LD, 186 (262).
15 X 1 A 65, 1849 (JP 4, 3899; NB9:65). Las cursivas son nuestras. Aquí los Hong traducen *Egoitet* por *egoity*. Lo mismo ocurre en los *KJN*.
16 X 3 A 264, 1850 (JP 2, 1408; NB20:11).
17 Ibid.
18 X 4 A 212 (JP 1, 532; NB23:205).
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid. Las cursivas son nuestras. Aquí los Hong se inclinan por traducir *Egoitet* por *I-ness* y *selfhood*. En los *KJN* prefieren *ego*. Hemos encontrado dos antecedentes del uso de *Egoitet* en publicaciones a las que Kierkegaard tuvo acceso. La primera de ellas aparece en el artículo “Om Villiesfrihed og Determinisme” (“Sobre el libre albedrío y el determinismo”), del teólogo alemán J. P. Romang, editado en 1838 en el sexto volumen de *Tidskrift för Udenlandsk theologisk litteratur* (*Revista de literatura teológica extranjera*), revista a la que Kierkegaard estuvo suscrito desde 1833 hasta 1840. Cf. Schreiber, Gerhard, et al., editores. *The Auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard's Library*. Ashgate, 2015, U29. La segunda referencia corresponde a la traducción danesa de la tesis de licenciatura de H. L. Martesen, originalmente escrita en latín. Martensen traduce *egoitatis* por *Egoitet*. Kierkegaard tenía ambas versiones de la tesis de Martensen. Cf. Schreiber, Gerhard, et al., editores. *The Auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard's Library*. Ashgate, 2015, 648 y 651. La traducción inglesa de la tesis de Martensen está incluida en Thompson, Curtis, y David Kangas, traductores. *Between Hegel and Kierkegaard: Hans L. Martensen's Philosophy of Religion*. Scholars Press, 1997, 73-147. En esta versión, *Egoitet* es traducido por *egoity*.

individualidad y la segunda, la forma auténtica. Luego de esta distinción, *Egoitet* vuelve a aparecer cinco veces más en los *Papirer*, conservando e intensificando su apelación al modo específico de interioridad del cristiano.[21]

En 1852, Kierkegaard usa *Egoitet* en dos ocasiones. Por un lado, para nombrar la profunda subjetividad (*Egoitet*) de un Dios que busca ser amado "al punto de exigir el odio al padre y a la madre,"[22] y la de un cristiano verdadero que está dispuesto a aparecer como un egoísta ante los más por "odiar al mundo, a sí mismo, a la generación, a sus amigos."[23] Por otro lado, para remarcar que en la época presente "el cristianismo ha desaparecido del mundo" [24] y que, en ese estado de cosas, no queda ni siquiera "la *subjetividad* (*Egoitet*) de un amigo o de una chica enamorada, que desean que amarlos signifique dejar de lado todo lo demás."[25]

Las tres menciones restantes a *Egoitet* son de 1854, dos de ellas en el cuaderno NB29 y una en el NB31. Con un cierto endurecimiento en el tono, Kierkegaard supone que la reduplicación exigida por el Nuevo Testamento es tan radical que el único paradigma de subjetividad que nos queda a los seres humanos es el de Cristo. En este estado de cosas, el modelo nos es tan extraño que no tenemos "criterio para la *subjetividad* (*Egoitet*)."[26] Así, el Cristo que dice "Venid todos a mí" o "He venido al mundo para salvarlo, no para juzgarlo" no está dando para Kierkegaard un pase libre, sino que, en tanto "*monstruosa subjetividad* (*uhyre Egoitet*),"[27] se pone como medida para una salvación que sólo alcanzarán unos pocos. En un ánimo muy parecido al de la primera delimitación del 51, Kierkegaard vuelve ahora a notar que, lejos de alentar la conversión de un individuo en un "*monstruoso egoísta* (*uhyre Egoist*),"[28] el cristianismo busca desarrollar la *subjetividad* (*Egoitet*), "para, aterrorizando a un hombre con el más terrible horror, guiarlo a preocuparse sola y únicamente por su propia salvación, completamente indiferente de la posible fragilidad e imperfección de los demás."[29] Por último, Kierkegaard refuerza esta modulación cuando asume que el cristianismo, "en vez de existir en la *subjetividad divina* (*guddommelige Egoitet*), es hábilmente arrojado al *egoísmo humano* (*menneskelige Egoisme*)"[30] cada vez que se lo piensa como un medio que supuestamente debería "sostenernos en el mundo."[31]

Cuando Kierkegaard termina por especificar la distinción entre *Egoisme* y *Egoitet*, ha encontrado un término específico para designar lo que para él es un egoísmo en sentido positivo. Este egoísmo es el de la divinidad y su seguimiento en el mundo acarrea sacrificio y supone abrazar la posibilidad de ser acusados de egoísmo en un sentido negativo.

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21 En su obra publicada, Kierkegaard utilizó *Egoitet* únicamente en *Estadios en el camino de la vida*, cuando en "¿Culpable? / ¿No culpable?" refiere a "mi personalidad en su subjetividad" ("min Personlighed i sin Egoitet"). SLW, 357 / SKS 6, 332. Aquí también los Hong traducen *Egoitet* por *egoity*.

22 X 4 A 508, 1852 (JP 4, 4343; NB25:81). En esta entrada, los Hong vuelven a traducir *Egoitet* por *egoity*. Lo mismo ocurre en los *KJN*.

23 Ibid.

24 X 4 A 642, 1852 (JP 3, 2439; NB26:89).

25 Ibid. Las cursivas son nuestras. Los Hong traducen *Egoitet* por *self-awareness* en este pasaje. Por su parte, en los *KJN* se inclinan por *selfhood*.

26 XI 1 A 154, 1854 (JP 3, 2906; NB29:104). Las cursivas son nuestras. Aquí los Hong traducen *Egoitet* por *I-ness*, puesto entre comillas. En los *KJN*, aparece *egoity*.

27 Ibid. Las cursivas son nuestras.

28 X 1 A 148, 1854 (JP 2, 2053; NB29:99). Las cursivas son nuestras.

29 Ibid. En este pasaje, los Hong prefieren traducir *Egoitet* por *self-awareness*. Por su parte, en los *KJN* usan *ego*.

30 X 1 A 376, 1854 (JP 3, 3779; NB31:46). Aquí los Hong traducen *Egoitet* por *egoity*. Las cursivas son nuestras.

31 Ibid. Una vez puesta la diferencia con *Egoitet*, Kierkegaard fue esparciendo en su *Papirer* diversos registros de *Egoisme*. Cf. X 4 A 518, 1852 (JP 1, 1088, NB25:89), X 4 A 624, 1852 (JP 1, 538; NB26:72), XI 2 A 160, 1854 (JP 3, 2624; NB34:13), XI 1 A 226, 1854 (JP 5, 5000; NB30:49).

Egoisme and *Egoitet* in the Papers

Matías Tapia Wende and Andrés Roberto Albertsen

In one of the weekly reading and discussion meetings at the Hong Kierkegaard Library with Prof. Gordon Marino, we dealt with some of the passages in the *Papers* from 1854 where Kierkegaard talks about the relationship between state and Christianity. In opposition to the Hegelian tradition that considers the state an instrument for the moral development of the individual, Kierkegaard maintains that the state is quite simply "human egotism (*menneskelige Egoisme*) in great dimensions,"[32] in which the particular egotisms converge and "intersect each other correctively."[33] In this context, the subjectivity of the Christian, as defined by Kierkegaard, appears in the eyes of the state as a "culpable egotism (*strafværdig Egoisme*)"[34] that has to be persecuted, and in the judgement of Christendom as a "mistaken egotism (*misforstaaet Egoisme*)"[35] that nobody should imitate. This difference between what Kierkegaard seems to consider an egotism in a positive sense and an egotism in a negative sense brought us to explore the use of *Egoisme* in other entries of the *Papers*, and to discover an original terminological distinction that Kierkegaard makes between *Egoisme* and *Egoitet*.[36]

In 1834, Kierkegaard mentions *Egoisme* for the first time in the *Papers*. Referring to the self-contradiction into which the doctrine of predestination brings a human being, Kierkegaard constructs the hypothetical case of someone who believes that every action has its origin in egotism. In that case, this theory would not be arguable, because it would mean that even acts done out of "noble sacrifice"[37] would be attributable to egotism.

A passage with a little more substance, and symptomatically in a similar vein to the previous one, appears in the drafts to the *Three Upbuilding Discourses* from 1843. In the midst of several references to the Scriptures that show Christ hiding transgressions out of love, Kierkegaard adds a commentary in which he criticizes the search for any kind of reward or recognition when we do good for someone. Kierkegaard warns that "self-love is egotism unless it is also love for God—thereby love for all."[38]

Four years later, in 1847, we find the use of *Egoisme* once again. At this time, Kierkegaard is already dismissing the power gained by the numerical, and he claims that, in a period in which what counts is to have adherents and

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[32] XI 2 A 108, 1854 (JP 4, 4238; NB33:34).
[33] Ibid.
[34] X 2 A 111, 1854 (JP 4, 4501; NB33:37).
[35] Ibid.
[36] According to the Meyers Fremmedordbog, *Egoitet* is a neo-Latinism equivalent to *Jeghed* and *Selvhed*, words that refer in a broad sense to the individual subjectivity. Neither in English nor in Spanish there is a univocal way of translating *Egoitet*. We do not have translations into Spanish directly from the Danish of any of the texts where Kierkegaard uses the word *Egoitet*.
[37] I A 22, September 29, 1834 (JP 3, 3545; Papir53:2).
[38] IV B 147, 1843 (JP 3, 2399).

promote the possibility of an easy life, "I am constantly charged with being an egotist (*Egoist*)."[39] Immediately, as if he were recognizing the need to explain what this quality is about, Kierkegaard states that egotism "is making one's personal life as strenuous as possible, and not wanting to have a comfortable life."[40] In 1848, with the revolution knocking at the heart of the Danish monarchy, Kierkegaard repeats the idea of having been, with God as witness, "accused of pride and egotism,"[41] only because he aimed at privileging inwardness over external worries. What is interesting is that in August of that same year, Kierkegaard tells J. L. A. Kolderup-Rosenvinge in a letter that politics has become a vortex, and needs "a fixed point where it can stop."[42] Kierkegaard displays a remarkable command of the Danish language when he tells Kolderup-Rosenvinge that the *brake* (*Bremse*) that the political turmoil requires is a new version of the Socratic gadfly (*Bremse*), or, in other words, that what is required is the blood of a martyr who will conquer through the superiority that "consists in laying down his life."[43] Thus, in 1849 Kierkegaard says, "'the martyr' in his lifetime will be accused, hated, and cursed for egotism, vanity, misanthropy, and so on."[44]

The year 1849 is important for two reasons: first, to see how the accusation of egotism that in the beginning fell on Kierkegaard, now falls on the martyr, the one who is called to turn politics into religion;[45] and second, because Kierkegaard begins to develop a terminological distinction about the real nature of the self-absorption of the Christian subject. In an entry from the notebook NB9, Kierkegaard writes that "in relation to the good as well as to the evil, to the demonic as well as to the religious, it is a matter of being *a substantial ego* (*stor Egoist*)—that is, *a substantial egoity* (*stor Egoitet*), subjectivity."[46] By now, Kierkegaard considers that *Egoism* is synonymous with *Egoitet*, in the sense of a developed inwardness that can tend to rebellion as well as to obedience in relation to God. Without refining any difference yet between the two terms, Kierkegaard determines in 1850 that "the highest form of godliness, complete abandonment of everything earthly, can be *the highest egotism* (*høieste Egoisme*)."[47] This condition that Kierkegaard sees as a requirement from Scripture makes the relationship to others unpleasant because it "expresses that the others are not really religious in the deepest sense of the word."[48] From here to the image of the martyr, there is not a long way.

Shortly thereafter, Kierkegaard introduces a crucial nuance. In an entry from the notebook NB23 from 1851, Kierkegaard faces the reticence of human beings to accept that Christianity is "God's invention,"[49] and that it cannot be molded "egoistically"[50] (*egoistisk*) in order to fit the requirements of external convenience. This stubbornness is due to the fact that people "forget that *egotism* (*Egoisme*) is one thing and that *I-ness or subjectivity* (*Egoitet*) is another, and that although God is infinitely far from being an *egotist* (*Egoist*), He

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39 VIII 1 A 124, 1847 (JP 5, 6006; NB2:17).
40 Ibid.
41 IX A 74, 1848 (JP 6, 6170; NB5:71).
42 LD, 186 (260).
43 LD, 186 (263). The Danish word *Bremse* used by Kierkegaard means both "brake" and "gadfly." Meanwhile, Andrew Burgess observes that Kierkegaard has to suspend the considerations he makes under the name of H.H. in *Two Ethico-Religious Essays* in order to maintain the project of becoming the martyr whose blood can stop the political vortex. Cf. Burgess, Andrew. "Kierkegaard, Moravian Missions, and Martyrdom." *International Kierkegaard Commentary. Volume 18: Without Authority*, edited by Robert L. Perkins, Mercer UP, 2007, 196-198.
44 X 2 A 58, 1849 (JP 1, 387; NB12:188).
45 Cf. LD, 186 (262).
46 X 1 A 65, 1849 (JP 4, 3899; NB9:65). The italics are ours. Also the KJN translate *Egoitet* as egoity.
47 X 3 A 264, 1850 (JP 2, 1408; NB20:11). The italics are ours.
48 Ibid.
49 X 4 A 212 (JP 1, 532; NB23:205).
50 Ibid.

nevertheless is the *infinite subjectivity* (*den uendelige Egoitet*) (he cannot be otherwise)."[51] The equivalence between *Egoisme* and *Egoitet* that we saw in 1849 disappears in 1851, and now the first word comes to mean the unauthentic form of individuality, and the second, the authentic one. After this distinction is made, the word *Egoitet* appears five more times in the *Papirer*, and in all cases it keeps and enhances the allusion to the specifically Christian type of inwardness.[52]

In 1852, Kierkegaard uses *Egoitet* twice. First, to name the deep subjectivity, the "egoity," (*Egoitet*) of a God who wants to be loved "to the point of one's hating father and mother,"[53] and the "egoity" (*Egoitet*) of a true Christian who is willing to "hate the world, himself, the generation, his friends," and appear before others as an egotist.[54] Second, to highlight that in the present age, "Christianity has essentially disappeared from the world,"[55] and that in this state of affairs, we do not have "even the *self-awareness* (*Egoitet*) possessed by a friend or a girl in love, who desire that loving them shall be expressed by giving up the rest."[56]

The remaining three references to *Egoitet* are from 1854, two in the notebook NB29 and one in the notebook NB31. With a tougher tone, Kierkegaard suggests that the redoubling required by the New Testament is so radical that the only paradigm of subjectivity that human beings have left is Christ himself. In this situation, the model has become "so entirely foreign to us that we have no criterion for the *'I-ness'* (*Egoitet*)."[57] Thus, the Christ who says "Come unto me, all of you" or "I have come into the world not to judge it but to save it," is not, according to Kierkegaard, offering a free pass, but, as "*tremendous I-ness*" (*uhyre Egoitet*),[58] He is putting himself as measure for a salvation that only a few will achieve. In a spirit similar to the one of his first distinction of the terms in 1851, Kierkegaard indicates again that Christianity does not encourage the conversion of an individual into "an *enormous egotist*" (*uhyre Egoist*).[59] He seeks instead to develop his "*self-awareness* (*Egoitet*) by terrifying a man with the most terrible horror it brings him to be concerned solely for his own salvation, completely oblivious to the possible frailty and imperfection of everybody else."[60] Finally, Kierkegaard reinforces this modulation when he assumes that Christianity, "instead of being in the *divine egoity* (*guddommelige Egoitet*), is adroitly shifted into human egotism,"[61] whenever it is understood as a means that "is supposed to carry us through the world."[62]

[51] Ibid. The italics are ours. Rather than as *I-ness* and *subjectivity*, the KJN prefer to translate *Egoitet* as *ego*. We have found two preceding publications by other authors that Kierkegaard had access to in which *Egoitet* was used. The first one is the article "Om Villiesfrihed og Determinisme" ("About Freedom of the Will and Determinism"), by the German theologian J. P. Romang, published in 1838 in the 6th volume of *Tidskrift for Udenlandsk theologisk litteratur* (*Journal of Foreign Theological Literature*), journal Kierkegaard had a subscription to from 1833 to 1840. Cf. Schreiber, Gerhard, et al., editors. *The Auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard's Library*. Ashgate, 2015, U29. The second reference appears in the Danish translation of H. L. Martensen's dissertation, originally written in Latin. In the Danish translation, the Latin *egoitatis* is translated as *Egoitet.* Kierkegaard owned both versions of Martensen's dissertation. Cf. Schreiber, Gerhard, et al., editors. *The Auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard's Library*. Ashgate, 2015, 648 and 651. The English translation of the dissertation is included in Thompson, Curtis, and David Kangas, translators. *Between Hegel and Kierkegaard: Hans L. Martensen's Philosophy of Religion*. Scholars Press, 1997, 73-147. In the English version, *Egoitet* is translated as *egoity*.
[52] In his published work, Kierkegaard only used *Egoitet* in *Stages on Life's Way*, when he in "'Guilty?'/'Not Guilty?'" refers to "my personality in its egoity" ("*min Personlighed i sin Egoitet*"). SLW, 357 / SKS 6, 332.
[53] X 4 A 508, 1852 (JP 4, 4343; NB25:81). Also the KJN translate *Egoitet* as *egoity*.
[54] Ibid.
[55] X 4 A 642, 1852 (JP 3, 2439; NB26:89).
[56] Ibid. The italics are ours. KJN in this case translate *Egoitet* as *selfhood*.
[57] XI 1 A 154, 1854 (JP 3, 2906; NB29:104). The italics are ours, and the Hongs put *I-ness* between quotation marks. The KJN translate *Egoitet* as *egoity*.
[58] Ibid. The italics are ours.
[59] X 1 A 148, 1854 (JP 2, 2053; NB29:99). The italics are ours.
[60] Ibid. Here the KJN translate *Egoitet* as *ego*.
[61] X 1 A 376, 1854 (JP 3, 3779; NB31:46). The italics are ours.

When Kierkegaard at last elaborates the distinction between *Egoisme* and *Egoitet*, he finds a specific term to name what to him is egotism in a positive sense. This is the egotism of the divine, and the following of it in the world results in sacrifices, and requires us to embrace the possibility that they will accuse us of egotism in a negative sense.

[62] Ibid. Once Kierkegaard has clarified the difference with *Egoitet*, he spreads many references to *Egoisme* in his *Papers*. Cf. X 4 A 518, 1852 (JP 1, 1088, NB25:89), X 4 A 624, 1852 (JP 1, 538; NB26:72), XI 2 A 160, 1854 (JP 3, 2624; NB34:13), XI 1 A 226, 1854 (JP 5, 5000; NB30:49).

It is with a heavy heart that I report that we have lost one of the pillars of our community. Professor Robert Leroy Perkins died on March 20, 2018. As you will glean from the obituary below, Professor Perkins was the founding editor of the *Newsletter* that you are now reading. He was also the editor of the *International Kierkegaard Commentary* and the author of many articles on Kierkegaard. More important than his stellar scholarly productivity, he was a mentor to scores of Kierkegaard scholars. We will sorely miss him.

Robert Lee Perkins

Robert Lee Perkins passed away at age 87 on March 20, 2018. Son of the late John Marshall Perkins and Sara Davis Perkins of Jacksonville, Florida, Robert, better known as Bob, was born on June 23, 1930. After graduating from Stetson University in 1951, he attended the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary in Louisville, Kentucky where he was awarded a Bachelor of Divinity degree and later taught as a Visiting Professor. He also received the M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from Indiana University in Bloomington, Indiana and a Diploma from the Graduate School for Foreign Students at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark. He held professional appointments as Assistant Professor and Associate Professor at Murray State College in Murray, Kentucky; Assistant Professor at Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, Illinois; Associate Professor, Professor, and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of South Alabama in Mobile, AL; Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy, and Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Scholar at Stetson University. Dr. Perkins was an internationally known scholar in the thought of the 19th century Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard. He founded the Søren Kierkegaard Society of North America and the Kierkegaard Newsletter and was the general editor of the 24 volume International Kierkegaard Commentary, to which he contributed a number of articles in addition to many articles in other journals and books, several of which he edited. He was the recipient of many honors, grants, and distinguished scholar awards, including a Festschrift in his honor upon the completion of the IKC by Mercer University Press. Dr. Perkins is survived by his wife, Sylvia Walsh Perkins of DeLand; son Todd Severin Perkins of Mobile, AL, daughter Leslie Perkins Scalfano of Huntsville, AL; step-son Erik Zachary Utterback of Astoria, OR; granddaughter Savannah Perkins of Mobile, AL; and four grandsons, Christian Perkins of Mobile, AL; Alexander Scalfano of Dublin, NH, Jason Scalfano of Huntsville, AL and Perry Scalfano of Huntsville, AL.



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